United States v. Hughes

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. DAMIEN HUGHES, Defendant.

No. 2:13-cr-20142-SHM-13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION

January 25, 2021

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

Before the Court is Defendant Damien Hughes's pro se Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's denial of his original motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (the "Motion"). (D.E. Nos. 574, 575, 564.) The government responded on December 15, 2020. (D.E. No. 577.) For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

In April 2013, Hughes was indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. (D.E. No. 3.) In January 2014, Hughes pled guilty. (D.E. No. 325.) On August 27, 2014, this Court sentenced Hughes to 127 months in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release. (D.E. No. 461-62.) Hughes's current release date is October 19, 2022. See Bureau of Prisons, Inmate Locator Utility, "Damien Hughes," www.bop.gov/inmateloc (last accessed Jan. 21, 2021).

Hughes initially filed for compassionate release on May 27, 2020. (D.E. No. 564.) The Court denied his original motion on June 22, 2020, because there were no cases of COVID-19 in Hughes's facility and because Hughes has a significant criminal history. (See D.E. No. 569.)

Since the Court denied Hughes's original motion, he has written two letters asking the Court for a decision. He submits new information to assist the Court. (See D.E. Nos. 574, 575.) The Court construes Hughes's subsequent letters as a motion for reconsideration. Hughes submits that there has been an outbreak of COVID-19 at his facility since his original motion and that the outbreak puts him at risk. (D.E. No. 575.) He submits that he has participated in the Residential Drug and Alcohol Program ("RDAP") at his facility. (Id.)

The government responded to Hughes's Motion on December 15, 2020. (D.E. No. 577.) The government argues that Hughes is as likely to contract the virus that causes COVID-19 outside his facility as he is in the facility. (Id. at 1467.) The government also argues that the Court should deny the Motion because theCourt has previously determined that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weigh against compassionate release. (Id. at 1468.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A sentencing court does not have inherent authority to modify an otherwise valid sentence. United States v. Washington, 584 F.3d 693, 700 (6th Cir. 2009). The authority to resentence a defendant is limited by statute. United States v. Houston, 529 F.3d 743, 748-49 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Ross, 245 F.3d 577, 585 (6th Cir. 2001)).

Eighteen U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) allows a court to modify a term of imprisonment where "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant [modification]." "Although relief under the statute is commonly referred to as 'compassionate release,' such relief is not limited to immediate release, but includes a reduction in sentence." United States v. Marks, 455 F. Supp. 3d 17, 21 n.3 (W.D.N.Y. 2020). "The compassionate release provisions were . . . intended to be a 'safety valve' to reduce a sentence in the 'unusual case in which the defendant's circumstances are so changed, such as by terminal illness, that it would be inequitable to continue the confinement of the prisoner.'" United States v. Ebbers, 432 F. Supp. 3d 421, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting S. Rep. 98-225, at 121 (1983)).

In the First Step Act of 2018 (the "First Step Act"), Pub L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239, Congress amended 18 U.S.C.§ 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow a prisoner to file a motion for compassionate release. Before the First Step Act, a motion for compassionate release could be brought only by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (the "BOP"). United States v. York, Nos. 3:11-cr-76, 3:12-cr-145, 2019 WL 3241166, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. July 18, 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2017)). The First Step Act modified § 3582(c)(1)(A) with the intent of "increasing the use and transparency of compassionate release." Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (capitalization omitted); see also Ebbers, 432 F. Supp. 3d at 430.

Section 3582(c)(1)(A) now provides that:

[T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that --

(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . .

and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . .

Section 3582(c)(1)(A) requires a defendant to exhaust available administrative remedies with the BOP before seeking judicial relief. See United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 832-34 (6th Cir. 2020). A defendant may exhaust his administrativeremedies in one of two ways: (1) by exhausting "all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf," or (2) on "the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The defendant bears the burden of showing he has exhausted his administrative remedies and is entitled to compassionate release. See Ebbers, 432 F. Supp. 3d at 426-27 (citing United States v. Butler, 970 F.2d 1017, 1026 (2d Cir. 1992)). Section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement is a mandatory claim-processing rule that is subject to waiver and forfeiture. See Alam, 960 F.3d at 834 (citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)).

Congress directed the United States Sentencing Commission, "in promulgating general policy statements regarding the sentencing modification provisions in section 3582(c)(1)(A) of title 18, [to] describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples." 28 U.S.C. § 994(t); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(C).

The Sentencing Commission has published a policy statement in the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (the "U.S.S.G."), addressing the standards for compassionate release. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (the "Policy Statement"). ThatPolicy Statement is not "applicable" to a motion for compassionate release filed directly with a court by a defendant. United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1111 (6th Cir. 2020) ("[F]ederal judges . . . have full discretion to define 'extraordinary and compelling' without consulting the policy statement § 1B1.13."); United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 236, (2d Cir. 2020) ("Because Guideline § 1B1.13 is not 'applicable' to compassionate release motions brought by defendants, Application Note 1(D) cannot constrain district courts' discretion to consider whether any reasons are extraordinary and compelling."); United States v. Beck, 425 F. Supp. 3d 573, 579 (M.D.N.C. 2019) ("There is no policy statement applicable to motions for compassionate release filed by defendants under the First Step Act. By its terms, the old policy statement applies to motions for compassionate release filed by the BOP Director and makes no mention of motions filed by defendants."). The only statutory limit on the sentencing court's authority to determine what is an extraordinary and compelling reason is that "[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered" such a reason. 28 U.S.C. 994(t); United States v. Rodriguez, 451 F. Supp. 3d 392, 396 (E.D. Penn. 2020) ("Congress never defined the term 'extraordinary and compelling reasons,' except to state that '[r]ehabilitation ... alone' does not suffice.").

Nevertheless, the Policy Statement applicable to motions brought by the BOP provides a helpful starting point for the extraordinary and compelling reasons analysis. United States v. Kolodesh, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, ---, 2020 WL 5292145, at *2 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 4, 2020) ("As many courts have noted, the Sentencing Commission's policy statements 'provide[] helpful guidance' when considering a motion for compassionate release."); United States v. Andrews, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, ---, 2020 WL 4812626, at *5 (E.D. Penn. August 19, 2020) (same); United States v. Burnside, 467 F. Supp. 3d 659, 664 (N.D. Iowa 2020) (same); Rodriguez, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 397 ("[A] majority of district courts have concluded that the old policy statement provides helpful guidance, [but] ... does not constrain [a court's] independent assessment of whether 'extraordinary and compelling reasons' warrant a sentence reduction under § 3852(c)(1)(A).") (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted); Beck, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 579 (same).

The Policy Statement reiterates that a court may reduce a term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(1)(A) if "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction" and "after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable." Id. The Policy Statement also directs courts to determine that "the defendant is not a danger to thesafety of any other person or to the community," before reducing a term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(1)(A). Id.

The commentary to the Policy Statement describes four categories of "extraordinary and compelling reasons" that may justify compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A): (A) the medical condition of the defendant; (B) the age of the defendant; (C) family circumstances; and (D) other reasons. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)-(D). The "other reasons" category allows compassionate release if, "[a]s determined by the Director of...