United States v. Hansmeier

1

United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Paul R. Hansmeier, Defendant.

Nos. 16-cr-334 (JNE) (1), 21-cv-2751 (JNE)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota

May 9, 2023

ORDER

JOAN N. ERICKSEN, United States District Judge.

A grand jury charged Defendant with one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud (count 1), five counts of mail fraud (counts 2-6), ten counts of wire fraud (counts 7-16) one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering (count 17), and one count of conspiracy to commit and suborn perjury (count 18). He moved to dismiss counts 1-17, asserting that “[t]he charging document fails to allege facts that constitute the charged criminal offenses at issue,” that the “charges are predicated upon a constitutionally- and legally-invalid theory and prosecution,” and that “the charging document fails to adequately and fairly inform the accused of the charged offenses.” The Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss. Reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss, Defendant pleaded guilty to counts 1 and 17. The Court sentenced him to 168 months' imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently, and 2 years' supervised release on each count, to run concurrently. Defendant appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. United States v Hansmeier, 988 F.3d 428 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 142 S.Ct. 262 (2021).

Within one year after the denial of his petition for a writ of certiorari, Defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255; another § 2255 motion that adds three claims (claims 13-15) to the twelve of his initial § 2255 motion; a supplement, which asserts another claim (claim 16) and a motion to amend in which he seeks to add six claims, including claims 13-16, to the twelve of his initial § 2255 motion. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants his motion to amend. Because the record conclusively shows that Defendant is not entitled to relief, the Court denies his § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing. See Thomas v. United States, 737 F.3d 1202, 1206 (8th Cir. 2013).

Defendant filed several motion after the motion to amend. The Court grants in part and denies in part his request for judicial notice. The Court denies his motion to expand the record, motion for leave to take discovery, limited motion to disqualify, motion for an evidentiary hearing, motion to alter or amend, and motion for a hearing under Rule 201(e) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

I. Motion to Amend

Defendant moved to amend his § 2255 motion to add six claims. Acknowledging that the additional claims are “timely without need to relate the claims back to his initial motion,” the United States asserted that the Court should deny the motion because Defendant “has not offered any reasons to support his motion to amend.”

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) governs requests to amend § 2255 motions before the district court enters judgment. A party may amend with the court's leave, which should be ‘freely give[n] . . . when justice so requires.'” United States v. Sellner, 773 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2014) (alterations in original) (citations omitted). In the absence of any allegations of undue delay or prejudice, the Court grants Defendant's motion to amend. See Friedman v. Farmer, 788 F.3d 862, 869 (8th Cir. 2015).^[1]

II. Section 2255 Motion

Section 2255 states:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “A motion under § 2255 is not a substitute for a direct appeal ....” Anderson v. United States, 25 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 1994). Section 2255 “provides a remedy for jurisdictional and constitutional errors.” Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “Beyond that, the permissible scope of a § 2255 collateral attack on a final conviction or sentence is severely limited; ‘an error of law does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error constituted “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.”'” Id. (quoting United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979)).

A. Claim 1

Defendant asserted that “the indictment failed to charge [him] with fraud because it failed to establish the essential element of ‘intent to harm.'” The United States asserted that the Court should reject claim 1 for three reasons: (1) “[i]t is not cognizable, absent exceptional circumstances,” because it “is an attack on the sufficiency of the Indictment, brought in a Section 2255 motion”; (2) “it was raised and lost on appeal”; and (3) it “fails on the merits.” In his reply, Defendant maintained that the claim “is cognizable because it is jurisdictional in nature”; that it is cognizable, even if it is not jurisdictional, because it asserts the indictment affirmatively shows no federal offense was committed; that he received ineffective assistance of counsel if the claim is not cognizable; that “the Eighth Circuit did not decide the issue”; and that the claim “should succeed on the merits.”

“[D]efects in an indictment do not deprive a court of its power to adjudicate a case.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). Claim 1 is not jurisdictional. See United States v. Harcevic, 999 F.3d 1172, 1179-80 (8th Cir. 2021); United States v. Fogg, 922 F.3d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 2019); United States v. Frook, 616 F.3d 773, 777-78 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Todd, 521 F.3d 891, 895 (8th Cir. 2008).

“A challenge to the sufficiency of an indictment is not cognizable in a section 2255 action without a showing of exceptional circumstances.” United States v. Shabazz, 657 F.2d 189, 190 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); see Houser v. United States, 508 F.2d 509, 514-15 (8th Cir. 1974).

No such circumstances are present. Claim 1 is not cognizable.^[2]

Finally, Defendant cannot relitigate the indictment's adequacy in his § 2255 motion. See Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 702 (“With rare exceptions, § 2255 may not be used to relitigate matters decided on direct appeal.”). In affirming the Court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss, the Eighth Circuit stated: “Because the facts in the indictment, accepted as true, describe a fraudulent scheme prohibited by federal law, [he] cannot succeed in his claim that it is facially insufficient.” Hansmeier, 988 F.3d at 43839. The Court denies Defendant's § 2255 motion insofar as it is based on claim 1.

B. Claim 2

Defendant asserted that “the indictment failed to charge [him] with fraud because it failed to establish the essential element of materiality.” Defendant acknowledged that the Eighth Circuit rejected this argument in his direct appeal. The United States argued that claim 2 should be rejected because “[i]t is a noncognizable attack on the sufficiency of the Indictment,” “it is an attempt to relitigate issues decided against [him] by the Eighth Circuit,” and “it is conclusively contradicted and belied by the factual stipulations in [his] plea agreement” and his “testimony under oath at his plea hearing.” In his reply, Defendant argued that claim 2 is jurisdictional; that it is cognizable, even if it is not jurisdictional, because it asserts the indictment affirmatively shows no federal offense was committed; that he received ineffective assistance of counsel if the claim is not cognizable; that the law of the case doctrine does not apply because the Eighth Circuit relied on “knowing material misstatements of law and fact” by the United States; and that the United States conceded the claim on the merits.

For reasons similar to those set forth above, the Court rejects claim 2. The claim is not jurisdictional. See, e.g., Harcevic, 999 F.3d at 1179-80; Fogg, 922 F.3d at 391. No exceptional circumstances are present. Claim 2 is not cognizable. Shabazz, 657 F.2d at 190; see Houser, 508 F.2d at 514-15. The Eighth Circuit rejected the claim. Hansmeier, 988 F.3d at 437 (“The information they misrepresented was also material.”). Defendant cannot relitigate it in his § 2255 motion. Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 702. His conditional assertion that he received ineffective assistance of counsel has no merit. The Court denies Defendant's § 2255 motion insofar as it is based on claim 2.

C. Claim 3

Defendant maintained that “the indictment failed to charge [him] with fraud because it failed to establish that the object of [his] alleged scheme to defraud was money or property in the hands of the victim.” He claimed that he raised the issue before this Court and on appeal and that “it has gone unaddressed.” The United States responded that claim 3 “is not cognizable for the same reasons claims 1 and 2 are not cognizable.” In his reply, Defendant asserted that claim 3 is jurisdictional; that it is cognizable, even if it is not jurisdictional, because it asserts the indictment affirmatively shows no federal offense was committed; that he received ineffective assistance of counsel if the claim is not cognizable; that the law of the case doctrine does not apply to the claim; and that the claim should succeed on the merits.

For reasons similar to those set forth above, the Court rejects claim 3. The claim is not jurisdictional. See, e.g. Harcevic, 999 F.3d at 1179-80; Fogg, 922 F.3d at 391. No exceptional circumstances are present. Claim 3 is not cognizable. Shabazz, 657 F.2d at 190; see Houser, 508...