United States v. Jackson

MEMORANDUM

MALACHY E. MANNION, United States District Judge.

Pending before the court is defendant Robert Jackson's motion to suppress statements pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b). The statements were made after he was arrested by an officer with the Pocono Mountain Regional Police, (“PMRP”), and a detective with the Monroe County District Attorney's Office. (Doc. 27). Jackson is charged with a drug trafficking conspiracy and distribution of a controlled substance resulting in death. Jackson seeks the court to suppress his incriminating statements alleging that they were obtained unlawfully after he invoked his Miranda rights. Jackson contends that all of his statements should be suppressed since he was in custody and being interrogated, and since officers continued to question him after he “reserve[d] all of [his] rights” and, claimed that he was “kidnapped” and being held “under threat, duress, and coercion.”

For the reasons discussed below, and after consideration of the briefs and the evidence submitted, including the video recording of the statements,

Jackson's suppression motion will be DENIED IN ITS ENTIRETY without the need for an evidentiary hearing.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND^[1]

As a backdrop, on July 28, 2020, the PMRP were dispatched to 1220 Little Billy Lane in Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania for an unresponsive male found in a gutted dwelling on the property. The male was identified as Joseph Sturgis, Jr. Sturgis's cell phone was located near his body, along with a hypodermic needle and multiple small wax bags consistent with heroin use. A forensic examination of Sturgis's cell phone revealed relevant text messages and Facebook communications between Sturgis and two female family members. The details of the conversations between Sturgis and the two females included the purchasing of two bundles of heroin for $150.00.

The two female family members were interviewed by officers at the scene about their communications with Sturgis prior to his death. They admitted that their contact for heroin was a guy they knew as “Jay” from Scranton, who was later identified as Robert Jackson. The females stated that they would typically text “Jay” to obtain heroin. Working with the officers,

the two females communicated with “Jay” to order additional heroin that evening. “Jay” agreed to meet the females and replied in a text message that he would arrive at their location in Tobyhanna in approximately 26 minutes. Officers set up a perimeter and observed “Jay” arrive as he had stated he would. “Jay” was immediately ordered out of his vehicle by officers. As “Jay” exited the vehicle, he dropped his cell phone and two bundles of heroin stamped “Dirty Harry” at his feet. Officers called “Jay's” cell phone number that was provided by the females and the cell phone that “Jay” had dropped rang. “Jay” was placed under arrest and identified himself as Robert Jackson. He also claimed to be “sovereign citizen” and a “Moorish American National.”

Jackson was taken into police custody and transported to the PMRP Headquarters where he was given his Miranda rights and asked to speak with officers. The details of Jackson's interview that are at issue in his instant motion will be discussed below.

A search subsequently executed by officers at the Tobyhanna property resulted in the seizure of a bundle of suspected heroin located in the front pants pocket of Sturgis. The bags in the bundle were stamped “Dirty Harry.” Also seized were multiple empty wax bags stamped “Dirty Harry.” An autopsy and toxicology determined the cause of Sturgis's death to be a fentanyl overdose. PSP laboratory analysis of the “Dirty Harry” bags showed that they contained fentanyl.

On November 17, 2020, a grand jury returned a three count indictment charging Jackson with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §846, distribution of a controlled substance resulting in death, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1), and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. §2. (Doc. 1).

On November 19, 2020, Jackson had an initial appearance before Chief Magistrate Judge Mehalchick, and he entered a not guilty plea. He was ordered detained in the Lackawanna County Prison (“LCP”). (Docs. 12 & 14).

On April 12, 2021, Jackson filed, through his appointed counsel, his motion to suppress his statements and supporting brief alleging that his statements to the officer and detective on July 28, 2020 were made after he invoked his Miranda rights to cease the interview. (Docs. 27 & 28). Jackson attached as an Exhibit to his brief a copy of selected portions of the transcript from his recorded interview. (Doc. 28-1).

On May 24, 2021, after being granted an extension of time, the government filed its brief in opposition to Jackson's motion to suppress statements with a CD disc containing the entire video recording of Jackson's complete interview. (Doc. 32).

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUPPRESSION MOTION

In U.S. v. Sater, 477 F.Supp.3d 372, 379 (M.D. Pa. 2020), the court discussed a defendant's 5^th Amendment rights in the context of a suppression motion and stated:

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he privilege against self-incrimination protects individuals not only from legal compulsion to testify in a criminal courtroom but also from ‘informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning.'” Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). To ensure a person's Fifth Amendment rights are protected, Miranda held that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602.

Here, Jackson argues that his post-Miranda incriminating statements to the officers were made after he invoked his right to remain silent and stop the interview, and contends that they should all be suppressed.

In U.S. v. Whiteford, 676 F.3d 348, 362 (3d Cir. 2012), the Third Circuit explained:

The decision to waive one's Fifth Amendment rights must be the product of “a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights afford.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010). A court will inquire first, whether “the relinquishment of the right [was] voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice, ” and second, whether the waiver was made “with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135 (1986).

In United States v. Hodge, 2017 WL 1345219, *13 (D.V.I. Feb. 24, 2017), the court discussed a waiver of rights and stated:

To determine whether Miranda rights have been voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived, courts must “consider the

totality of circumstances surrounding [the defendant's] statement.” Briscoe, 69 F.Supp.2d at 741 (quoting United States v. Tyler, 164 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 1998)) (quotations omitted). Courts also must consider “the background, experience, and conduct of the [defendant], as well as any indicia of coercion.” Id. (citing Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046 (1983)) (internal citations omitted). Examples of “traditional” indicia of coercion are the duration and conditions of detention, the attitude of the interrogators, the defendant's physical and mental state, and other pressures affecting the defendant's powers of resistance and self-control. Id. at 741 n.1. “Miranda rights will be deemed waived only where the totality of the circumstances reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension.” United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 749 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1253 (3d Cir. 1994)).

III. DISCUSSION

This court has jurisdiction over Jackson's motion to suppress under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.

The government has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Jackson's statements made during his interview were voluntary. See Sater, 477 F.Supp.3d at 383. If the government fails to meet its burden, the defendant's involuntary statements are not admissible in evidence for any purpose. “Due process requires a suspect's confession to be voluntary if it is to be admitted into evidence”, and “[a] confession is involuntary if the suspect's will was overborne in such a way as to render his confession the product of coercion.” Id. at 384 (internal citations omitted). Additionally, “[i]t is well established that an involuntary confession may result from psychological, as well as physical, coercion”, Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 603 (3d Cir. 1986),

and “[t]he question in each case is whether the defendant's will was overborne when he confessed.” Id. at 604. The court considers, in part, “the specific tactics utilized by the police in eliciting the admissions, ” and “the details of the interrogation” in determining whether the officer's statements and actions, as well as the conditions, were so coercive that they deprived the defendant of “his ability to make an unconstrained, autonomous decision to confess.” Miller, 796 F.2d at 604.

Jackson moves to suppress his incriminating alleged post-invocation statements...