United States v. Jackson

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. LANGSTON JACKSON, Defendant.

Crim. No. SAG-13-0564

United States District Court, D. Maryland

October 31, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Stephanie A. Gallagher United States District Judge

In March, 2014, Defendant Langston Jackson pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. ECF 91. United States District Judge Catherine C. Blake accepted the parties' plea agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) and imposed their agreed sentence of 151 months of incarceration, to be followed by a period of three (3) years of supervised release. ECF 184. On March 9, 2021, Mr. Jackson filed a pro se Motion for Compassionate Release. ECF 301. The Government filed an opposition, ECF 311, and Mr. Jackson filed a reply. ECF 314.^[1] This Court has carefully reviewed those submissions and finds that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D Md. 2021). For the reasons that follow, Mr. Jackson's Motion will be denied.

As part of the First Step Act, enacted in December, 2018, Congress expanded 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), permitting courts to reduce an existing term of imprisonment where “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); Pub. L. No. 115391, tit. VI, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239-41 (2018). While previously any motion for compassionate release had to be initiated by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), the First Step Act granted defendants the ability to move the Court for a reduction in their sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” Id. Before a defendant's motion can be filed with the Court, however, one of two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the defendant must have exhausted all administrative remedies to appeal the BOP's failure to bring a motion on his behalf, or (2) thirty days must have lapsed “from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility,” whichever is earlier. Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Once a motion is for compassionate release is properly filed, the Court follows a three-step inquiry: (1) determining whether “extraordinary and compelling reasons” render the inmate eligible for compassionate release; (2) considering whether the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weigh in favor of a sentence reduction; and (3) ensuring that the reduction is “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); United States v High, 997 F.3d 181, 186 (4^th Cir. 2021).

The government concedes that Mr. Jackson adequately exhausted his administrative remedies. See ECF 311 at 3 n.2. Thus, this Court turns to the three-step inquiry enumerated under § 3582(c)(1)(A), beginning with whether Mr. Jackson has established any “extraordinary and compelling reason[]” warranting further consideration of compassionate release. This Court has authority to consider any “extraordinary and compelling reason” for release that a defendant might raise, as well as the impact of a combination or totality of the circumstances and factors presented by a defendant. See United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 284 (4th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Harris, No. 21-6781, 2022 WL 636627, at *1 (4th Cir. Mar. 4, 2022) (unpublished).

Here, Mr. Jackson cites three factors: (1) “an unwarranted disparity between career crack cocaine offenders and career powder cocaine offenders,” (2) the fact that the pandemic created harsher conditions of incarceration for inmates, and (3) his history of positive institutional behavior. ECF 301 at 1-2. Each is addressed below.

Mr. Jackson's argument about a sentencing disparity appears misplaced. He is correct that he would have had a lower sentencing guideline range if he had not been a career offender. He is also correct that the passage of the First Step Act allowed many inmates convicted of crack cocaine offenses, including those who were career offenders, to seek and obtain sentencing reductions. Persons convicted of powder cocaine offenses, including career offenders, were ineligible for those same reductions. But those facts do not, as Mr. Jackson suggests, create a disparity between career offenders convicted of crack cocaine offenses and those convicted of powder cocaine offenses. Instead, they eliminate the disparity - because the crack cocaine offenders had received higher sentences than similarly situated powder cocaine offenders in the first place, reduction of those crack cocaine sentences simply puts the two groups of offenders closer to parity then they had been previously.^[2]

Turning to Mr. Jackson's second argument, this Court considers COVID-19 related conditions of confinement to be of minimal import for purposes of establishing an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. Unfortunately, all of society experienced significant imposition as a result of the pandemic, including the inability to participate in many desirable activities. This Court does not minimize the increased hardship suffered by incarcerated persons, who already experience significant restrictions on their liberty and who were at greater health risk because of their collective living situation. Mr. Jackson cites several of those hardships, including the lack of any constructive programming options during the pandemic period, restricted movements throughout the prison facility, and increased difficulties in obtaining medical care. But those hardships were experienced universally by all incarcerated inmates and were not unique or extraordinary to Mr. Jackson. See, e.g., United States v. Murry, 538 F.Supp.3d 615, 619 n.2 (E.D. Va. 2021) (same); United States v. Burks, No. 3:14-CR-208-MOC-1, 2021 WL 1394857, at *4 (W.D. N.C. Apr. 13, 2021) (same). A finding that those conditions were extraordinary and compelling would affect every person incarcerated during the pandemic.

Finally Mr. Jackson cites his history of positive institutional behavior, noting that he has availed himself of many educational...