United States v. Israel

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. KAMAU ALAN ISRAEL, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 17-10948

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

December 23, 2020

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

4:17-CV-409

Before OWEN, Chief Judge, and DENNIS and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:^*

Our court previously granted a certificate of appealability (COA) to Kamau Alan Israel for the following issues: whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) investigate Israel's mental health history and competency; (2) move for a competency examination and hearing; (3) investigate and advise Israel regarding an insanity defense; and(4) present mitigating evidence of Israel's mental health at sentencing. We conclude that the district court properly denied Israel's § 2255 motion. Accordingly, we affirm.

I

Israel is a diagnosed schizophrenic with a history of mental health issues. He takes medication for his schizophrenia, but the medication is not always effective. As a result, Israel occasionally has psychotic episodes during which he hallucinates both visually and audibly.

A

In 2014, Israel walked into a bank and waited in line. He had recently shaved his head, removing "notably long hair that was fashioned in 'dread locks,'" and "was wearing construction clothing, including a yellow reflective vest and a dust mask, which was pulled up around his chin[] but just underneath his mouth." Once he reached the front of the line, he exposed a small handgun tucked in his waistband and commanded the teller to open the cash drawer. When she did not comply, Israel climbed over the counter and pointed his handgun at multiple tellers, commanding them to open the drawers. After obtaining money from all the teller drawers, he fled the bank in his vehicle.

A short pursuit ensued after Israel failed to yield to officers and fled at an extremely high rate of speed." Israel crashed his vehicle, disabling it and breaking his wrist and ankle. He exited the vehicle; limped toward a nearby vehicle; and pointed his handgun at the woman inside, unsuccessfully attempting to steal her vehicle. An officer then approached Israel and ordered him to drop his gun. Israel complied, was taken into custody, and was ultimately charged with bank robbery. After his arrest, Israel told paramedics that he was prescribed Haladol. They asked if he was schizophrenic. Israel "appeared surprised the paramedics knew thismedication was prescribed for schizophrenia." "After this exchange, [Israel] began referencing an alter ego named 'Damon' [who] was violent and had attempted to kill [Israel] in the past."

When detectives attempted to interview Israel shortly after the paramedics' treatment, "he stated that he could not talk in front of 'Damon' because Damon was going to kill him. He then said that the robbery was supposed to be a 'suicide by cop' that didn't work," and that "he had scheduled his funeral for the following morning at 8 a.m." Israel now "wanted to go to jail because Damon could not get in there." Israel "reported that Damon had cut his throat and wrist and had stabbed him in the past," when in actuality those wounds were self-inflicted.

B

At his rearraignment, Israel pleaded guilty with no plea agreement. He assured the district court that he was "of sound mind" to understand "exactly what [he was there] for [that day], that is, to plead guilty to the offense of bank robbery," and "all of [the] penalties and punishments" he was subjecting himself to by doing so. Israel confirmed that he had discussed his factual resume with trial counsel, that counsel explained "the legal meaning of everything in it," and that he read and understood everything before he signed it. He agreed that he had been "satisfied" with trial counsel as his lawyer and did not "have any complaint whatsoever with anything [trial counsel had] done or failed to do during the time" he represented Israel.

The district court engaged Israel in a colloquy on the specifics of his mental health, current medications, and the "stress" he reported experiencing; his understanding of the charges against him and the proceeding that day; his understanding of the factual resume; his wish to plead guilty; the role of the sentencing court and the Guidelines; and the possibility of a sentence including a term of imprisonment of up to 20 years,a $250,000 fine, and a three-year term of supervised release. When the court addressed Israel's potential sentence, Israel asked the court to clarify that the sentence would not certainly be twenty years, but rather could be a maximum of twenty years. Satisfied with the colloquy, the court determined that Israel was "fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, and that his plea of guilty . . . is a knowing and voluntary plea" not "result[ing] from force, threats, or promises."

Shortly after the rearraignment, Israel wrote a letter to the district court. He identified himself as "the African American male that came to your court [two]-weeks ago on crutches to plead guilty to bank robbery." He knew the district court was "busy" with "all the felony cases [it was] dealing with, including [his]" and that the district court would ultimately impose his sentence. Israel clarified that he was writing the court "only as a last resort" after "exhaust[ing] all [his] other avenues," i.e., writing to the U.S. Marshals and speaking to trial counsel. He complained that the conditions of his confinement constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" because he was being denied a transfer from the jail to a medical unit where he would receive proper medication. He mentioned that his attorney had told him the week before why he had yet to be moved to a different facility. He said that trial counsel and the prosecutor on his case were "both privy to [his] quandary because" trial counsel told him that the prosecutor told trial counsel Israel would be moved after he consented to a psychological evaluation. But the prosecutor changed his mind after Israel pleaded guilty. Israel emphasized that he had "all [his] mental faculties . . . to say this; 'I'm not crazy enough to try to play games with my federal sentencing judge!!'" He assured the court that, though he had "psychiatric issues in [his] past," he had "never [given] anyone a doubt about [his] competency."

C

A month later, in an interview with the probation officer who prepared his presentencing report, Israel "admitted that all the facts set forth in his Factual Résumé are true, and he is guilty of the offense." He stated that "he does not know why he decided to rob the bank," "that his actions may have been caused by his mental health condition," and that "he may have been partially motivated by a desire to commit suicide." He "reported a history of suicidal ideation and stated that he has attempted suicide on multiple occasions in the past." When asked why he robbed the bank, located in Grapevine, Texas, when he lived in Fort Worth, Texas, Israel "said he got lost on the way to his wife's home." "[U]pon advice from counsel, he declined to clarify this statement." When asked "if there were any circumstances of the offense which needed clarification or further explanation" than was in the factual resume, Israel wished to dispute "that he attempted to steal a car . . . , which is inconsistent with the evidence in this case." When the officer attempted to clarify, "upon advice of counsel, [Israel] declined to say anything else about his relevant conduct" to avoid risking the loss of an adjusted offense level for acceptance of responsibility.

The "Mental and Emotional Health" section of Israel's presentencing report noted "discrepancies regarding the nature of [Israel's] mental health conditions." It concluded with a request for a condition of supervised release "requiring a mental health evaluation," as it "would be beneficial to determine the full nature and extent of [Israel's] reported, but uncorroborated, mental health history." Israel never objected to any statement in the presentencing report addressing his mental health.

Two months later—and two weeks before sentencing—Israel sent another letter to the district court, addressed to trial counsel, discussing Israel's concerns with trial counsel "downplay[ing]" his mental illness "inan effort to get [him] through this judicious process [as] expeditiously as possible, with little or no assistance." He accused counsel of not securing a psychiatric evaluation, failing to contact family members and hospitals to substantiate his history of mental illness, and "constantly patronizing" him due to his mental illness. Israel concluded that he was "presently conscious to the harsh reality that [trial counsel had] been playing on" his mental health issues by telling him that the interview room in the jail may be bugged. That made him "afraid to speak freely" and was "why [he writes trial counsel] letters, but [trial counsel] 'never' respond[s] to them."

In response to that letter, the court commented that "[o]ften what appear to be irreconcilable differences between a defendant and appointed counsel for a defendant are nothing more than misunderstandings that can readily be resolved by frank and open discussions between the defendant and counsel. The court is optimistic that such is the case here." The court then ordered that the two meet and, if any problems remained, trial counsel would be required to file an appropriate motion on behalf of Israel. Accordingly, Israel and trial counsel met for twenty-five minutes. Trial counsel then filed a report in compliance with the court's order stating that the two had "resolved the differences between them at the outcome of the meeting." Israel sent no further communication to trial counsel or the court, and all proceeded to sentencing.

D

At sentencing, the district court confirmed that Israel and trial counsel had received in a timely manner and read the presentencing report and...