United States v. Helmstetter

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MARLO HELMSTETTER

CRIMINAL ACTION No. 92-469

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

April 5, 2023

SECTION I

ORDER & REASONS

LANCE M. AFRICK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is pro se defendant Marlo Helmstetter's (“Helmstetter”) “renewed” motion^[1] for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).^[2]Helmstetter asks the Court to reconsider its ruling on his previous motion for compassionate release in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Concepcion v. United States, 142 S.Ct 2389 (2022). The government opposes^[3] the motion. For the following reasons, the Court will deny Helmstetter's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Helmstetter was convicted of five felony counts in 1993: conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute (Count 1) murder in aid of racketeering activity (Counts 9 and 10), aggravated assault in aid of racketeering activity (Count 11), and using and carrying a firearm in aid of drug trafficking activity (Count 15).^[4] The Court sentenced Helmstetter to three life sentences each for Counts 1, 9, and 10; 240 months' imprisonment for Count 11; and 60 months for Count 15.^[5] All sentences were to be served consecutively.^[6] The Fifth Circuit affirmed on all counts, United States v. Tolliver, 61 F.3d 1189 (5th Cir. 1995), but this Court later vacated his conviction and sentence as to Count 15.^[7] Helmstetter is currently incarcerated at United States Penitentiary Lee in Virginia.^[8]

In August 2020, Helmstetter filed a motion for compassionate release, citing his health ailments in light of the COVID-19 pandemic as grounds for relief.^[9]Helmstetter also highlighted the length of his incarceration, his youth at the time of his arrest and conviction, his efforts at rehabilitation while in prison, and his support network at home as reasons the Court should consider compassionate release.^[10] This Court denied his motion after determining that “Helmstetter's risk of serious illness is too speculative to be compelling.”^[11] This Court also found that “[n]either Helmstetter's age (49) nor his family circumstances qualify as extraordinary or compelling under the policy statement.”^[12] Finally, the Court held that even if Helmstetter had presented an extraordinary and compelling circumstance, the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) would nonetheless preclude his release.^[13]

II. STANDARD OF LAW

The Court “may” grant defendant's motion for compassionate release pursuant to the First Step Act if, “after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] to the extent they are applicable,” it finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).^[14] According to the statute, the Court must also conclude that “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. (ii). However, the Fifth Circuit-along with the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits^[15]-has held that “neither the [Sentencing Commission's] policy statement nor the commentary to it binds a district court addressing a prisoner's own motion under § 3582.” United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, the Court is “bound only by § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and, as always, the sentencing factors in § 3553(a).” Id. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit has also recognized that the policy statement may still “inform[ ] [its] analysis.” United States v. Thompson, 984 F.3d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 2021).

The most relevant policy statement is found in § 1B1.13 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”). The Application Notes to that policy statement, in turn, provide four categories of extraordinary and compelling reasons: “(1) medical conditions, (2) age, (3) family circumstances, and (4) ‘other reasons.'” Thompson, 984 F.3d at 433 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, Policy Statement, cmt. n.1(A)-(D)) (alterations omitted). Before passage of the First Step Act, only the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)-not defendants themselves-could move for compassionate release. The First Step Act changed that, but the Sentencing Commission's policy statements have lagged behind. Because these policy statements have not been amended since the enactment of the First Step Act, portions of the statements now contradict 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).^[16]

III. ANALYSIS

a. Concepcion v. United States

Helmstetter again seeks compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).^[17] Helmstetter filed the instant motion on December 12, 2022, and filed supplemental memoranda on December 29, 2022, January 20, 2023, and January 30, 2023.^[18] Helmstetter's renewed motion requests the Court reconsider his previous motion in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Concepcion v. United States.^[19] In Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that the First Step Act “allows district courts to consider intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence.” Id. at 2404. A federal judge, in determining and imposing a sentence, “may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.” Id. at 2399 (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972)). Helmstetter asserts that Concepcion allows this Court to consider “intervening changes of law or fact in exercising [its] discretion to reduce a sentence.”^[20]

Helmstetter specifically cites United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), as intervening changes in law that justify a reduction in his sentence. In Booker, the Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, as amended, “makes the Guidelines effectively advisory.” 543 U.S. at 245. In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that an aggravating factor used to increase a statutory maximum sentence must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 570 U.S. at 103. In his first supplement memorandum, Helmstetter further contends that changes in the application of the Guidelines have resulted in a “gross disparity” between his sentence and those of similarly situated defendants.^[21] Accordingly, Helmstetter asks this Court to consider the inequity brought about by these changes to the law “in conjunction with the ‘other contentions,' documents, and evidence that was submitted in his previous compassionate release motion.”^[22]

In response, the government asserts that Helmstetter “does not identify or allege any new or changed facts in pursuit of his early release from prison.”^[23]Specifically, the government argues that his claims are doomed by his failure to explain which changes to the Guidelines would have reduced his Guideline range.^[24]Instead, the government argues, he “only represents generally that the guidelines have changed; he does not identify which offense level applications or criminal history calculations would result in what amounts to a three-offense level reduction.”^[25]Finally, the government asserts that Helmstetter mischaracterizes and misapplies Concepcion.^[26]

As the government argues, Concepcion does not aid Helmstetter. The Supreme Court held in Concepcion that the only limitations on the “longstanding tradition” of discretion afforded to sentencing courts “to consider any relevant materials at an initial sentencing or in modifying that sentence are those set forth by Congress in a statute or by the Constitution.” 142 S.Ct. at 2396, 2400. The procedural requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) are such congressional constraints.

As this Court and others have held, Concepcion is not relevant to the threshold requirements parties seeking compassionate release must first satisfy: a finding by the Court that the § 3553 factors do not warrant the defendant's continued incarceration and the existence of “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances which justify compassionate release. See United States v. Elwood, No. 92-469, 2022 WL 14810101 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2022) (Africk, J.). Without Concepcion, Helmstetter's renewed motion largely recycles his first one. Nonetheless, the Court will consider Helmstetter's renewed and new arguments to determine (1) if extraordinary and compelling circumstances justifying his release or a reduction in sentences exist, and (2) whether compassionate release is warranted after application of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.

b. Extraordinary and Compelling Circumstances

A defendant must present extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying his compassionate release. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). As stated, the Sentencing Commission's policy statement “informs” the Court's analysis of whether Helmstetter has presented such reasons. Thompson, 984 F.3d at 433 (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, Policy Statement, cmt. n.1); Perdigao, 2020 WL 1672322, at *2. Neither Helmstetter's age (51)^[27] nor his family circumstances^[28] qualify as extraordinary or compelling under the policy statement. Therefore, the Court reviews Helmstetter's medical conditions and “other reasons.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)-(D). The Court concludes that neither are sufficient to constitute extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting compassionate release

i. Medical Conditions

The Sentencing Commission's relevant policy statement specifies that, to be sufficiently serious as to warrant release, a medical condition must be a “terminal illness,” or a condition that “substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.”...