United States v. Heisle

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH HEISLE, Defendant.

No. 3:21-cr-00081

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division

August 1, 2023

ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A SENTENCE REDUCTION UNDER THE COMPASSIONATE RELEASE STATUTE DUE TO A FAMILY EMERGENCY PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 3582(C)(1)(A) (DOC. NO. 30)

THOMAS M. ROSE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This case is before the Court on the Motion for “a Sentence Reduction Under the Compassionate Release [Statute] Due to [a] Family Emergency Pursuant to [1]8 U.S.C §3582(c)(1)(A)” (Doc. No. 30) (the “Motion”), filed by Joseph Heisle (“Heisle”). Heisle is currently incarcerated at Lexington FMC (Federal Medical Center) in Kentucky. He asks the Court for compassionate release from his term of imprisonment. More specifically, Heisle requests “a sentence reduction under the compassionate release [sic] pursuant to [1]8 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) due to defendant's [m]other's death.” (Doc. No. 30 at PageID 138.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Heisle's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 22, 2021, the United States of America (the “Government”) filed a two-count Indictment against Heisle in this case. (Doc. No. 4.) Count one charged Heisle with knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute forty grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of fentanyl and fifty grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B). (Doc. No. 4 at PageID 10.) Count two charged Heisle with knowingly and intentionally managing a controlled place as an owner and occupant, and in doing so, knowingly and intentionally making available for use, with and without compensation, the place for the purpose of unlawfully storing and distributing a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). (Id. at PageID 11.)

On September 28, 2021, pursuant to a plea agreement, Heisle pleaded guilty to Count two of the Indictment.^[1] (Doc. No. 21.) The Statement of Facts attached to the Plea Agreement, signed by Heisle and his attorney, states:

During May 2021, in Montgomery County, Ohio, defendant Joseph Heisle knowingly and intentionally used [his] home in Dayton, Ohio to store and distribute illegal controlled substances. Throughout that time, Mr. Heisle kept at his personal residence bulk amounts of fentanyl and methamphetamine that he intended for resell. Upon acquiring a buyer for these drugs, Mr. Heisle would remove a portion of these controlled substances from his residence and deliver them to his customers.

For the information of the Court, fentanyl and methamphetamine are Schedule II controlled substances.

(Doc. No. 21 at PageID 65.)

The Final Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) prepared for Heisle provided additional information about the circumstances of the offense, and it identified approximately eighteen prior adult criminal convictions, as well as numerous minor convictions. (Doc. No. 25 (PSI) at ¶¶ 3755.) Heisle's extensive criminal history contained numerous convictions for possession of controlled substances, including one conviction for “Possession With Intent to Distribute 100 Grams [or] More of a Mixture or Substance Containing a Detectable Amount of Heroin.” (Id. at ¶54.) Notably, the PSI stated that the most recent offense occurred while Heisle was on supervised release for the previous conviction of possession with intent to distribute. (Id. at ¶ 57.) The PSI indicated that Heisle expressed remorse and responsibility for his actions. (Id. at ¶ 16.)

At sentencing, the Court imposed a 54-month term of imprisonment, three years of supervised release with special conditions, and a $100 special assessment. (Doc. No. 28.) Heisle is currently 42 years old and has an anticipated release date of November 15, 2025. (See FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS INMATE LOCATOR, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc (last visited July 21, 2023).) Thus, Heisle has approximately 28 months remaining in his sentence.

The Government filed a Response to Defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release (Doc. No. 31) (the “Response”), in which the Government opposes the relief sought in the Motion. Heisle did not file a reply, and the time for him to do so has now expired. S.D. Ohio General Order 2213 (order rescinding General Order 20-21 and explaining that briefing on motions for compassionate release will revert to the default under the local rules); S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 7.2(a)(2) (setting default deadlines for opposing and reply memoranda); S.D. Ohio Crim. R. 1.2 (applicability of the local civil rules to criminal actions); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) (three-day mailbox rule).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standards

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), colloquially known as the “compassionate release” statute, grants authority, in certain limited circumstances, to modify a term of imprisonment after it has been imposed. It provides, in part:

The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that-in any case-the court ... may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction ... and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).^[2]

Therefore, a court may reduce a defendant's previously imposed term of imprisonment if it finds that three requirements are met: (1) “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction”; (2) the “reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”; and (3) the § 3553(a) factors, to the extent that they are applicable, support the reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see also United States v. Lemons, 15 F.4th 747, 749 (6th Cir. 2021). On the other hand, a court may deny a compassionate release motion when any of the three substantive requirements is lacking and need not address the others.^[3] United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021). Moreover, while a court may reduce the term of imprisonment if all three requirements are met, it “need not do so.” Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (stating that a court “may” reduce the term of imprisonment); United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Congress's use of ‘may' in § 3582(c)(1)(A) dictates that the compassionate release decision is discretionary, not mandatory”).

Regarding the third requirement, “§ 3582(c)(1)(A) instructs a court to consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by steps one and two is warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.” Jones, 980 F.3d at 1108 (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted). The factors set forth in § 3553(a) consider such things as the nature of the offense, the circumstances of the offense, the history of the defendant, the characteristics of the defendant, “and various penological goals, such as the need to promote respect for law and to protect the public,” as well as to reflect the seriousness of the offense, provide just punishment for the offense, afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1005 (6th Cir. 2020); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Among the variety of items that courts specifically have considered in the context of motions for compassionate release are the type of offense(s) for which the defendant was convicted, whether the defendant had prior criminal convictions (and, if so, how many and the seriousness of such crimes), whether the defendant had prior juvenile convictions, the defendant's background, whether the defendant previously complied with any presentence or post-incarceration conditions, the amount of the sentence that the defendant has served to date, whether the court varied downward from the guidelines range when imposing the sentence, sentencing disparities between defendants (nationally and also among co-defendants) with similar records who are convicted of similar conduct, conditions at the place of incarceration, the defendant's health issues, whether the defendant is receiving medical treatment for his or her health issues, the defendant's behavior in prison, whether the defendant has had a drug addiction, the defendant's successful participation in substance abuse programming or other rehabilitation efforts while incarcerated, the defendant's successful participation in educational or vocational training while incarcerated, and whether the defendant took responsibility for his or her actions. Jones, 980 F.3d at 1115; Ruffin, 978 F.3d at 1008-09. Of course, not all of these items will be applicable (or known to the court) in all cases, and other items may be applicable. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (a court should consider “the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable”); see also United States v. Wright, 991 F.3d 717, 719 (6th Cir. 2021) (“[d]istrict courts may place great weight on one sentencing factor when that weight is warranted”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Application

Heisle raised only one argument in his Motion as to why his situation involves alleged extraordinary and compelling...