United States v. Holdford

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF v. TIMOTHY HOLDFORD DEFENDANT

No. 4:18-cr-00278 KGB

United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Central Division

September 30, 2024

ORDER

KRISTINE G. BAKER, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Before the Court is Timothy Holdford's pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence by a person in federal custody (Dkt. No. 39). The government has responded in opposition to the motion (Dkt No. 49). Mr. Holdford has filed a reply and motion for evidentiary hearing (Dkt. No. 50). While the § 2255 motion was pending, Mr. Holdford filed a second motion (Dkt No. 51). For the following reasons, the Court denies and dismisses with prejudice Mr. Holdford's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition, denies his motion for hearing, and denies his motion for resentencing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (Dkt. Nos. 39; 50; 51).

I. Background

Mr. Holdford was charged by indictment with possession with intent to distribute less than 50 grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) in count one, being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in count two, and knowingly possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Dkt. No. 1).

On September 12, 2019, Mr. Holdford entered into a written plea agreement and pled guilty to count two of the indictment (Dkt. Nos. 19; 20), and the Court dismissed, upon motion of the government, counts one and three of the indictment (Dkt. No. 18). During the change of plea hearing, the Court found Mr. Holdford competent to proceed, and he confirmed that his counsel had explained the charges he would be pleading guilty to and that he understood the consequences of his pleading guilty (Dkt. No. 45, at 3-6). Relevant here, Mr. Holdford acknowledged the penalty could be enhanced by statute or the advisory sentencing guidelines, if the Court determined predicate offenses qualified him as an armed career criminal. (Id., at 5-6; see also Dkt. No. 19, at 2, 4). The Court explained that the maximum penalty for the felon-in-possession charge is not more than ten years of imprisonment, but that, if the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), applied, the statutory sentencing range is 15 years to life imprisonment. In response to the Court's questions, Mr. Holdford acknowledged that his counsel had explained the charge and that he understood the possible consequences of pleading guilty.

At the plea hearing, Mr. Holdford contested whether he was hiding during events relevant to his charge and contested that a document with his name on it was in fact an enforceable lease, but Mr. Holdford admitted to all other facts read by the government at the plea hearing, including that Mr. Holdford had previously and knowingly been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, as listed in the indictment (Dkt. No. 45, at 15-18; see also Dkt. No. 19, at 5-6). Mr. Holdford swore that no promises had been made to him other than those set forth in his plea agreement (Dkt. No. 45, at 15).

Consistent with the negotiated plea agreement, Mr. Holdford pled guilty to count two charging felon in possession of a firearm. He acknowledged that he voluntarily signed the plea agreement and understood its terms. He said that he understood that the Court had the authority to sentence him to the maximum penalty permitted by law. He said that he was satisfied with his counsel's advice and representation. The Court then accepted Mr. Holdford's plea and found him guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

The Court directed the Probation Office to conduct a presentence investigation and prepare a presentence report (Dkt. No. 21). On July 15, 2020, this Court sentenced Mr. Holdford (Dkt. Nos. 33-35).

The Court reviewed with the parties Mr. Holdford's Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”). In the light of his prior convictions, Mr. Holdford was determined to be an Armed Career Criminal and subject to an enhanced penalty pursuant to the ACCA. At the sentencing hearing, with no objection to the PSR, the Court adopted its undisputed finding that, at the time of his conviction, Mr. Holdford had three prior Arkansas state court convictions: (1) 1997 conviction of residential burglary in Pulaski County Circuit Court, Case No. CR96-3443, (2) 1997 conviction of residential burglary in Pulaski County Circuit Court, Case No. CR97-480, and (3) 2005 conviction of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver in Pulaski County, Case No. CR04-3714. These prior convictions were listed in the indictment, as well as the PSR (Dkt. No. 1). The Court determined the advisory sentencing guidelines range of 188 to 235 months of imprisonment. Seeking leniency on Mr. Holdford's behalf, his counsel asked the Court to consider the presentence report's findings: Mr. Holdford's traumatic childhood with abuse and neglect, mental illness issues, a history of substance abuse, and a lack of education. Mr. Holdford's counsel also asked the Court to impose any sentence concurrent to any state court sentences that Mr. Holdford was currently serving. Based on Mr. Holdford's social history, the government did not object.

Determining that a downward variance from the advisory sentencing guidelines was warranted, the Court sentenced Mr. Holdford as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) to the statutory mandatory minimum of 180 months of imprisonment to be served concurrently with the term of imprisonment that he was currently serving or may be imposed in the Arkansas Department of Correction and to three years of supervised release (Dkt. No. 35). Judgment was entered on July 15, 2020 (Id.). Mr. Holdford did not appeal his sentence.

II. § 2255 Petition

On July 30, 2021, Mr. Holdford filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Dkt. No. 39). On August 2, 2022, the Court granted Mr. Holdford's motion for extension of time to file a memorandum of law (Dkt. No. 40), and on September 1, 2022, Mr. Holdford filed his brief in support of his initial motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Dkt. No. 42).

Mr. Holdford now timely asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on two grounds: (1) his trial lawyer's failure to object to the Court's finding or to the PSR that Mr. Holdford qualified as an armed career criminal under the ACCA, and (2) his trial lawyer's failure to seek dismissal of the indictment.

“Section 2255 ‘was intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal habeas corpus.'” Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974)). The statute provides for collateral review of the defendant's sentence based on claims of “jurisdictional errors, constitutional errors, and errors of law.” Raymond v. United States, 933 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255). Remedies for errors of law are available only when the “claimed error constitute[s] a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (internal quotations omitted). Mr. Holdford waived his right to collaterally attack the conviction and sentence in any post-conviction proceeding, including a § 2255 motion, except for claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. (Dkt. No. 12 at 2-3). Mr. Holdford's two ineffectiveness claims are properly before this Court.

A. Legal Standard For Ineffective Assistance

To demonstrate constitutional ineffectiveness under the familiar Strickland v. Washington standard, Mr. Holdford must show deficient performance and resulting prejudice. 466 U.S. 688 (1984). Review of the trial lawyer's work is “highly deferential,” and Mr. Holdford must overcome the “strong presumption” that his lawyer acted “within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. To satisfy the Strickland prejudice element, Mr. Holdford must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, absent attorney error, he would not have been sentenced as an armed career criminal or the indictment would have been dismissed. Id., at 694.

Importantly for this case, the Court “must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; see also Auman v. United States, 67 F.3d 157, 162 (8th Cir. 1995). In other words, on federal habeas review, courts examine counsel's challenged conduct under the circumstances prevailing and the state of the law as it existed at the relevant time, and “avoid making judgments based on hindsight.” Fields v. United States, 201 F.3d 1025, 1027 (8th Cir. 2000). Under the first prong of the Strickland test, as “counsel [is] not required to make meritless objections under then-existing precedent, anticipate changes in the law, or raise every potentially meritorious claim.” United States v. Garza, 340 Fed.Appx. 243, 244-45 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see Ragland v. United States, 756 F.3d 597, 601 (8th Cir. 2014) (counsel's failure to anticipate a change in the law does not constitute ineffective assistance); Brown v. United States, 311 F.3d 875, 878 (8th Cir. 2002) (“counsel's decision not to raise an issue unsupported by then-existing precedent did not constitute ineffective assistance.”); Thomas v. United States, 951 F.2d 902, 904 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless issue).

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