United States v. Heffington

476 F.Supp.3d 1042

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Ray Martin HEFFINGTON, Defendant.

No. 1:93-cr-05021-NONE

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed August 3, 2020

Filed August 4, 2020

William Sze Wong, William Sze Wong Attorney at Law, Meadow Vista, CA, Jason Hitt, United States Attorney's Office, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiff.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

Dale A. Drozd, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the court is defendant Ray Martin Heffington's motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The motion is largely based on defendant's medical condition and the risks posed to him by the ongoing coronavirus ("COVID-19") outbreak. (Doc. No. 309.) For the reasons explained below, defendant's motion will be granted.

BACKGROUND

On January 21, 1993, defendant Heffington and his two co-defendants were indicted in this action and charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 841(a)(1) and possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine and aiding and abetting the same in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (Doc. No. 20.)¹ In May of 1993 the case proceeded to jury trial where the evidence indicated that defendant Heffington had hired defendant Neil Stevens, agreeing to pay him $2,000 plus expenses, to drive a box wrapped like a Christmas present containing approximately five pounds of methamphetamine from Chowchilla to Iowa where he would meet the buyer, collect $50,000 and return.² The plot apparently unraveled when defendant Stevens became concerned that he was being followed as he passed through Wyoming and threw the box containing the methamphetamine out the window, where it was later discovered by a truck driver and turned over to law enforcement. At trial, Heffington and co-defendant Stephen Kosinski were convicted on both counts. (Doc. Nos. 88–89.) Prior to trial and pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, the government had filed a notice of information to establish that defendant Huffington had suffered two prior drug felony convictions. (Doc. No. 47.)³ Following his conviction, it was determined that under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines defendant Heffington's adjusted offense level was 38 and his criminal history category was III, resulting in guideline range calling for a sentence of between 292 to 365 months imprisonment. (Presentence Report at 13.) The court found that the defendant had accepted responsibility reducing his adjusted offense level to 36. However, as a result of the notice of his prior drug convictions being filed, by statute at the time "[t]he increased punishment require[d] a minimum sentence of life imprisonment with no release" pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (1992) (Id. ) Accordingly, defendant Heffington was sentenced to two concurrent life terms of imprisonment on August 2, 1993. (Doc. No. 126.)

Thereafter, Heffington's judgment of conviction and sentence was affirmed on appeal. See United States v. Heffington , 52 F.3d 335 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished). In 1996, 2001, 2007 and 2009 petitioner brought motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and, in some instances, Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, challenging his conviction and sentence; all of which were denied by the original sentencing judge. See United States v. Heffington, CR-F-93-5021, 2016 WL 1626992, at *2–3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2016) (reviewing procedural history of defendant's prior § 2255 motions); see also Heffington v. United States, CR-F-93-5021, 2009 WL 2043012 (E.D. Cal. July 13, 2009) ; Heffington v. United States , CR-F-93-5021, 2008 WL 2055417 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2008). Appeals from those denials were also unsuccessful. Finally, in 2016, defendant Heffington once again sought relief pursuant to § 2255 and moved for a reduction of his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582 in light of Sentencing Guideline Amendment 782. Heffington , 2016 WL 1626992. The then-assigned district judge denied this latter motion on the ground that the subsequent reclassification of defendant's prior convictions to misdemeanor offenses did not entitle him to relief from his life sentence under binding Ninth Circuit precedent and because defendant had been sentenced to a statutory minimum mandatory term of imprisonment unaffected by changes in the sentencing guidelines. ( Id. at *6.) The Ninth Circuit affirmed that order. United States v. Heffington, 780 Fed. Appx. 521 (9th Cir. 2019).

Defendant is currently serving his life sentence at the U.S. Bureau of Prisons’ ("BOP") Victorville Federal Correctional Institute. (Id. at 5.) On April 2, 2020, defendant filed the pending motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Doc. No. 309.) On April 9, 2020, the government filed its opposition to the motion, and on April 14, 2020, defendant filed his reply thereto. (Doc. Nos. 315, 316.) The parties thereafter submitted supplemental authority to the court. (Doc. Nos. 317, 318, 319.) Finally, on July 29, 2020, defendant filed a request for immediate grant of compassionate release, bringing to the court's attention the significant outbreak of the COVID-19 virus at FCI Victorville where he is imprisoned. (Doc. No. 320.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A court generally "may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) ; see also Dillon v. United States , 560 U.S. 817, 824, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) (" ‘[A] judgment of conviction that includes [a sentence of imprisonment] constitutes a final judgment’ and may not be modified by a district court except in limited circumstances."). Those limited circumstances include compassionate release in extraordinary cases. See United States v. Holden , 452 F. Supp. 3d 964, 967–68, (D. Or. April 6, 2020). Prior to the enactment of the First Step Act of 2018 ("the FSA"), motions for compassionate release could only be filed by the BOP. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2002). Under the FSA, however, imprisoned defendants may now bring their own motions for compassionate release in the district court. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2018). In this regard, the FSA specifically provides that a court may

upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf⁴ or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in [ 18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that –

(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or

(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a determination has been made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, as provided under section 3142(g); and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii).⁵

The applicable policy statement with respect to compassionate release in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines sets out criteria and circumstances describing "extraordinary and compelling reasons." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.") § 1B1.13⁶ ; see also United States v. Gonzalez , No. 2:18-cr-00232-TOR, 451 F.Supp.3d 1194, 1196–97, (E.D. Wash. Mar. 31, 2020) (noting that courts "universally" rely on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to define "extraordinary and compelling reasons," even though that policy statement was issued before Congress passed the FSA and authorized defendants to file compassionate release motions). However, a large and growing number of district courts across the country have concluded that because the Sentencing Commission has not amended the Guidelines since the enactment of the FSA, courts are not limited by the pre-FSA categories described in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 in assessing whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances are presented justifying a reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). See, e.g., United States v. Parker , 461 F. Supp.3d 966, 977–80, (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2020) (collecting cases); United States v. Rodriguez , 424 F. Supp. 3d 674, 681 (N.D. Cal. 2019).

In the past, when moving for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), it was recognized that the defendant bore the initial burden of demonstrating that a sentence reduction was warranted. See United States v. Sprague , 135 F.3d 1301, 1306–07 (9th Cir. 1998). Although the Ninth Circuit has not specifically addressed the question of which party bears the burden in the context of a motion for compassionate brought pursuant to § 3582(c) as amended by the FSA, district courts that have done so have agreed that the burden remains with the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Greenhut , No. 2:18-cr-00048-CAS, 2020 WL 509385, *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2020) ; United States v. Van Sickle , No. 18-cr-0250-JLR, 2020 WL 2219496, *3 (W.D. Wash. May 7, 2020).

ANALYSIS

As district courts have summarized, in analyzing whether a defendant is entitled to compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the court must determine whether a defendant has satisfied three requirements:

First, as a threshold matter, the statute requires defendants to exhaust administrative remedies. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Second, a district court may grant compassionate release only if "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction" and "that such reduction is consistent with

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