United States v. Hill

215 F.Supp.3d 823

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Quentin HILL, Defendant.

Criminal No. 04–323 (1) (RHK/JSM)

Civil No. 16–cv–2143 (RHK)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

Signed October 19, 2016

Benjamin Bejar, Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney's Office, United States Courthouse, 300 South Fourth Street, Suite 600, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55415, for plaintiff.

Quentin Hill, Reg. No. 11832–041, USP Marion, 4500 Prison Road, Marion, IL

62959, pro se defendant.¹

ORDER

RICHARD H. KYLE, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Quentin Hill's June 24, 2016, Motion to Vacate and Correct Sentence, brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. No. 36). The Defendant's Motion asserts his 2005 180–month sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), ("the Act," or "the ACCA"), should be vacated and corrected because his prior 1988 Minnesota convictions for third-degree criminal sexual conduct purportedly no longer qualify as a "violent felony" under the Act based on the retroactive application of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States , 576 U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). Specifically, the Defendant asserts that his two criminal sexual conduct convictions—either of which would constitute the third required ACCA violent felony—only qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA's now-defunct residual clause.² For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Defendant's Motion and declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In July 2004, Minneapolis Police arrested the Defendant at his apartment building following a complaint that the Defendant and an accomplice had robbed a female of money and credit cards at gunpoint and that the Defendant then kidnapped her and sexually assaulted her. During a search of his apartment, police recovered a loaded .22–caliber semiautomatic handgun, a quantity of suspected crack cocaine, a glass crack pipe, and various pornographic material.

In August 2004, a grand jury returned a one-count Indictment charging the Defendant with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm as an armed career criminal, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1), which carries a mandatory-minimum term of 180–months' imprisonment. (Doc. No. 1) In November 2004, the Defendant appeared with his counsel and pleaded guilty to the Indictment pursuant to an executed plea agreement filed with the Court. (Doc. Nos. 30, 31) The plea agreement included a waiver of appeal and collateral attack provision, wherein the Defendant agreed to "waive[ ] his right to appeal or to contest, directly or collaterally, the sentence on any ground" if the Court sentenced the Defendant at or below the Guidelines range contemplated by the plea agreement, which was 180 to 210 months.

In July 2005, the United States Probation Office issued its final Presentence Report ("PSR"), finding that the Defendant was subject to an enhanced sentence as an armed career criminal because the Defendant had four predicate violent felony convictions, namely, two third-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions, an attempted simple robbery conviction, and a first-degree burglary conviction. The Defendant did not object to his designation as an armed career criminal.

In August 2005, this Court sentenced the Defendant to the mandatory-minimum term of 180 months' imprisonment. (Doc. Nos. 33, 34) The Defendant did not appeal his conviction or sentence. On June 24, 2016, the Defendant, through appointed counsel, filed his present § 2255 Motion.

DISCUSSION

I. Scope and Timing of Section 2255 Relief

Although Section 2255 permits a federal prisoner to collaterally attack the constitutional or jurisdictional basis of a final federal conviction or sentence, "the remedy ‘does not encompass all claimed errors in conviction and sentencing.’ " Meirovitz v. United States , 688 F.3d 369, 370 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Sun Bear v. United States , 644 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc)); United States v. Addonizio , 442 U.S. 178, 185, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979). Absent a claimed constitutional or jurisdictional challenge, "the permissible scope of a § 2255 collateral attack on a final conviction or sentence is severely limited" to claimed errors of law constituting a "fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Sun Bear , 644 F.3d at 704 (quoting Addonizio , 442 U.S. at 185, 99 S.Ct. 2235 ).

Hence, "[r]elief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised for the first time on direct appeal and, if uncorrected, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice." United States v. Apfel , 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that movant must establish both cause for "procedural default" and "actual prejudice" from alleged error before raising even constitutional issues for first time on collateral review).

The burden of proof is on the petitioner in a § 2255 proceeding to show that the Court violated "the Constitution or laws of the United States" by, in this case, sentencing him as an armed career criminal. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) ; Holloway v. United States , 960 F.2d 1348, 1355 (8th Cir. 1992) ; Day v. United States , 428 F.2d 1193, 1196 (8th Cir. 1970) (providing that petitioner bears burden of proof on each ground asserted in § 2255 motion). See also Stanley v. United States , 827 F.3d 562, 566 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that "proponent of collateral review" required "to produce evidence demonstrating entitlement to relief").

The United States properly concedes that the Defendant's ACCA residual-clause claim based on Johnson is cognizable and timely—despite the Defendant's appeal and collateral-attack waiver in the plea agreement. See Headbird v. United States , 813 F.3d 1092, 1094–95 (8th Cir. 2016) ; Donnell v. United States , 826 F.3d 1014, 1015 (8th Cir. 2016) ; 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3).

The Defendant, however, is not entitled to relief because at least one of his prior third-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions qualifies as a predicate violent felony under the ACCA's "force clause" in that it "has as an element the use, attempted use or threated use of physical force against the person of another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) ; United States v. Schaffer , 818 F.3d 796, 798 (8th Cir. 2016) ("Any crime which ‘has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another’ qualifies as a violent felony under the force clause."). Accordingly, because the Defendant still has three predicate convictions for a violent felony that do not depend on the ACCA's residual clause, the Defendant still qualifies as an armed career criminal, his 180–month sentence was lawful, and the Defendant has failed to meet his burden under § 2255 of showing he is entitled to relief.

II. The Defendant's August 1988 Minnesota Conviction for Third–Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct Qualifies as a Violent Felony Under the ACCA's Force Clause, Which was Unaffected by Johnson .

A. The PSR's qualifying predicate offenses

The unobjected-to PSR noted that the Defendant had been twice previously convicted for third-degree criminal sexual conduct in Minnesota; one offense committed in December 1987 and one offense committed in August 1988. The Defendant challenges only these two convictions and does not challenge his prior felony convictions for attempted simple robbery and first-degree burglary as qualifying ACCA predicates. Accordingly, if either one of the Defendant's two prior third-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions qualifies as an ACCA predicate felony without resort to the residual clause, the Defendant would still be properly deemed an armed career criminal because "Johnson did not invalidate the ACCA's force clause." United States v. Robinson , 826 F.3d 1044, 1045 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Johnson , 135 S.Ct. at 2563 ).

According to Hennepin County certified court records for the August 1988 offense, the Defendant was initially charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, kidnapping, and simple robbery, but the Defendant pleaded to an amended lesser-included charge of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, and the counts of kidnapping and simple robbery were dismissed as part of the plea agreement. The PSR and court documents noted that the August 1988 offense involved the Defendant forcing the victim into a cellar, pinning her arms and attempting to force her to perform oral sex, and then forcing the victim to the ground and sexually penetrating the victim for approximately 20 minutes. Because the Defendant did not object to this factual statement in the PSR, the Court properly adopted it and relied on it at sentencing to find that it qualified as a predicate ACCA violent felony. See United States v. Garcia–Longoria , 819 F.3d 1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that by failing to object to facts in PSR and by conceding that prior felony assault conviction was a crime of violence, defendant relieved government of obligation to establish that prior conviction was crime of violence by submitting court documents under modified categorical approach). See also Voytik v. United States , 778 F.2d 1306, 1308 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting that "defendant's representations during the plea-taking carry a strong presumption of verity and pose a ‘formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.’ ") (quoting Blackledge v. Allison , 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) ).

B. Minnesota's statutory framework for third-degree criminal sexual conduct

At the time of the Defendant's offense, Minnesota's third-degree criminal sexual conduct statute, Minnesota Statute section 609.344, comprised several disjunctive statutory subparts (subdivisions 1(a) through 1(k), separated by the term "or"), some of which have as an element the use...