United States v. Howell

491 F.Supp.3d 110

UNITED STATES of America,

v.Xavier HOWELL, Defendant.

Criminal Action No. 2:20-cr-11-1

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Norfolk Division.

Signed September 30, 2020

Andrew C. Bosse, John F. Butler, U.S. Attorney's Office, Norfolk, VA, for Plaintiff.

James Orlando Broccoletti, Zoby & Broccoletti, Norfolk, VA, for Defendant.

OPINION

John A. Gibney, Jr., United States District Judge

Xavier Howell has moved to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop and subsequent search of his vehicle. Officers stopped Howell's vehicle because they suspected him of trafficking narcotics and had learned of an outstanding warrant for his arrest. During the stop, a drug dog alerted on Howell's vehicle, giving the officers probable cause to search it. The search uncovered methamphetamine, incriminating paperwork, cell phones, mailing and packaging materials, and U.S. currency. Howell asks the Court to suppress all this evidence, arguing that the officers unlawfully stopped and detained his vehicle, making their later search of it also unlawful. Because the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Howell and did not unnecessarily prolong the stop, the Court will deny the motion to suppress the evidence found in the vehicle.

I. FACTS

On September 26, 2019, a confidential informant told Chesapeake Police Department Detectives Beha and Milewczik that a drug trafficker would stay overnight at the Aloft Hotel in Chesapeake, Virginia, to conduct drug transactions. This informant had demonstrated reliability through previous tips: he "ha[d] provided information that led to the seizure of large amounts of currency, narcotics, and firearms," resulting "in arrests and convictions at the state and federal level." (ECF No. 75, at 2.) In the tip to the detectives, the informant named the alleged drug trafficker, and said the trafficker would drive a black rental SUV with out-of-state license plates and travel with a female companion. The informant told the detectives that the suspected drug trafficker would depart from the Aloft Hotel the next morning. The Aloft Hotel, "known to police as a gathering place for drug dealers and their customers," is located in "a well-known drug trafficking area." (Id. at 1, 13.)

At about 7:00 a.m. on September 27, 2019, Detective Milewczik began surveilling the Aloft Hotel. Around 9:45 a.m., he obtained the Aloft Hotel's guest registry and searched for the name the informant had given him for the suspected drug trafficker. He did not see that individual's name or the name of any known female associate on the register. Instead, Detective Milewczik saw Howell's name on the guest registry. Howell had reserved a room at the Aloft Hotel for one night. Detective Milewczik recognized Howell's name because of Howell's involvement in a previous drug trafficking investigation. Through that earlier investigation, which had resulted in neither charges nor a conviction, Detective Milewczik had learned that Howell had a prior conviction for trafficking controlled substances into Virginia.

After Detective Milewczik saw Howell's name on the guest registry, Detective Beha conducted a National Crime Information Center ("NCIC")/Virginia Criminal Information Network ("VCIN") inquiry and discovered that Howell had an outstanding arrest warrant from Georgia for failure to appear.

About two hours later, Howell pulled up to the hotel in a black rental SUV with Georgia license plates. An unknown woman accompanied Howell. Police later identified this woman as Howell's sister. Howell entered the hotel, retrieved his bags, and left in his SUV about ten minutes later.

Detectives Beha and Milewczik asked Officers Byrd and Weeks to stop Howell's vehicle, so the officers followed Howell after he left the hotel. Howell drove below the posted speed limit and signaled before he made turns.

As the detectives had requested, the officers stopped Howell based on the ongoing narcotics investigation and the outstanding arrest warrant. They stopped him at 12:06 p.m. After Howell stopped, Officer Byrd began checking Howell's driver's license and registration and performing an additional NCIC/VCIN inquiry. The inquiry confirmed that Howell had an outstanding arrest warrant from Georgia.

At 12:11 p.m., as Officer Byrd checked Howell's license and performed the NCIC/VCIN inquiry, K-9 Officer Rombs arrived with a drug dog. By the time Officer Byrd confirmed the warrant, the drug dog had alerted on Howell's vehicle. Based on the drug dog's alert, the officers searched the vehicle and uncovered approximately 1,768 grams of methamphetamine, incriminating documents, cell phones, mailing and packaging materials, and U.S. currency.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "When a police officer stops a car and detains its occupants, the traffic stop amounts to a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." United States v. White , 836 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2016), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Stitt , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 399, 202 L.Ed.2d 364 (2018).

"The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops," known as Terry¹ stops, "when a law enforcement officer has ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’ " Navarette v. California , 572 U.S. 393, 396-97, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (quoting United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 417–18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ). The "reasonable suspicion determination is a ‘commonsensical proposition’ " courts make by considering the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Hands , 573 F. App'x 278, 279 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Foreman , 369 F.3d 776, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) ).

To justify a Terry stop, "the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the stop. Terry , 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868. "Evidence that would support only ‘a mere "hunch" is insufficient,’ though a reasonable basis need not establish probable cause and may well ‘fall[ ] considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.’ " United States v. Massenburg , 654 F.3d 480, 485 (4th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) ).

III. DISCUSSION

Howell argues that because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him, and because the warrant did not justify the stop, the Court must exclude the evidence obtained during the stop. He argues in the alternative that the Court must suppress the evidence because the officers unreasonably extended the length of the stop. The government defends the lawfulness of both the stop of Howell and the five-to-eight-minute detention before the drug dog alerted to Howell's vehicle. In defense of the stop, the government argues that reasonable suspicion supported the stop. The government also points to the outstanding warrant from Georgia, arguing that the warrant gave the officers the authority to arrest Howell, so it certainly gave them the authority to stop him. As for the brief roadside detention following the stop, the government says that the officers did not unnecessarily prolong the stop and the drug dog alerted during their diligent pursuit of the ongoing narcotics investigation, giving them probable cause to search Howell's vehicle. Because the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Howell and the resulting stop did not exceed the allowable duration, the Court will deny Howell's motion to suppress.²

A. Reasonable Suspicion

The government argues that the totality of the circumstances gave the officers reasonable suspicion to stop Howell and investigate him for suspected narcotics trafficking. The relevant circumstances included the tip from the confidential informant, Howell's status as a known narcotics trafficker, his criminal history, and his presence at a hotel known for drug trafficking.³

The government first points to the confidential informant's tip. An informant's tip alone, if supported by "enough indicia of reliability," can justify a Terry stop. Adams v. Williams , 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) ; cf. United States v. Harris , 39 F.3d 1262, 1269 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Information of criminal activity given by a known reliable informant is enough to sustain a Terry stop."). "Informants' tips, like all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman on the scene, may vary greatly in their value and reliability." Adams , 407 U.S. at 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921. To determine whether an informant's tip is reliable enough to justify a Terry stop, courts look to the informant's past reliability and the accuracy and specificity of the tip. See, e.g., United States v. Lundy , 164 F. App'x 332, 333 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court's finding of probable cause to issue a search warrant based on information from an informant who had provided the government with reliable information in the past); United States v. Harris , No. 3:15cr170-REP, 2016 WL 1441382, at *7 (E.D. Va. Apr. 11, 2016) (finding the specificity and general accuracy of the informant's tip bolstered his reliability which, in turn, supported the government's reasonable suspicion to stop).

In this case, the confidential informant had provided the government with reliable information in past drug and gun investigations.

In addition, the tip that led the detectives to Howell included details corroborated by the police. The informant told the detectives on September 26, 2019, that a suspected drug trafficker would spend that night at the Aloft Hotel in Chesapeake. The informant predicted that a woman would accompany the suspected trafficker, and that the suspected trafficker would drive...