United States v. Hill

98 F.4th 473

UNITED STATES of America v. Carlos C. HILL, Appellant

No. 19-3508

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

Argued: June 27, 2023

Filed: April 12, 2024

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal No. 1-12-cr-00243-001), District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo

Lisa B. Freeland, Samuel G. Saylor [ARGUED], Office of Federal Public Defender, 1001 Liberty Avenue, Suite 1500, Pittsburgh, PA 15222, Counsel for Appellant

Gerard M. Karam, Carlo D. Marchioli, Office of United States Attorney, Middle District of Pennsylvania, Sylvia H. Rambo United States Courthouse, 1501 N 6th Street, 2nd Floor, P.O. Box 202, Harrisburg, PA 17102, Kenneth A. Polite, Lisa H. Miller, Joshua K. Handell, John-Alex Romano [ARGUED], United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Room 7101, 1400 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20005, Counsel for Appellee

Before: JORDAN, KRAUSE, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judge.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for a person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment of a term exceeding one year to possess a firearm. Before 2019, in every circuit, a conviction under § 922(g)(1) required the government to prove that a person had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than one year and that the person knew that he or she possessed a firearm. Relevant to this appeal, the government did not have to prove that the person knew that he or she had been convicted of such a crime. In 2019, in Rehaif v. United States, — U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 204 L.Ed.2d 594 (2019), the Supreme Court overturned this uniform precedent and held that to be convicted under § 922(g), the government must prove that the person knew that he or she is a member of the prohibited group.

In 2013, Carlos Hill was convicted of possession of a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(1), and, in 2019, like many similarly situated people, he sought to collaterally attack his conviction in the wake of Rehaif. Hill filed a request with the District Court for appointment of counsel to pursue his Rehaif claim in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (a "§ 2255 motion"). The District Court denied his request for counsel and held that Hill did not qualify for relief under Rehaif because his 2019 § 2255 motion was second or successive.

Hill appealed the District Court's order, arguing that he does qualify for relief under Rehaif because his 2019 § 2255 motion was not second or successive, and Rehaif announced a new substantive rule that is retroactive for non-successive § 2255 motions. We agree and will vacate the District Court's order and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

In September 2012, Hill was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). The indictment charged that Hill, "having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, did knowingly possess in and affecting interstate commerce a firearm and ammunition." App. 18. Trial was held in March 2013. The District Court instructed the jury that it must find the following beyond a reasonable doubt to find Hill guilty:

First, that Carlos Hill has been convicted of a felony; that is a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. Two, that after this conviction, Carlos Hill knowingly possessed the firearm described in the indictment. And third, that Carlos Hill's possession was in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.

App. 393. The District Court also reminded the jury that the parties had stipulated that before Hill allegedly possessed the firearm, Hill had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The jury convicted Hill.

In April 2014, the District Court sentenced Hill. At sentencing, Hill objected to the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (the "ACCA"), but the District Court overruled the objection and sentenced Hill to 235 months' incarceration and a five-year term of supervised release. Hill appealed, and this Court affirmed his conviction and sentence in August 2016.

In February 2018, Hill filed a § 2255 motion asking that his sentence be vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel and because his prior convictions no longer qualified him for a sentencing enhancement under the ACCA. In June 2018, the District Court partially granted Hill's § 2255 motion because one of Hill's predicate convictions no longer qualified under the ACCA. The District Court resentenced Hill without the ACCA enhancement and entered an amended judgment.

In June 2019, in Rehaif v. United States, — U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 204 L.Ed.2d 594 (2019), the Supreme Court overturned extensive precedent, including from this Court, and held that under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2), the government "must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm." Id. at 2200. Previously, the scienter requirement of § 922(g) applied only to the possession of the firearm and not to the membership in the relevant category of banned persons. See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 999 F.3d 171, 178 (3d Cir. 2021) ("[T]he District Court was following established precedent when it interpreted this knowledge requirement to apply only to gun possession." (citing United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 596 (3d Cir. 2012))).

In September 2019, Hill filed a motion for appointment of counsel to file a § 2255 motion in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Rehaif. The District Court denied the request for counsel and held that Hill did not qualify for relief under Rehaif because the Eleventh Circuit, in In re Palacios, 931 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2019), "held that Rehaif did not announce a new rule of constitutional law, nor was it made retroactive to cases on collateral review." App. 1. In so holding, the District Court implied that Hill's § 2255 motion was second or successive and thus subject to the "new rule of constitutional law" requirement under § 2255(h). See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). Hill appealed.

II. DISCUSSION¹

We resolve the following issues: (1) whether Hill needs a certificate of appealability ("COA") to pursue this appeal; (2) if so, whether we should issue one because (a) Hill's Rehaif claim is one with at least an arguably constitutional dimension, and (b) we should extend the reasoning of Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 130 S.Ct. 2788, 177 L.Ed.2d 592 (2010), and Lesko v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 34 F.4th 211 (3d Cir. 2022), to the § 2255 context, making Hill's § 2255 motion not second or successive; and (3) whether Rehaif v. United States, — U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 204 L.Ed.2d 594 (2019), recognized a new right that applies retroactively in cases on collateral review such that Hill can pursue a Rehaif claim in his § 2255 action. Because we answer each of the above questions in the affirmative, we will vacate the District Court's order and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A. COA Requirement

The parties dispute whether Hill needs a COA to pursue this appeal. Hill argues that he does not need a COA because he is appealing the denial of a motion for counsel. The Government argues that Hill needs a COA to proceed with this appeal because the District Court's order was a final order. We agree with the Government.

Section 2253 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that an appeal from the final order in a § 2255 proceeding can be taken only if a circuit justice or judge issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). An order is "final" if it disposes of the habeas proceeding on the merits, rather than resolves a collateral issue. It makes no difference if the final disposition is based on the substantive merits or the procedural merits, so long as it concludes the habeas proceedings. See Bracey v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 986 F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2021) ("Harbison used 'the merits' to distinguish 'final orders' that conclude the habeas proceeding itself from those orders that merely resolve a collateral issue. And while Harbison excluded from § 2253(c)'s COA requirement orders that do not conclude habeas proceedings, it made no further distinction among those orders that do conclude proceedings based on whether the disposition was substantive or procedural in nature." (citation omitted) (citing Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183, 129 S.Ct. 1481, 173 L.Ed.2d 347 (2009))).

In the order at issue here, the District Court skipped over Hill's request for counsel and definitively resolved Hill's Rehaif claim by concluding that it was barred because Hill raised it in a second or successive § 2255 motion. While this ruling does not address the substantive merits of the claim (i.e., deciding whether the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Hill knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than one year when he possessed the firearm), the ruling nonetheless disposed of the § 2255 motion on the procedural merits and concluded the proceedings, making the order a final order for COA purposes. Id. Thus, Hill needs a COA to proceed with this appeal.

B. Issuance of a COA

The parties also dispute whether a COA should issue. Hill argues that a COA should issue because the District Court denied Hill's § 2255 motion on a procedural ground and jurists of reason would find it debatable whether Hill has stated a valid constitutional claim and whether the District Court was correct in its procedural ruling. The Government argues that a COA should not issue because Hill has procedurally defaulted on his Rehaif claim. We agree with Hill.²

The Supreme Court has established the two-prong Slack test to determine whether a COA should issue "[w]hen the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds...