United States v. Helton

35 F.4th 511

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.John D. HELTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-5144

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Decided and Filed: May 24, 2022

ON BRIEF: Travis A. Rossman, ROSSMAN LAW, PLLC, Barbourville, Kentucky, for Appellant. Andrew A. Spievack, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Fort Mitchell, Kentucky, Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.

Before: SUHRHEINRICH, WHITE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

STRANCH, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which WHITE, J., joined. SUHRHEINRICH, J. (pp. 523–24), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge.

John Helton appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress and its decision to excuse a juror during trial. Because the district court found that the search warrant for Helton's home established both probable cause and nexus to the home, it denied the motion to suppress. The court excused the juror based on concerns that the juror could not set aside her personal knowledge of a trial witness. We find no error in the district court's decision to excuse the juror. We hold that the search warrant did not satisfy constitutional requirements. But because the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of the motion to suppress.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In June 2019, after going to Helton's home to execute a warrant for his arrest, Knox County Sheriff Deputy Sam Mullins sought a search warrant.

Deputy Mullins wrote the search warrant affidavit, stating only the following:

Affiant has been an officer in the aforementioned agency for a period of 6 years and information and observations contained herein were received and made in his capacity as an officer thereof.

Deputy Sam Mullins had received numerous drug complaints at the above residence that John Helton was selling methamphetamine. A reliable source advised he was at the residence a few days ago when a subject he was with purchased a half pound of methamphetamine. On 06/09/2019 deputies went to the residence of John Helton to execute a warrant. Upon arrival Helton had a clear baggie that appeared to had [sic] residue in it and a sum of US currency in small bills. This deputy has experience and knowledge that there is [sic] illegal narcotics on the property.

Based on this two-paragraph affidavit, a Knox County judge issued a search warrant for Helton's residence.

Upon execution of the search warrant, the deputies found illegal drugs, currency, and multiple firearms. Helton's wife told law enforcement that Helton would take drug-trafficking money to the home of his mother, Patsy Hopkins. On the day Helton's residence was searched, two deputies went to Hopkins’ house to secure it while other law enforcement officials obtained a warrant to search her home. When the deputies executed the search warrant, they recovered money, firearms, and drugs from Hopkins’ home.

In July 2019, while Helton was in jail on state charges, a federal grand jury indicted him for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and being a felon in possession of firearms; a superseding indictment was subsequently issued. In district court, Helton moved to suppress the evidence found pursuant to both search warrants. Concluding that the search warrant affidavit for Helton's house was sufficient to establish probable cause, a magistrate judge recommended that the motion to suppress be denied. The magistrate judge then concluded that the search warrant executed at Patsy Hopkin's house was valid because the search warrant of Helton's house was valid. Helton objected to the recommendations of the magistrate judge, but the district court adopted them.

Helton was tried before a jury in August 2020. Shawna Moore was called as a government witness, and testified that she participated in a controlled purchase of methamphetamine from Helton along with the Kentucky State Police. Moore explained that she communicated with Helton by phone to set up the buy, and then Helton's wife met her at the Trademart Shopping Center to complete the sale.

After Moore's testimony, Juror 191 spoke with the district court. Though she did not know Moore by name, the Juror said she recognized her because Moore was someone that she and her fellow employees at the shopping center would "kind of watch in case she was going to steal." Juror 191 then said, "I don't think that anything like that would affect how I would judge anybody because we're - - based on the evidence, but I did want to let the Court know that I did recognize her from my place of employment."

Juror 191 clarified that she had previously spoken with Moore at that store but had never witnessed, nor was she aware of, Moore ever shoplifting from the Juror's place of work. When asked if she could "set [her] experiences aside and judge [Moore's] credibility based solely on the evidence [she] heard" at trial, Juror 191 responded, "Yes." The Juror was also asked if there was anything regarding her "personal interactions" with Moore, or her other knowledge of Moore that would impact her "fairness and integrity as a juror." Juror 191 responded, "No."

Juror 191 was also asked, "And are you confident that your concerns, or the concerns that your store has had about [Moore's] potential to be stealing, would not in any way color your evaluation of her testimony?" She said, "I don't think so. I mean, it's bad that they steal, but they're not stealing from me." The court followed up by asking, "based on your interactions with her, or this suspicion that has been there in the past, would you be able to set that aside, or do you believe it would make you believe one side or the other more?" Juror 191 said, "I don't think so." Juror 191 also stated that she would "be able to follow [the court's] instructions on how to evaluate this witness's testimony."

The Government moved to strike Juror 191 for cause and Helton opposed the motion. The district court struck Juror 191 on the basis that she personally knew Moore and she had twice responded "I think so" when asked if she could set aside her knowledge of Moore.

The jury found Helton guilty of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and being a felon in possession of firearms. The jury also found after a Phase II trial that Helton's prior conviction qualified to enhance his sentence. The district court sentenced Helton to 264 months of imprisonment. Helton timely appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

Helton presents two arguments on appeal. First, he contends that the district court's decision should be reversed because the search warrant for his home was unconstitutional. Relatedly, he argues that this court should remand his case for further proceedings to determine whether the search warrant for his mother's home was fruit of the poisonous tree. Second, he contends that the district court abused its discretion by excusing Juror 191 for cause during trial, and claims that he was prejudiced by Juror 191's excusal.

A. The Search Warrants

Helton contends that the search warrant affidavit was not supported by probable cause and did not establish a nexus between his residence and the drug evidence sought. The Government responds that there was probable cause for the search warrant, and even if probable cause did not exist, the motion to suppress was properly denied because the Leon good faith exception applies.

Federal constitutional law applies to a state search warrant that is challenged in federal court. United States v. Abernathy , 843 F.3d 243, 249 (6th Cir. 2016). When a motion to suppress is denied, we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusion de novo. United States v. Prigmore , 15 F.4th 768, 777 (6th Cir. 2021). Although the evidence is to be reviewed in the light most favorable to a district court's factual determinations, United States v. Trice , 966 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 1395, 209 L.Ed.2d 133 (2021), when the district court is a reviewing court—as it was here—the district court's legal conclusions are not owed any deference, Abernathy , 843 F.3d at 250.

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. It also provides that a warrant must have probable cause "supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id. Probable cause "is not a high bar," D.C. v. Wesby , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018) (quoting Kaley v. United States , 571 U.S. 320, 338, 134 S.Ct. 1090, 188 L.Ed.2d 46 (2014) ), as it "requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity," id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 243–44 n.13, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ).

Thus, to show that probable cause supports a search warrant, the officer "must submit an affidavit that ‘indicate[s] a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be located on the premises of the proposed search.’ " United States v. Hines , 885 F.3d 919, 923 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Dyer , 580 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2009) ). The search warrant affidavit must establish a "nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence sought." United States v. Carpenter , 360 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Van Shutters , 163 F.3d 331, 336–37 (6th Cir. 1998) ). Viewing the search warrant affidavit "under the totality of the circumstances," we examine its "four corners" with "great deference toward" the determination of the judge who issued the search warrant. United States v. Jackson , 470 F.3d 299, 306 (6th Cir. 2006).

Here, the affidavit requesting the state warrant included only four pieces of...