United States v. Hargrove

30 F.4th 189

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.Terrell Anthony HARGROVE, a/k/a Rell, Defendant - Appellant.

United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.Terrell Anthony Hargrove, a/k/a Rell, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 20-7709

No. 20-7726

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: December 9, 2021

Decided: March 29, 2022

ARGUED: Joseph Stephen Camden, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Jacqueline Romy Bechara, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Raj Parekh, Acting United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, Joseph Attias, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Gregory and Judge Quattlebaum joined.

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

On July 7, 2020, Terrell Hargrove, a 36-year-old inmate at Federal Medical Center Devens in Massachusetts, filed a motion for compassionate release from prison, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), alleging in support of it:

– that FMC Devens had "just recently reported positive COVID-19 test results";

– that he has asthma, high blood pressure, and obstructive sleep apnea, making it "reasonably probable" that he will suffer "severe complications" if he were to contract COVID-19; and

– that he has a "clean disciplinary record," has "participated in extensive programming," and has a "concrete release plan."

Hargrove was serving a 103-month sentence of imprisonment, which consisted of a 46-month component imposed for a drug-trafficking conviction and a 57-month component imposed for his violation of the conditions of his supervised release, which had been imposed in connection with an earlier drug-trafficking conviction.

The district court denied Hargrove's motion, finding principally (1) that because his medical conditions only "might increase Hargrove's risk" of experiencing serious illness from COVID-19, he failed to establish an "extraordinary and compelling reason" for release; and (2) that the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) did not, in any event, support his release.

Hargrove contends on appeal that the district court erred by (1) applying a "bright-line rule" that if a medical condition was not included in the CDC's highest risk category^* with respect to COVID-19, it could never qualify as an "extraordinary and compelling reason" for release; (2) considering § 3553(a) factors that may not be applied when imposing a revocation sentence; and (3) failing to address Hargrove's rehabilitation efforts and explain why the court gave them no weight in applying the § 3553(a) factors.

While we agree with Hargrove that application of a bright-line rule based on CDC risk categories would be overly restrictive, we conclude that the district court did not apply such a rule and otherwise did not abuse its discretion in denying Hargrove's motion. Accordingly, we affirm.

I

Hargrove's 103-month sentence was imposed on May 25, 2018, and 25 months later, he filed this motion for compassionate release on the ground that COVID-19 had just arrived at FMC Devens, where he was serving his sentence. While his motion was pending, he was transferred to USP Yazoo City in Mississippi, which, he alleged, was also "in the midst of an ongoing [COVID-19] outbreak." He claimed that, based on his medical conditions, it was "reasonably probable" that he would suffer "severe complications" should he contract COVID-19, which, he maintained, was likely given its presence in each facility.

The medical records attached to Hargrove's motion showed that he had been diagnosed with asthma and obstructive sleep apnea, which were currently well controlled with an inhaler and a continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) machine, respectively. The records further indicated that while some of Hargrove's blood pressure readings had been high, he had not been diagnosed with hypertension.

In addition to arguing that his risk of becoming seriously ill from COVID-19 established an "extraordinary and compelling" reason warranting his immediate release, Hargrove also claimed in his motion that the § 3553(a) factors favored such relief. He asserted that he did not have "a single disciplinary violation during his current term" of imprisonment; that he had "participated in extensive programming," completing numerous classes as well as a non-residential drug treatment program; and that he had both "a concrete release plan" and "family support." His wife also submitted two letters to the court describing the Hargrove family's fear for his safety and relating that she herself had health problems that had required her to undergo "major surgery every year since 2014" and would require another surgery in the next few months.

While Hargrove briefly addressed his prior criminal behavior, providing some explanation for his conduct, his response to his criminal history was mainly a promise that if he were released, he would "not go back to the streets." His criminal history, however, is long and continuous, beginning when he was 12 years old. The operative conduct for this case began in the fall of 2005 when he was arrested for trafficking in cocaine base and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. In July 2006, after he was convicted based on his guilty plea, the district court imposed a sentence of 144 months' imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. Subsequent to his sentencing, however, the court twice granted Hargrove's motions for a reduction of his sentence, ultimately reducing it to the mandatory minimum of 120 months' imprisonment.

In July 2015, Hargrove was released from prison and began his 5-year term of supervised release. Less than six months later, however, he was found to have violated the conditions of his release by committing two domestic violence assault offenses. For those violations, the court sentenced him to 12 months' imprisonment to be followed by 4 years of supervised release. Hargrove began serving that new term of supervised release in November 2016.

Less than a year later, however, starting in September 2017, Hargrove repeatedly trafficked in heroin, leading to his arrest in December 2017. He subsequently pleaded guilty to distributing heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). At the sentencing hearing on May 25, 2018, the court imposed a sentence of 46 months' imprisonment — a sentence at the top of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. The court also found that by trafficking heroin, Hargrove had again violated the conditions of his supervised release and imposed an additional sentence of 57 months' imprisonment, also at the top of the advisory sentencing range for the supervised release violation. The court required that the sentences be served consecutively, for a total sentence of 103 months' imprisonment.

When imposing those sentences, the court recognized that Hargrove had made some attempts to change his life since his release from federal prison. For instance, he had been "steadily employed" and had been supporting his family. The court also recognized the support that Hargrove had received from friends and family members, who had written letters on his behalf and attended the hearing. But the court explained that Hargrove's case was also "troubling" and "unusual" because Hargrove "was already on supervised release" following a lengthy term of imprisonment for participating in a drug-trafficking conspiracy when he went "back to doing this kind of conduct" and sold "hundreds of doses" of heroin.

Hargrove appealed the 57-month revocation sentence, contending that the district court relied on impermissible factors when imposing that portion of his sentence, in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). We rejected the argument and affirmed. See United States v. Hargrove , 746 F. App'x 226, 227–28 (4th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).

After serving about 31 months of his 103-month sentence, Hargrove filed the same motion for compassionate release in both of his criminal cases.

The government opposed Hargrove's motion. While it recognized the spread of COVID-19, it asserted that in response the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") was "actively working on the critical problem of containing the spread of the coronavirus within prisons" by, "among other steps, limit[ing] access to prisons, restrict[ing] prisoner movements within prisons, us[ing] screening and testing, s[eeking] to educate inmates and staff on preventing the spread of disease, provid[ing] masks and hand cleaners, separat[ing] ill inmates, and — in appropriate cases — releas[ing] inmates for home confinement." The government also maintained that Hargrove's medical conditions did not establish "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warranting his release. Finally, it argued that the § 3553(a) factors "counsel[ed] against release, at this time," maintaining that releasing Hargrove, after he had "served less than a third of his sentence," would "ignore[ ] the risk of recidivism and the risk he poses to the community."

By a memorandum order dated November 2, 2020, the district court denied Hargrove's motion. It concluded that, based on CDC guidance, Hargrove's medical conditions "might place him at greater risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19" and held that "medical conditions that might increase Hargrove's risk do not establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for immediate release." The court also held that "[g]ranting Hargrove's motions would serve none of the[ ] goals" set forth in § 3553(a)(2), the most relevant of which, the court stated, were the requirements that sentences " ‘reflect the seriousness of the offense,’ ‘promote respect for the law,’ ‘afford adequate deterrence,’ and ...