United States v. Holtzclaw

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. AARON DARIUS HOLTZCLAW

1:18CR46-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

June 26, 2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OSTEEN, JR., District Judge

As part of an investigation into a fatal shooting, law enforcement sought and received a search warrant from a Magistrate in Rowan County authorizing a search of 1508 Lakewood Drive, Salisbury, North Carolina, on December 4, 2016. (Def.'s Mot. to Suppress, Ex. A, Search Warrant (Doc. 14-1).) The warrant was issued on the application and affidavit of an officer with the Salisbury Police Department. (Id.) Defendant Aaron Darius Holtzclaw ("Defendant") challenged the search warrant on the basis that it fails to establish probable cause for the search. This court previously found that the facts contained in the affidavit underlying the search warrant application "fall short of providing probable cause to search Defendant's alleged residence at 1508 Lakewood Drive for '[c]ell phones, other electronic media devices,' '[a]ny weapons, to include handguns,' and '[a]ny clothing that contains blood for the purpose of DNA.'" (Mem. Op. & Order (Doc. 21) at 11 (quoting Mot. to Suppress, Ex. A, Search Warrant (Doc. 14-1) at 4).) This court not only found probable cause absent, but also found that the affidavit failed to provide a nexus between the items to be seized and the property to be searched. (Id.)

The Government contends:

Even if this Court were to determine that probable cause did not exist to support the issuance of the search warrant, that finding would be unavailing to the defendant. Leon directs that a court should not suppress the fruits of a search . . . unless "a reasonably well-trained officer would have known the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization."

(Government's Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Suppress ("Government's Resp.") (Doc. 17) at 9 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 & n.23 (1984)). In response, Defendant argues that "[t]he affidavit supporting the search warrant cannot be saved by the Leon good faith exception." (Def. Holtzclaw's Suppl. Br. ("Def.'s Suppl. Br.") (Doc. 24) at 1.)

I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme Court established the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

The Court identified four circumstances in which the good-faith exception would not apply: (1) "if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew wasfalse or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth;" (2) if "the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role in the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York"; (3) if the affidavit supporting the warrant is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable;" and (4) if under the circumstances of the case the warrant is "so facially deficient — i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized — that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid."

United States v. DeQuasie, 373 F.3d 509, 519 (4th Cir. 2004) (citations and footnote omitted). Under any of those circumstances, the good-faith exception does not apply, and any evidence gathered pursuant to the deficient warrant must be excluded from trial. United States v. Andrews, 577 F.3d 231, 236 (4th Cir. 2009).

In making a determination as to the good-faith exception under Leon, it is appropriate to look outside an affidavit in determining whether the officer's reliance was objectively reasonable because Leon notes that the good-faith exception is determined "in light of all the circumstances." United States v. McKenzie-Gude, 671 F.3d 452, 459 (4th Cir. 2011); cf. United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 197-98 (4th Cir. 2002) (information not presented in affidavit but known to officer about informant's credibility rendered reliance on warrant reasonable).

The burden of proof is on the Government to establish objectively reasonable reliance under Leon. See United States v. Voustianiouk, 685 F.3d 206, 215 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d 927, 932 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Michaelian, 803 F.2d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Maggitt, 778 F.2d 1029, 1034 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 924 ("When officers have acted pursuant to a warrant, the prosecution should ordinarily be able to establish objective good faith without a substantial expenditure of judicial time.").

"In the Leon context, we begin with the assumption that there was not a substantial basis for finding probable cause; the only question is whether reliance on a warrant that lacks such a 'substantial basis' was nevertheless reasonable." Andrews, 577 F.3d at 236 n.1; see also United States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 460, 470 (4th Cir. 2011).

I. ANALYSIS

The affidavit in this case establishes that a shooting occurred at the Firewater Restaurant and Lounge on December 4, 2016, and one victim was killed. (Mot. to Suppress, Ex. A, Search Warrant (Doc. 14-1) at 6-7.) Thereafter, the affidavit provides in relevant part:

During the investigation Salisbury Police obtained information from multiple witnesses that Aaron Darius Holtzclaw was present during the shooting and is a suspect of the shooting.

Salsibury [sic] Police Detectives located Aaron Darius Holtzclaw at his residence, 1508 Lakewood Dr. Salisbury NC. Aaron Darius Holtzclaw agreed to go with Salisbury Police Detectives to the Salisbury Police Department to be interviewed, he was informed he was not under arrest and he would be coming under his own free will. Holtzclaw said he understood and agreed to go with the Detectives.

While at Holtzclaw's residence, 1508 Lakewood Dr., Holtzclaw stated that he was at Firewater at the time of the shooting and that he was driving a black 2016 Jeep Patriot (NC# DMT9138), which is a rental car from Enterprise. Holtzclaw stated that the black jeep was shot into during the shooting at Firewater. Detectives verified this and observed a bullet hole in the drivers side of the windshield of the jeep in question. This jeep was secured by Salisbury Police and towed to the Salisbury Police Department.

While still at Holtzclaw's residence, 1508 Lakewood Dr., Holtzclaw stated that people were making threats to him on social media. When Salisbury Police Detectives asked him where his phone was Holtzclaw stated that he had two phones. When Detectives asked him where the phones were Holtzclaw said the phone he uses on social media was broke he then retracted this statement and said he lost it on the west side he then stated it might be at Firewater. Holtzclaw did have one phone on his person but would not release it to the detectives.

Holtzclaw then left willingly with Salisbury Police Detectives to be driven to the Salisbury Police Department to give a statement.

Based on these facts, it is believed there is probable cause to believe more evidence is on Aaron Darius Holtzclaw's media devices and within Holtzclaw[']s apartment . . . .

(Id. at 7-8.)

Defendant contends under Leon that "[t]he affidavit is 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.'" (Def.'s Suppl. Br. (Doc. 24) at 1.) The Government contends the affidavit in this case is "far superior to the affidavit upheld by the Fourth Circuit in [United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2002)]" as the information is less than twenty-four hours old and was corroborated. (Government's Resp. (Doc. 17) at 10-11.) The Government specifically argues that a reasonable officer would rely upon this warrant because the information in the affidavit included:

(1) the fact that multiple sources identified the defendant as a suspect; (2) the defendant admitted being at the scene at the time of the homicide; (3) the defendant admitted that he was driving a vehicle that was discovered to contain a bullet hole; (4) the defendant admitted receiving threats because others believed he killed "Stacks"; and (5) the defendant gave inconsistent statements regarding the location of his second phone.

(Id. at 11.) In assessing whether the good-faith exception applies in this case, this court considers each piece of information identified above.

A. "Suspect"

The statement contained in the affidavit that Defendant "is a suspect¹ of the shooting," (Mot. to Suppress, Ex. A, SearchWarrant (Doc. 14-1) at 7), is a bare conclusion and contrary to longstanding precedent that an affidavit must contain facts, not belief or suspicion. "Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may not properly issue a warrant to search a private dwelling unless he can find probable cause therefor from facts or circumstances presented to him under oath or affirmation. Mere affirmance of belief or suspicion is not enough." Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933); accord United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 578 (1971). "Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983). As Justice Jackson stated in Johnson v. United States:

The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.

333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (footnote omitted). An objective law enforcement officer could not reasonably believe that the use of the term "suspect" provides any fact or circumstance which would allow the magistrate to make an independent determination of probable cause. Instead, the statement that...