United States v. Inman

583 F.Supp.3d 1117

UNITED STATES of America

v.Daniel Lewis INMAN

No. 3:20-cr-00154

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

Filed February 1, 2022

Rachel M. Stephens, Assistant US Attorney, Debra Teufel Phillips, U.S. Attorney's Office, Nashville, TN, for United States of America.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ELI RICHARDSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release (Doc. No. 50), and Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. No. 51). Via the Motion for Compassionate Release, Defendant seeks a reduction of his 60-month sentence and immediate release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The Government has filed a response in opposition (Doc. No. 55, "Response"), arguing that the Motion should be denied because Defendant has not established "extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release" and consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors counsels strongly against granting compassionate release.

BACKGROUND

On April 17, 2020, the Government charged Defendant in a criminal complaint with one count of possession of a firearm subsequent to a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Doc. No. 1). On December 1, 2020, Defendant pled guilty to the sole count pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(B) plea agreement. (Doc. No. 30). On April 21, 2021, this Court sentenced Defendant to 60 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. (Doc. No. 45). Defendant has been serving his sentence at USP Coleman. According to BOP, Defendant's release date is July 9, 2024. See Federal Inmate Locator , Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last accessed Jan. 27, 2022).

ANALYSIS

I. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Defendant seeks appointment of counsel. (Doc. No. 51). The Sixth Amendment secures the right of a criminal defendant who faces incarceration to be represented by counsel at all "critical stages" of the criminal process. United States v. Wade , 388 U.S. 218, 224, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). However, the constitutional right to assistance of counsel does not extend to motions for post-conviction relief. Pennsylvania v. Finley , 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987) ; Shedwick v. Warden N. Cent. Corr. Inst. , No. 16-3203, 2016 WL 11005052 (6th Cir. Dec. 30, 2016) ("[T]here is no right to counsel in a post-conviction action."). The decision of whether to appoint counsel for the purpose of seeking compassionate release is a decision within the sound discretion of the Court. See United States v. Stephens , 2020 WL 3250226 at *2 (E.D. Mich. June 16, 2020). "In exercising discretion as to whether to appoint counsel, a court should consider several factors, including the nature of the case, whether the issues are legally or factually complex, and the litigant's ability to present the claims for relief to the court." United States v. Woods , No. 2:03-CR-069, 2020 WL 5805324, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2020) (citing Lavado v. Keohane , 992 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1993) ).

Defendant fails to present any unique circumstances justifying appointment of counsel. A compassionate release request is not a particularly complex claim factually or legally. See United States v. Drayton , No. 10-20018-01, 2020 WL 2572402, at *1 (D. Kan. May 21, 2020) (denying motion to appoint counsel related to motion for compassionate release and noting that compassionate release claims are not particularly complex factually or legally and that the defendant appeared able to adequately present his claim). Defendant has failed to articulate why he is unable to present his request for compassionate release pro se. Moreover, the Court believes that it is able to fairly adjudicate such motions even though one side (and not the other) is unrepresented by counsel. That is not to say that learned counsel cannot contribute something, especially something regarding nuances, to a defendant's cause on these motions. But it is to say that typically, the degree of substantive merit of these very fact-based motions is evident to the Court even without learned counsel advocating the merits on the defendant's behalf. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. No. 50) is DENIED.

II. MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

Legal Standard

Prior to 2018, only the Director of the Bureau of Prisons could move for compassionate release. The First Step Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) to allow prisoners to move for compassionate release on their own behalf. See First Step Act of 2018, § 603, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5239. Now, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as modified by the Section 603(b)(1) First Step Act,¹ a district court may under certain circumstances grant a defendant's motion for compassionate release (hereinafter, "defendant-filed motion"). See United States v. Jones , 980 F.3d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 2020) ("Congress's use of ‘may’ in § 3582(c)(1)(A) dictates that the compassionate release decision is discretionary, not mandatory."). In order to grant such a defendant-filed motion, however, a court must find that the so-called "exhaustion requirements" have been satisfied—i.e. , "[either] the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of [BOP] to bring a motion [for compassionate release] on the defendant's behalf or [there has been a] lapse of 30 days since the receipt of such a request [for BOP to file such a motion] by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." See also United States v. Alam , 960 F.3d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 2020) (explaining that a district court may not disregard the exhaustion requirements of Section 3582(c)(1)(A) ).

Once it properly can act on a defendant-filed motion brought under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the district court next determines whether, in its discretion, to grant compassionate release to a defendant. In its recently issued opinion in Jones , the Sixth Circuit discussed the steps of the compassionate release analysis:

The three-step § 3582(c)(1)(A) test is as follows. At step one, a court must "find[ ]" whether "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant" a sentence reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).12 At step two, a court must "find[ ]" whether "such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The Commission's policy statement on compassionate release resides in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (U.S. Sent'g Comm'n 2018). Thus, if § 1B1.13 is still "applicable," courts must "follow the Commission's instructions in [ § 1B1.13 ] to determine the prisoner's eligibility for a sentence modification and the extent of the reduction authorized."

Dillon [v. United States ], 560 U.S. [817,] 827, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 [(2010)]. At step three, " § 3582(c) [(1)(A)] instructs a court to consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by [steps one and two] is warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case." Id.

Jones , 980 F.3d at 1108. The court then went on to resolve the following question with respect to defendant-filed motions (as opposed to compassionate-release motions filed BOP) in particular: "given the First Step Act's procedural reforms to compassionate release, is § 1B1.13 still an applicable—‘that is, "relevant" or "appropriate," ’ [ United States v. Ruffin , 978 F.3d 1000, 1007–08 (6th Cir. 2020) ]—policy statement for the purposes of the second § 3582(c)(1)(A) inquiry?" Id. The court noted that this is a question that has "sharply divided the courts," id. (citation omitted), as many district courts, including this Court, previously considered the Section 1B1.13 policy statements applicable when determining whether compassionate release was warranted. The court then chose a side, holding that "the passage of the First Step Act rendered § 1B1.13 ‘inapplicable’ to cases where an imprisoned person files a motion for compassionate release." Id. (citing United States v. Brooker , 976 F.3d 228, 234 (2d Cir. 2020) ).² Therefore, "[u]ntil the Sentencing Commission updates § 1B1.13 to reflect the First Step Act, district courts have full discretion in the interim to determine whether an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason justifies compassionate release when an imprisoned person files a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion." Id.

In other words, because § 1B1.13 is inapplicable to defendant-filed motions, a district court adjudicating such a motion is not bound by anything § 1B1.13 has to say about—including any limitations or requirements § 1B1.13 would impose upon—the finding of extraordinary and compelling reasons. But this rule is not the only consequence of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Jones. Another is that the district court, in adjudicating a defendant-filed motion, may disregard the requirement of § 1B1.13(2) that the court find the defendant not pose a danger (to any other person or to the community) in order to grant compassionate release.

If, in adjudicating a defendant-filed motion, a district court determines that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for compassionate release exist, the court then determines whether compassionate release is warranted in light of the Section 3553(a) sentencing factors. See Jones , 980 F.3d at 1112.³ The sentencing factors set forth in Section 3553(a) include:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed—

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or

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