United States v. Harding

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.CHARLES JAMES HARDING

Civil Action No. 7:13cr00008

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ROANOKE DIVISION

Entered: May 1, 2013

By: Michael F. Urbanski

United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendant Charles James Harding is charged in a one-count indictment with failure to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA") in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250. At a status conference held on March 29, 2013, Harding orally moved to dismiss the indictment on various jurisdictional and constitutional grounds. Because Harding's arguments find no support in law and have been soundly rejected by other courts to have considered them, Harding's motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 21) is DENIED.

I.

The indictment handed down on January 24, 2013 charges that from on or about October 14, 2012 to on or about November 30, 2012 in the Western District of Virginia and elsewhere, Harding, being a person required to register under SORNA and having traveled in interstate and foreign commerce, did knowingly fail to update his registration as required by SORNA, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250. Following his arrest, Harding appeared before the court on February 5, 2013 for an initial appearance, identity hearing¹ and detention hearing, at which he stated that he did not want an attorney paid by the federal government to represent him. The magistrate judge appointed assistant federal public defender Randy Cargill as an advisor to Harding for purposes of the hearing and gave Harding an opportunity to retain other counsel.The magistrate judge determined there was probable cause to find Harding was the person named in the indictment and remanded him to custody pending trial, finding him both a risk of flight and a danger to the community. On February 13, 2013, after Harding indicated that he was not able to retain other counsel, Cargill was appointed to represent Harding. Harding entered a plea of not guilty and his trial was scheduled for April 15, 2013.

The parties appeared before the court for a status conference on March 29, 2013. At that time, Cargill explained that Harding wanted Cargill to raise certain legal arguments at trial that Cargill believed he could not raise in good faith, given his ethical obligations to the court. The court invited Harding to address the court directly and raise any issues of law he would like the court to consider. Harding did so, raising the various jurisdictional and constitutional arguments addressed herein, which the court indicated would be considered and ruled upon in written form. At the conclusion of the March 29th status conference, Harding clearly and unequivocally stated that he wanted Cargill to continue to represent him.

Harding subsequently entered a plea of guilty on April 8, 2013, conditioned upon his right to appeal the instant ruling.

II.

Harding argues that the federal government and the court lack jurisdiction over him because (1) the Organic Act of 1871 created a United States corporation which does not have jurisdiction over him as a citizen; (2) the CHARLES JAMES HARDING named in the indictment in all capital letters is not a natural, living person; (3) there is no corpus delicti; and (4) this is a court of admiralty. Harding's arguments are akin to those advanced by proponents of the sovereign citizen movement who "believe they are not subject to federal or state statutes or proceedings, reject most forms of taxation as illegitimate, and place special significance in commercial law." United States v. Brown, 669 F.3d 10, 19 n.12 (1st Cir.) (citing Wikipedia,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_citizen_movement (last visited Jan. 13, 2012)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2448 (2012). Similar arguments raised by defendants in other cases consistently have been rejected as erroneous as a matter of law. United States v. Delatorre, No. 03 CR 90, 2008 WL 312647, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2008); see Quigley v. Geithner, No. 1:09-CV-293-REB, 2010 WL 3613901, at *1 (D. Idaho Sept. 8, 2010) ("The [sovereign citizen] legal theory (in all of its various forms) has been struck down consistently by the courts."); see also United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992) (defendant's arguments, e.g., that he is a citizen of the "Republic of Idaho" and that the government in prosecuting him was acting on behalf of an agency controlled by a foreign entity, were "completely without merit, patently frivolous, and will be rejected without expending any more of this Court's resources on their discussion"); United States v. Sloan, 939 F.2d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Mr. Sloan's proposition that he is not subject to the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States is simply wrong."). Because they are contrary to established law, Harding's arguments will likewise be rejected.

A.

Harding first argues that the "United States" is a municipal corporation consisting merely of the District of Columbia and the United States territories, citing the Organic Act of 1871. The Organic Act of 1871 "created a government by the name of the District of Columbia, constituted it 'a body corporate for municipal purposes' with all of the powers of a municipal corporation 'not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the provisions of this act,' and gave it jurisdiction over all the territory within the limits of the District." District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 104 (1953). The act provided "that 'the legislative power of the District shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation within said District, consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of his act.'" Id. at 104-05.

Harding does not explain, and the court cannot discern, how the Organic Act of 1871 in any way affects the court's jurisdiction over this matter. The district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, exclusive of state courts, over all offenses committed against the laws of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 3231. "[T]he laws of the federal government apply to United States citizens throughout the nation, not just in the District of Columbia or federal enclaves." Delatorre, 2008 WL 312647, at *2. The court's Article III jurisdiction over this case stems from the indictment handed down by a properly assembled grand jury, charging Harding with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250. The court "is obligated to follow the extensive line of United States Supreme Court precedent—and that of every federal court in this nation—asserting jurisdiction over criminal defendants and actions occurring not just in the District of Columbia and certain federal territories, but in every [state] in this country." Id. Harding's argument that is he outside the jurisdiction of the United States is unavailing.

B.

Harding's second jurisdictional argument revolves around the way his name is written in the indictment. Harding takes issue with the use of all capital letters, which he argues denotes a corporate entity, not a living person.² Harding does not appear to claim that he is not the personnamed in the indictment.³ Rather, Harding's argument concerns the court's jurisdiction over his natural person.

At the March 29th status conference, Harding referred to the term "capitis deminutio maxima." The term "capitis deminutio" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "[a] diminution or abridgement of a person's legal status." Black's Law Dictionary 202-03 (7th ed. 1999). Black's Law Dictionary goes on to quote from Rudolph Sohm, The Institutes: A Textbook of the History and System of Roman Private Law 178-79 (James Crawford Ledlie trans., 3d ed. 1907)), as follows:

Capitis deminutio is the destruction of the 'caput' or legal personality. Capitis deminutio, so to speak, wipes out the former individual and puts a new one in his place, and between the old and the new individual there is, legally speaking, nothing in common. A juristic personality may be thus destroyed in one of three ways: (1) by loss of the status liberates. This is the capitis deminutio maxima; (2) by loss of the status civitatis. This is the capitis deminutio media (magna); (3) by severance from the agnatic family. This entails capitis deminutio minima.

Black's Law Dictionary 203 (7th ed. 1999). Relying on this definition, Harding argues that the capitalization of his name in the indictment results in a comprehensive loss of his status as a natural person, reducing him to nothing more than a slave. Interestingly, however, nothing in this definition refers to the use of capital letters. The court is again at a loss as to how the term "capitis deminutio maxima," or the use of capital letters in the indictment, in any way affects the court's jurisdiction over this matter.

Courts have held that "the use of capital letters in the caption of an indictment is irrelevant to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction." United States v. Mitchell, 405 F. Supp. 2d 602, 604 (D. Md. 2005V see also United States v. Montgomery, No. 10-00187-01-CR-W-ODS, 2011 WL 976555, at *6 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 22, 2011) (rejecting argument that use of capital lettersin indictment refers to a corporation not a living person), adopted by 2011 WL 941336 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2011); United States v. Singleton, No. 03 CR 175, 2004 WL 1102322, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2004) ("[I]t makes no sense to rest a jurisdictional distinction upon the use of all upper case letters or a mixture of upper and lower case letters. The federal courts abandoned this level of formalism long ago."). The government and the court have properly addressed Harding both in court and on paper in a manner that clearly identifies him. Therefore, this jurisdictional argument also fails.

C.

Harding argues the court lacks jurisdiction over this case because there is no corpus delicti, as no person has been injured by his conduct. Corpus delicti literally means "body of the crime." Black's Law Dictionary defines the term...