United States v. Hopkins

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. REGINALD HOPKINS

Crim No. 1:21-CR-00177

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

March 6, 2023

MEMORANDUM

JENNIFER P. WILSON, United States District Court Judge.

Before the court is a motion to dismiss the indictment filed by Defendant Reginald Hopkins (“Hopkins”). (Doc 66.) Hopkins alleges that the indictment should be dismissed pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment. (Id.) For the following reasons, the court will deny the motion to dismiss the indictment.

Factual Background and Procedural History^[1]

In early 2021, the regional office of the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) learned that Hopkins was potentially selling narcotics in Harrisburg and that he may be in possession of firearms. (Doc. 68, p 1.)^[2] Based on this information, ATF Task Force Officer Darrin Bates (“TFO Bates”), a police office for the City of Harrisburg who is cross-designated as a federal agent in order to work with the ATF, opened a federal investigation into Hopkins' alleged gun and drug activities. (Id. at 1-2.) The ATF agents then utilized a confidential information (“CI”) to attempt to purchase narcotics from Hopkins. (Id. at 2.)

On January 15, 2021, agents, with the assistance of the CI, conducted a controlled purchase of crack cocaine from an individual the CI knew as “Dreads,” whom the CI later identified as Hopkins. (Doc. 67-2, p. 4.) The ATF made two subsequent unsuccessful attempts to purchase crack cocaine from Hopkins. (Doc. 68, p. 2.) Based on the information then-known to the ATF, TFO Bates applied for a search warrant for 100 Evergreen Street Apt B1 in Harrisburg^[3], on February 11, 2021. (Id.; Doc. 67, p. 2.) The search warrant was granted by a federal Magistrate Judge on the same date. (See Doc. 67-3.)

ATF agents, other officers from Harrisburg Police Department, and TFO Bates executed the search warrant on February 19, 2021. (Doc. 67, p. 2.) Hopkins was present during the execution of the search warrant. (Id.) After officers recovered several firearms from the residence, two of which had previously been reported stolen, TFO Bates filed a state criminal complaint charging Hopkins with one count of person not to possess a firearm and two counts of receiving stolen property. (Doc. 67, pp. 2-3; Doc. 68, p. 2.)

Hopkins was arraigned on the state charges filed by TFO Bates on February 19, 2021 before state Magisterial District Judge Hanif Johnson, and he was detained in lieu of $250,000 bail. (Doc. 67, p. 3.) The case was assigned to Magisterial District Judge David O'Leary (“MDJ O'Leary”). (Id. at 3, n.1.) Hopkins was unable to post bail. (Id. at 3.) Hopkins' preliminary hearing on these charges was continued several times. (Id. at 3-4.)

The United States Attorneys' Office (“USAO”) received the investigative materials following the execution of the search warrant. (Doc. 68, p. 3.) Whether the USAO would file federal charges remained an open question at the time of Hopkins' arrest on the state charges. (Id. at 3, n.1.) Ultimately, on June 23, 2021, the grand jury returned an indictment charging Hopkins with distribution of a controlled substance, namely cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Doc. 1.)

Based on the indictment, a detainer was sent to Dauphin County Prison, where Hopkins was being detained on the state charges. (Doc. 67, p. 4.) On July 8, 2021, Hopkins had his initial appearance on the federal charges before Magistrate Judge Martin Carlson, and he was ordered detained. (Id.) Hopkins' state charges were later dismissed. (Doc. 68, p. 4.)

To date, in the instant federal case, eleven motions to continue have been filed. (See Docs. 19, 21, 26, 35, 40, 42, 55, 57, 59, 64, 80.) All motions were unopposed. (Id.) Of these eleven motions, two were filed by the Government. (See Docs. 55, 57.) Additionally, Hopkins' counsel has changed numerous times.^[4]A date-certain trial has been scheduled for May 22, 2023. (Doc. 89.)

On October 6, 2022, Hopkins filed the instant motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment. (Doc. 66.)^[5]A brief in support was filed the same day. (Doc. 67.) The Government filed its brief in opposition on October 20, 2022. (Doc. 68.) Hopkins timely filed a reply brief on October 25, 2022. (Doc. 71.) The Government filed a concession of factual issues for clarification of issues that arose during the briefing. (Doc. 75.) An evidentiary hearing was held on February 3, 2023. Subsequently, the Government filed a clarification. (Doc. 86). Thus, the motion is ripe for review.

Discussion

Hopkins moves to dismiss the Indictment based on alleged violations of his rights under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) and (c)(1), and his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Hopkins' first Speedy Trial Act argument relies on application of what is known as the “ruse exception,” which some circuits have recognized where state charges are filed in an effort to avoid the time constraints set forth in the Speedy Trial Act. (Doc. 67, pp 5-10.) Hopkins' second argument under the Speedy Trial Act relates to whether the time was properly excluded for three of the continuances granted by the court. (Id. at 1012.) Hopkins' Sixth Amendment argument relies on the four-part balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). (Id. at 15-18.) In all events, Hopkins argues that the dismissal of the indictment should be with prejudice.

The court will address each of these arguments in turn.

A. Speedy Trial Act - 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b)

The parties agree that the crux of this issue is when the clock began to run for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act. In relevant part, the Speedy Trial Act provides that “[a]ny information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). Here, the indictment was returned on June 23, 2021, and Hopkins had his first appearance in federal court on these charges on July 8, 2021. However, Hopkins was arrested on the state charges on February 19, 2021. Therefore, Hopkins' first Speedy Trial Act argument can only succeed if the court decides that the so-called “ruse exception” should apply in this case.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, when examining the “ruse exception,” has explained:

Under the Speedy Trial Act, “[a]ny information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). If the government fails to file the information or indictment within thirty days, “such charge against that individual contained in such complaint shall be dismissed or otherwise dropped.” Id. at § 3162(a)(1); see also United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 2009) (“In general, delay is measured from the date of arrest or indictment, whichever is earlier, until the start of trial.”) Where, as here, the defendant is arrested on state charges and later indicted on federal charges, “the right to a speedy trial in the federal case is triggered by the federal indictment, and the time period under consideration commences on that date.” Id. at 679. As stated in United States v. Garner, 32 F.3d 1305, 1309 (8th Cir. 1994), an “arrest on state charges does not engage the speedy trial protection for a subsequent federal charge.” See also United States v. Muniz, 1. F.3d 1018, 1024 (10th Cir. 1993) (“When [the defendant] was arrested by state authorities . . . [,] his speedy trial rights for the subsequent federal charges did not attach.”) This is true even if the federal charge shares the same facts as the state case. See United States v. Mills, 964 F.2d 1186, 1189-90 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

A state arrest, however, may trigger the Speedy Trial Act “when the Government has knowledge that an individual is held by state authorities solely to answer to federal charges.” United States v. Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590, 596 (4th Cir. 2005). This is known as the “ruse” exception. See United States v. Benitez, 34 F.3d 1489, 1494 (9th Cir. 1994). Under this exception, state proceedings may trigger the Speedy Trial Act upon a showing of “collusion or evidence that the detention was for the sole or primary purpose of preparing for [federal] criminal prosecution.” United States v. Garcia-Martinez, 254 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 2001).

United States v. Costello, 720 Fed. App'x 120, 122-23 (3d Cir. 2018). The Third Circuit has also noted that “[f]ederal officials' awareness, and even involvement in, the state court proceedings, would not establish the requisite collusion.” See United States v. Dyer, 325 F.3d 464, 470 (3d Cir. 2003). Additionally, even if there are federal officials involved in the state arrest who intend to bring federal charges, that is not, on its own, sufficient to trigger the “ruse exception.” Id. at 470.

Although the Third Circuit has not yet decided whether the “ruse exception” is adopted in this Circuit, it has considered and discussed it repeatedly rather than rejecting its application, leading the court to believe that if the right circumstances arose, the Third Circuit may be willing to adopt it. See Costello, 720 Fed. App'x at 123 (“We have yet to adopt the ‘ruse' exception”); see also United States v. Brown 445 Fed. App'x 474, 479 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Our Circuit has yet to recognize a ‘ruse exception' to the Speedy Trial Act's federal arrest requirement”); Dyer, 325 F.3d at 468 (“Even if ...