United States v. Hargraves

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. TORANIO HARGRAVES, Defendant.

CRIMINAL ACTION No. 22-91-GBW

United States District Court, D. Delaware

July 29, 2024

David C. Weiss, Jennifer K. Welsh, U.S. ATTORNEY OFFICE Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Plaintiff

Eleni Kousoulis, David L. Pugh, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GREGORY B. WILLIAMS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Presently before the Court is Defendant Toranio Hargraves' (“Hargraves” or “Defendant”) Motion to Suppress Evidence (D.I. 29). The Government opposes Defendant's Motion. D.I. 33. The Court held an evidentiary hearing and heard oral argument on May 23, 2024 (“Tr.”). For the reasons set forth below Defendant's Motion is DENIED in all respects.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 7, 2021, Sergeant Sean Nolan (“Nolan”) of the Wilmington Police Department (“WPD”) and his State of Delaware Probation and Parole colleague, Officer Joseph Scioli (“Scioli”), witnessed a Nissan Rogue with Maryland tags conduct an illegal left turn on a right lane in Wilmington, Delaware. Tr. 10:23-11:14. The officers subsequently pulled the Nissan over for making the illegal left turn. Tr. 12:7-12. Three (3) law enforcement vehicles responded to the scene, with approximately seven (7) officers present. Tr. 40:18-23.

When Nolan and Scioli approached the vehicle, the officers witnessed Hargraves in the driver's seat with two other passengers. Tr. 20:6-25. Nolan asked Hargraves for his license, and Hargraves responded that he did not have his license on him. Tr. 21:5-11. Hargraves instead provided the officers with a state-issued identification card. Tr. 21:12-13. Nolan asked Hargraves to roll down his rear driver's side window, and Hargraves claimed that the window was broken. Tr. 21:23- 22:3; Ex. B at 1:40-l:48. Nolan then indicated that he would open the rear driver's side door to see who else was in the vehicle. Tr. 21:23-22:3. Nolan claims he opened the rear driver's side door to ensure officer safety. Tr. 22:1-3. Nolan testified that, when he opened the rear driver's side door, he did not move away from the front driver's side door. Ex. B at 1:47. By this time, the car's three other windows were partially rolled down. Ex. B at 1:48.

Approximately thirty (30) seconds later, and while he was standing near the front driver's side door, Nolan indicated to Scioli that he smelled marijuana. Tr. 2:13-25; Ex. B at 2:16. Around the same time, another officer ran Hargraves' identifiers through Delaware's criminal justice information system, DELJIS, and found that his license was suspended. Tr. 24:19-25:15. The officer also found that Hargraves was wanted. Id. Nolan then asked Hargraves to step out of the car and patted him down. Ex. B at 3:25-3:50. 'During the pat down, Nolan asked Hargraves' whether he had “any weed in the car,” to which Hargraves responded “just like a little bit” before retracting his statement. Tr. 27:24-28:2; Ex. B at 3:54-4:12. The other occupants were removed from the vehicle and officers commenced a search. Tr. 28:16-28:22. Nolan asked Hargraves where the marijuana was, and Hargraves stated that they had smoked it already. Ex. B at 4:11, 4:52. However, the officer on the passenger side of the car, Scioli, found a gun, and Nolan found marijuana in the car. Tr. 29:4-12,31:6-12 Ex. B at 5:30. The car's occupants were then handcuffed and taken into custody. Tr. 29:13-20; Ex. B at 5:40.

At the police station, Detective Gaetan MacNamara and Probation and Parole Officer Tiffani Hughes attempted to interview Hargraves, at which time MacNamara read Hargraves his Miranda rights. Tr. 16:4-17:17, 58:5-62:3, 60:5-8. Hargraves indicated that he did not want to speak. Tr. 61:23-25. MacNamara asked Hargraves whether Hargraves would consent to a DNA swab. Tr. 62:9-64:3. In response, Hargraves asked, “you need my DNA for what?” and MacNamara informed Hargraves that a gun was found in the car. Tr. 63:5-8. MacNamara stated that, if Hargraves did not consent to a DNA search, then the police would “type a search warrant and we'll do it that way ... doesn't matter to me.” Ex. C at 2:55. Hargraves responded, “don't matter” and, after inquiring how to do the swab, Hargraves performed the swab and handed it back. Tr. 65:21-67:16. Of the two other passengers arrested alongside Hargraves, one consented to a DNA swab and one declined; the officers sought and obtained a warrant for a DNA search from the non-consenting passenger. Tr. 69:1-17, Ex. E.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Officers had Reasonable Suspicion to Conduct the Traffic Stop.

In support of his Motion to Suppress, Hargraves contends that the officers effected an unlawful traffic stop of the vehicle because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. D.I. 29 at 5-6. Reasonable suspicion is not a high bar. D.I. 29 at 5; Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (“Although a mere ‘hunch' does not create reasonable suspicion, ... the level of suspicion the standard requires is ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,' and ‘obviously less' than is necessary for probable cause . . ..”) (internal citations omitted). In the context of a traffic stop, officers may satisfy this standard by providing “the ‘specific, articulable facts' to justify a reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual has violated the traffic laws.” United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392,397 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). In reviewing whether the facts presented by the officers warranted the stop, the Court must “weigh ‘the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture.'” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Nolan testified that he observed Hargraves make a left-hand turn from the far-right lane. Tr. 11:2-14:2. There was no contrary testimony. Tr. 128:2. Hargraves' counsel conceded at the evidentiary hearing that “I am not alleging . . . that it was an illegal stop, merely [pretextual] because the real intent is to search the vehicle. Now, I understand that case law allows that even if the intent is beyond what the stop is for that that can still be a legal stop . . . .” Tr. 128:5-10. Indeed, pretextual stops do not violate the Fourth Amendment. See generally Whren v. U.S, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). Thus, the intent of the officers is irrelevant to the Court's analysis of the traffic stop, and the Court finds that Hargraves' illegal left turn provided officers with sufficient reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial stop.

B. The Officers' Roadside Questioning of Hargraves was Non-Custodial.

Defendant contends that Hargraves was in police custody when Nolan asked Hargraves if there was marijuana in the vehicle. D.I. 55 at 1-2. The Court disagrees. Parties detained pursuant to ordinary traffic stops are not in custody for the purposes of Miranda. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-40 (1984). During a lawful traffic stop, an officer may order the driver and any passengers out of the vehicle without any particularized suspicion. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997). An officer may commence a traffic stop for “tinted front car windows,” “smell the odor of ‘freshly burned marijuana,”' ask a suspect “if he had been smoking marijuana in the vehicle,” and then ask “if there was any marijuana in the vehicle” without transforming a traffic stop into custodial interrogation. See United States v. Caraballo, 643 Fed.Appx. 163, 166, 168 (3d Cir. 2016). As was the case in Berkemer, the traffic stop was relatively brief and public, which together “mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced ‘to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.'” 468 U.S. at 437.

Defendant next contends that this traffic stop was not ordinary because of (1) the presence of multiple officers and (2) Nolan's statements that there was a warrant for Hargraves and that Hargraves lacked a driver's license.^[1] In determining whether a routine traffic stop becomes custodial, the Court must decide “how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood the situation.” Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 422. The Third Circuit precedent requires courts to weigh the following five (5) factors in determining if an interrogation is custodial:

(1) whether the officers told the suspect he was under arrest or free to leave; (2) the location or physical surroundings of the interrogation; (3) the length of the interrogation; (4) whether the officers used coercive tactics such as hostile tones of voice, the display of weapons, or physical restraint of the suspect's movement; and (5) whether the suspect voluntarily submitted to questioning.

United States v. Willaman, 437 F.3d 354,359-360 (3d Cir. 2006). The number of officers may go to “coercive tactics,” but the lack of other coercive tactics mitigates the impact of that factor. See United States v McMillan, 227 F.Supp.3d 432,438 n.3 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (“Defendant makes much of the fact that there were multiple officers on the scene ... [h]owever, Defendant does not cite to any Third Circuit law that ties the relevance of such facts to the Court's analysis here. Additionally, the Court notes that leading Third Circuit opinions do not mention the number of officers present . . . .”).^[2] With respect to Nolan's statement that there was a warrant out for Hargraves' arrest, this statement must be balanced with Nolan's statements that the officers were “not even necessarily going to take” Hargraves and that Hargraves would “most likely be back in the car.” Ex. B at 3:28-3:38. The remainder of the factors weigh against a finding that Hargraves' questioning was a custodial interrogation: the interrogation took place in public, was brief, and appears to have been voluntary. In...