United States v. Huber

622 F.Supp.3d 645

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Matthew HUBER, Defendant.

Case No. 1:22-cr-00052

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division

Signed August 22, 2022

Leslie S. Johns, Ashley Jones Law, Cleveland, OH, Richard J. Perez, Rosplock & Perez, Willoughby, OH, for Defendant.

Patrick P. Burke, Henry F. DeBaggis, II, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Ohio, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiff.

OPINION AND ORDER

J. Philip Calabrese, United States District Judge

Defendant Matthew Huber moves to suppress all evidence obtained during a search of his residence pursuant to a warrant signed by a State court judge and requests an evidentiary hearing. The United States opposes the motion. The Court held oral argument on the motion on July 22, 2022 and took the motion under advisement. This case presents close and difficult questions, about which reasonable jurists could disagree and reach contrary conclusions. But the record shows that the police had probable cause based on a statement from a third-party some two months before the search. Contrary to Defendant's argument, the information in that statement was not stale, such that when Mr. Huber's probation officer confirmed that he was residing at the house in question, there was probable cause for a search. For these reasons, as more fully explained below, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to suppress and sees no reason to hold an evidentiary hearing to test the warrant at issue.

FINDINGS OF FACT

On Defendant's motion to suppress, the record establishes the following relevant facts. The Court takes these facts from the affidavit supporting the search warrant at issue. Accordingly, the Court recognizes that these facts present a one-sided view of the case and might not carry the day at trial. Nevertheless, they provide the record for purposes of the motion before the Court. Finally, the Court limits this discussion of the facts to those it finds relevant to a determination of probable cause.

On February 22, 2021, Detective Christopher Giordano of the Cleveland Heights Police Department, who also serves on the local U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration Task Force, sought a search warrant for a residence in South Euclid, Ohio. (ECF No. 17-2.) Based on Detective Giordano's affidavit, a judge of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas issued a search warrant for the residence. (Id., PageID #121.)

A. Background

By way of background, during the relevant times, Defendant Matthew Huber was on probation in Lake County. (ECF No. 17-2, ¶ 7, PageID #115.) Mr. Huber reported his address as 8707 Clark Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio. (Id.) But an anonymous tip in November 2020 reported that Mr. Huber was living on Colony Road in South Euclid. (Id., ¶ 1, PageID #113.)

B. Statements Implicating Mr. Huber

While conducting surveillance of the South Euclid residence, a police officer saw a gold Toyota Avalon pull into the driveway then pull out approximately twenty minutes later. (Id., ¶ 9.) During a subsequent traffic stop of the vehicle, Harvey Jones was identified as the driver. (Id., ¶¶ 9 & 11, PageID #115 & #116.) Jones consented to a search of the vehicle after admitting to possessing two small bags of marijuana inside the trunk. (Id., ¶ 11, PageID #116.) An officer arrested Jones and towed his vehicle. (Id., ¶ 12, PageID #116.) During an inventory search of the vehicle, the police found $25,000 inside a bag, a loaded pistol, a suspected drug ledger, three iPhones, and a plastic bag containing 128.21 grams of cocaine. (Id., ¶¶ 12 & 13.)

DEA agents interviewed Jones on two separate occasions. During the first interview on December 16, 2020, Jones stated that he "knew the white guy who lived on Colony Road as Chad[.]" (Id., ¶ 17, PageID #117.) DEA agents conducted another interview on the following day. (Id., ¶ 18, PageID #118.) During that interview, Jones stated that he "sold his friend Champ [ ] and a white male approximately five sacks of marijuana" inside the South Euclid residence. (Id.) Jones then identified Mr. Huber as the "white guy" involved in the marijuana sale with Champ. (Id.) Also, Jones stated that approximately one week before the marijuana sale, he "sold Champ [ ] a half kilo of cocaine for $30,000" inside the South Euclid residence. (Id.)

C. The Home Visit

On February 22, 2021, the Lake County Probation Department conducted a home visit at the South Euclid residence pursuant to probation policy and procedure. (Id., ¶¶ 24 & 25 PageID #119.) Specifically, Probation Supervisor Craig Berry, Probation Officer Jillian Gibson, and officers from the South Euclid Police Department went to the residence in South Euclid. (Id., ¶ 25.) According to the search warrant affidavit, Kristy Cargill, Mr. Huber's girlfriend, opened the door and confirmed that Mr. Huber resided there. (Id.) "A further search of the second floor . . . bedroom/office area" that Mr. Huber and Cargill used turned up, among other things, a blue tub containing a white powdery substance, several rubber-banded amounts of cash, a small plastic bag suspected of containing marijuana, a digital scale containing white powdery residue, nine bottles of sleeping pills, and mail addressed to Mr. Huber. (Id.)

During the home visit, Detective Giordano observed Mr. Huber driving near the residence. (Id., ¶ 26, PageID # 120.) Later, South Euclid police officers stopped Mr. Huber for a traffic violation. (Id.) The officers detained Mr. Huber for a probation violation and drug investigation. (Id.) Then, they obtained the warrant at issue.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A grand jury returned a four-count indictment charging Defendant with: (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and psilocyn; (2) possession with intent to distribute cocaine; (3) possession with intent to distribute psilocyn; and (4) possession of firearms by a convicted felon. (ECF No. 1.)

Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of the residence. (ECF No. 17.) He maintains that probable cause did not support the search warrant. He also requests a Franks hearing. The United States opposes the motion. (ECF No. 18.) In addition to arguing that probable cause supports the warrant, the United States argues that, in any event, the good faith exception applies. (Id., PageID #130.)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" and provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend IV. Probable cause means "reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof, but more than mere suspicion" and exists "when there is a fair probability given the totality of the circumstances, that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." United States v. Lattner, 385 F.3d 947, 951 (6th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up).

A judge's determination of probable cause receives great deference. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The issuance of a warrant is not scrutinized after the fact under a de novo standard, which would be inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to warrants. Id. (quotation omitted). The issuing judge must make "a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Id. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317. When reviewing that determination, the Court simply ensures that the judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause supported the warrant. Id. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317. "Review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting probable cause is limited to the information presented in the four corners of the affidavit." United States v. Jackson, 470 F.3d 299, 306 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 2005)).

Defendant argues that the probation officers did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial search of his South Euclid residence. (ECF No. 17, PageID #91-97.) Because the initial search of the residence was illegal, Defendant argues, the evidence obtained in that search is inadmissible and should not have been included in the search warrant affidavit. (Id., PageID #101-02.) Further, based on the totality of the circumstances, Defendant asserts that probable cause did not exist to support the issuance of the search warrant. (Id., PageID #102-03.)

I. Initial Search of the South Euclid Residence

Ordinarily, the search of an individual's residence requires a warrant supported by probable cause. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (citation omitted). "However, the Supreme Court has made clear that the nature of the relationship between state actors and individuals subject to state supervision in lieu of or following release from prison alters the relevant analysis under the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Herndon, 501 F.3d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 2007).

In the context of probation, the Supreme Court has used two different approaches under which the warrantless search of a probationer's home may still meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164; United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). First, in Griffin, the Supreme Court held that a State policy allowing searches of probationers upon a finding of "reasonable grounds" satisfied the Fourth Amendment. 483 U.S. at 872-73, 107 S.Ct. 3164. So long as a warrantless search is carried out "pursuant to a regulation that...