United States v. Heatley

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. CLARENCE HEATLEY, Defendant.

Nos. 96-CR-515 (LAP), 15-CV-9534 (LAP)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

October 8, 2024

OPINION AND ORDER

LORETTA A. PRESKA, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Before the Court is Defendant Clarence Heatley's pro se motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, dated May 19, 2020, (see dkt. no. 662 [the "Motion"]), as well as his pro se motion to supplement, (see dkt. no. 668) -^[1] For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Defendant's motions.

I. Background

On July 15, 1999, Clarence Heatley and his co-defendants were charged with their involvement in a racketeering enterprise known as the "Preacher Crew," which operated principally in the Bronx during the 1990s. (See dkt. no. 1.) On December 17, 1997, a grand jury returned a Superseding Indictment, charging Heatley and his co-defendants with engaging in numerous acts of racketeering, including "murder, assault, robbery, extortion, other acts of violence, and narcotics trafficking." (See Sil Superseding Indictment, dated Dec. 17, 1997 [dkt. no. 193] ["Indictment"], ¶¶ 1-5; dkt. no. 746-1 ¶¶ 1-5.)

a. The Plea Agreement

On February 5, 1999, Heatley pleaded guilty to several of the charges in the Indictment pursuant to a plea agreement. (See dkt. no. 692-1.) The plea agreement stated that the Government accepted a guilty plea from Heatley on the following Counts:

• One count of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Count 1);

• One count of racketeering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count 2);

• Twelve counts of conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5) (Counts 3, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14, 17, 22, 24, 28, 31, and 36);

• Thirteen counts of murder and aiding and abetting murder in aid of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(1) and 2 (Counts 4, 6, 9, 11, 13, 16, 18, 19, 23, 25, 29, 30, and 37);

• One count of attempted murder and aiding and abetting attempted murder in aid of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(1) and 2 (Count 15);

• One count of assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3) (Count 7);

• Five counts of Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Counts 40-44};

• Eleven counts of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(a), (b), (c), and (e) (1) (A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Counts 46-56); • Ten counts of use of a firearm in furtherance of murders and conspiracies to commit murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2 (Counts 66, 67, 69-71, 73, 75, 76, 78, and 81);

• One count of use of a firearm in furtherance of attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2 (Count 72); and

• One count of use of a firearm in furtherance of assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2 (Count 68).

See id. at 1-5. Counts 66 through 73, 75, 76, 78, and 81 (the "§ 924(c) counts" or the "§ 924(c) convictions") charged Heatley with the use and carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. (See Indictment ¶¶ 133-40, 142-43, 145, 148.)

In consideration of Heatley's plea to the above offenses, the Government agreed not to prosecute Heatley further for his participation in the Preacher Crew, to dismiss any open counts against Heatley in the Indictment, and to withdraw its Notice and Amended Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty as to Heatley. (Dkt no. 692-1 at 6.)

b. Sentencing

On June 4, 1999, the Court sentenced Heatley to life imprisonment plus 225 years. (Dkt. no. 692-2 at 20:8-12; dkt. no. 461.) The Court delineated the break-down of the aggregate sentence as: (a) concurrent life terms of imprisonment on each of Counts 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, 13, 16, 18, 19, 23, 25, 29, 30, 37, and 46-56; (b) ten years imprisonment on each of Counts 3, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 22, 24, 28, 31, and 36, to run concurrently with Heatley's life sentences; (c) twenty years imprisonment on each of Counts 7 and 40-44, to run concurrently with Heatley's other sentences; (d) five years imprisonment on Count 66, to run consecutive to Heatley's other sentences; and (e) twenty years on each of Counts 67-73, 75, 76, 78, and 81, to run consecutive to Heatley's other sentences. (Dkt. no. 692-2 at 20:8-12; dkt. no. 461 at Rider B.)

c. Post-Sentencing Proceedings

On May 30, 2000, Heatley filed his first motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, (see Heatley v. United States, OO-cv-4313, dkt. no. 8), in which Heatley argued that the Indictment to which he entered his guilty plea was deficient, that his plea and conviction violated due process, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. See Heatley v. United States, 2002 WL 1836753, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2002). The Court denied Heatley's motion on August 12, 2002. See id. at *6. Heatley appealed on August 27, 2002, which appeal the Court of Appeals dismissed on October 15, 2022. (See dkt. nos. 550, 558.)

Heatley then filed a motion to reinstate his right to direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in September 2015, (see dkt. no. 604), and filed a second motion for leave to file a successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in December 2015, (see dkt. no. 605.) The Court of Appeals denied Heatley's motions on May 26, 2016. (See dkt. no. 611.) In December 2015, Heatley also filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (b) to set aside the Court's 2002 order denying his 2000 motion made pursuant to § 2255. (See dkt. no. 608 [the "Motion for Reconsideration"].) On May 1, 2018, the Court denied Heatley's Motion for Reconsideration. (See dkt. no. 628.) On December 9, 2019, Heatley moved for a reduction in sentence pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018, (see dkt. no. 654), which the Court denied on June 10, 2021, (see dkt. no. 721).

d. Petitioner's Section 2255 Motion

On June 11, 2020, Heatley filed his pro se Motion, pursuant to § 2255, to vacate his § 924(c) convictions. (See Motion, dkt. no. 662.) On August 26, 2020, the Court of Appeals granted Heatley leave to file his Motion. (See dkt. no. 671.) The Government filed its initial memorandum of law in opposition to Heatley's Motion on December 1, 2020. (See dkt. no. 692 ["Gov't Br."].) After the Court appointed counsel to represent Heatley with respect to his Motion, counsel for Heatley filed a supplemental brief in support of Heatley's Motion on December 16, 2021. (See Heatley v. United States, 15-cv-9534, dkt. no. 35 ["Def. Br."].) The Government filed its memorandum of law in opposition to Heatley's counseled brief on January 24, 2022. (See dkt. no. 733.)

II. Applicable Legal Standards a. Motion to Vacate

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner "may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence" on the grounds, inter alia, that the "sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States ... or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) . Relief under § 2255 is only available "for a constitutional error, a lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or an error of law or fact that constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." United States v. Bokun, 73 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1995} (internal quotations omitted).

Section 2255(f)(3) also requires that a motion be filed within one year of "the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3).

b. Procedural Default

Under the procedural default doctrine, a guilty plea may not be collaterally attacked unless first challenged on direct review; if a defendant fails to do so, the § 2255 claim is considered procedurally defaulted. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) . The purpose of this doctrine is to promote the "important interest in the finality of judgments." Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003).

A defendant may overcome such a procedural default by demonstrating either (1) "'cause' and actual 'prejudice,'" or (2) actual innocence. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 615 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489, 496 (1986)). A court may find "cause" where a claim "is so novel that its legal basis [was] not reasonably available to counsel" at the time of direct review. Id. (quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984)) . That scenario can occur when the Supreme Court overturns "a longstanding and widespread practice to which th[e] Court ha[d] not spoken, but which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority ha[d] expressly approved." See Reed, 468 U.S. at 17 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 551 (1982)).

Actual prejudice means that the error alleged in the § 2255 motion "worked to [a defendant's] actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Murray 477 U.S. at 494 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)). A mere "possibility of prejudice" is insufficient. Frady, 456 U.S. at 170. When challenging a guilty plea, a defendant must show that the error was a "fundamental defect which inherently result[ed] in a complete miscarriage of justice or an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure." Williams v. United States, 2017 WL 532469, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2017) (internal quotation omitted). Where a § 924(c) conviction is based upon a guilty plea, prejudice has been defined to require a defendant to "show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have pleaded guilty." United States v. Dussard, 967 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 2020) (reviewing the validity...