United States v. Hamilton

487 F.Supp.3d 140

UNITED STATES of America,

v.Darin HAMILTON and Jerome Jones, Defendants.

19-CR-54 (NGG)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed September 17, 2020

Tanya Hajjar, U.S. Attorney's Office, Brooklyn, NY, for United States of America.

David Stern, Rothman, Schneider, Soloway & Stern, P.C., New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge.

Defendant Jerome Jones has been indicted for murder while engaged in narcotics trafficking and conspiracy to do the same in violation of 28 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 848(e)(1)(A) in connection with the 1992 murder of Robert Arroyo, a member of the Black Rain drug trafficking organization ("Black Rain"). (Indictment (Dkt. 51-3) at ECF pp. 22-25.) According to the Government, Mr. Jones was also a member of Black Rain and, along with co-defendant Darin Hamilton, recruited two other members to kill Mr. Arroyo because they believed he was acting as an informant. (See Gov't Mem. in Opp'n to Def. Mot. to Suppress ("Gov't Mem.") (Dkt. 54) at ECF pp. 3-4.)

Upon his arrest for unrelated drug charges on November 20, 2017 in West Virginia, Mr. Jones was interviewed by State Police Corporal L.W. Price, Detective John Roberts of the New York Police Department (NYPD) homicide bureau's cold case unit, and Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) Special Agent (SA) Gregory Kies. (Nov. 20, 2017, FD-302 ("302") (Dkt. 51-4) at ECF p. 27.) Mr. Jones now moves to suppress all statements made during the interview, or alternatively, for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether his statements were coerced, in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. (Def. Mot. to Suppress (Dkt. 51); Def. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. To Suppress ("Def. Mem.") (Dkt. 51-1) at ECF pp. 7, 16.) Separately, Mr. Jones moves for a bill of particulars, arguing that allegations in the indictment are not sufficiently specific to permit him to prepare his defense. (Id. ) For the following reasons, Defendant's motions to suppress his November 20, 2017 statements and for a bill of particulars are DENIED.¹

I. BACKGROUND

A. Arrest and Miranda Waiver

This case arises out of the 1992 murder of Mr. Arroyo. (Indictment at ECF pp. 23-24.) According to the Government, Mr. Jones and Mr. Hamilton were members of Black Rain, which sold cocaine, crack cocaine, and heroin in Queens through the 1980s and early 1990s. (Gov't Mem. at ECF pp. 3-4.) At its peak, Black Rain yielded $10,000 to $15,000 per day in drug sales. (Id. at ECF p. 3.) In August 1992, Mr. Jones and Mr. Hamilton allegedly recruited two other members of Black Rain to murder Mr. Arroyo. (Id. at ECF p. 4.) On their first attempt, the two gunmen inadvertently shot a different man, who survived the attack. (Id. ) On September 8, 1992, they shot and killed Mr. Arroyo. (Id. )²

Twenty-four years later, Mr. Jones was living in West Virginia. On June 1, 2016, state police searched his house pursuant to a warrant based on an affidavit by Cpl.

Price. (Def. Mem. at ECF p. 8.) Cpl. Price stated that a confidential informant purchased about $160 worth of crack cocaine from Mr. Jones over the course of several controlled buys. (June 1, 2016 Search Warrant (Dkt. 51-5) at ECF pp. 39-41.) Officers recovered a small quantity of crack cocaine during the search. (Id. at ECF p. 42.)

On November 20, 2017, state police executed a second search of Mr. Jones's home after an informant purchased approximately $350 worth of crack cocaine from him in another series of controlled buys. (Nov. 13, 2017 Criminal Compl. (Dkt. 51-7) at ECF p. 61; Def. Mem. at ECF p. 8; Gov't Mem. at ECF p. 5.) Mr. Jones was then arrested on drug charges.³ (Def. Mem. at ECF pp. 8-9.; Gov't Mem. at ECF p. 5.) At the scene, Cpl. Price was accompanied by SA Kies and Det. Roberts. (302 at ECF p. 27.) Cpl. Price arrested Mr. Jones, and SA Kies administered a Miranda warning orally and in writing. (Id. ) Mr. Jones responded "Yeah" to acknowledge each right as it was read to him (id. ), and subsequently signed a Miranda waiver. (Def.’s Advice of Rights ("Waiver") (Dkt. 54-1) at ECF p. 16.) Mr. Jones was transported to the State Police Department in Princeton, West Virginia, where he was interviewed for over six hours by Cpl. Price, SA Kies, and Det. Roberts. (302 at ECF. p. 27; Aff. of Def. Jerome Jones ("Jones Aff.") (Dkt. 58-1) at ECF p. 17.)

Mr. Jones claims that before he was transported to the station, he asked for permission to bring medicine that he takes to manage his diabetes, but the officers denied his request. (Jones Aff. at ECF p. 16.) Mr. Jones stated that he was supposed to take his medicine that morning, and that if he does not take it, his blood sugar can drop, causing seizures. (Id. ) As a result, he claims that he was under physical stress when he signed the Miranda waiver and during the subsequent interview at the police station. (Id. ) Mr. Jones also contends that he was denied food and water during the interview, which lasted at least six hours, and that he was permitted to go to the bathroom only once. (Id. at ECF p. 17.) The FBI's 302 tells a different story. According to SA Kies, Mr. Jones was offered food and coffee on several occasions but declined, was provided with water upon request, and was taken to the restroom on several occasions at his request. (302 at ECF p. 27.)

B. The Interview

In the 302, SA Kies recounts that over the course of the interview, Mr. Jones made several incriminating admissions relating to his own purchase of cocaine since 2010, as well as his affiliation with Black Rain, although he denied involvement with any murders. (Id. at ECF pp. 28-30.) Mr. Jones allegedly made admissions or statements regarding:

1) The dates and quantities of cocaine he had purchased since 2010;

2) The structure of the Black Rain organization;

3) His role in the organization: "I was a shooter back [in the 1980s] .... I was known to be a gunslinger, not for murders, you're not gonna take what is in my pocket";

4) The location of several drug spots that Black Rain maintained;

5) Black Rain's use of violence;

6) The murders of "Spanish Rob" (identified by the Government as Robert Arroyo) and "Juice" (identified by the Government as Anthony Lloyd); and

7) Black Rain's treatment of informants: "Back then, you paid the price for being an informant, it cost your life."

(302 at ECF pp. 27-30; Gov't Mem. at ECF p. 6 n.2.) Mr. Jones denies making the statements in the 302 and notes that he was incarcerated from 2010 to 2013, undermining the claim that he told the officers that he was regularly purchasing crack cocaine during that time. (Jones Aff. at ECF p. 17-18.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Suppress Statements

"[I]n cases involving involuntary confessions, [the Supreme Court] enforces the strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).⁴ However, a suspect may waive his Fifth Amendment rights. "An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver .... The question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case." North Carolina v. Butler , 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) (citing Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ). Once validly waived, so the admonition goes, anything the suspect says may be used against the accused in the Government's case in chief. See id. at 370, 99 S.Ct. 1755. Miranda and its progeny require the court to assess the voluntariness of any waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination. See Miranda , 384 U.S. at 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; Moran v. Burbine , 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) ("First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.").

When a defendant contests the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, the Government bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the waiver was valid. Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). If the Government fails to meet its burden, the cure is exclusion from evidence. See United States v. Anderson , 929 F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 1991). A waiver or statement is involuntary if it is obtained "under circumstances that overbear the defendant's will at the time it is given." Anderson , 929 F.2d at 99. That evaluation is made with reference to "the totality of all the surrounding circumstances, including the accused's characteristics, the conditions of interrogation, and the conduct of law enforcement officials." Id. While the mental state of the defendant is part of that analysis, involuntariness generally cannot be found "[a]bsent police conduct causally related to the confession." Connelly , 479 U.S. at 164, 107 S.Ct. 515.

"[W]here a defendant ‘supports his motion [to suppress] with moving papers that are sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that contested issues of fact ... are in question,’ " an evidentiary hearing may be appropriate. United States v. Miller , No. 18-CR-395 (NGG), 2019 WL 2088248, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2019) (quoting United States v. Barrios , 210 F.3d 355, 355 (2d Cir. 2000) ). However, "[a]rguments made solely by defense counsel in motion papers cannot by themselves create a factual issue." Id. And, "if facts urged in support of a hearing...