United States v. Jean

108 F.4th 275

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. Joel Francois JEAN, Defendant—Appellee.

No. 23-40463

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

July 15, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, USDC No. 1:08-CR-101-1, Michael Joseph Truncale, U.S. District Judge,

Bradley Elliot Visosky, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Plano, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Jeanne Marie Heffernan, Nadia E. Haghighatian, Kirkland & Ellis, L.L.P., Austin, TX, for Defendant-Appellee

Before Smith, Wiener, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge:

The United States appeals the grant of compassionate release to Joel Francois Jean. Because Jean exhibited extraordinary rehabilitation and because his sentence, if imposed today, would have been nearly a decade shorter, the district court held compassionate release was warranted. Finding no abuse of discretion, we AFFIRM.

I

A

Compassionate release is not a new remedy; in fact, "[i]t dates back at least to the Parole Reorganization Act of 1976." United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2021) (Oldham, J.). This early compassionate release statute read as follows: "At any time upon motion of the Bureau of Prisons [("BOP")], the court may reduce any minimum term to the time the defendant has served." 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g) (repealed 1987). "The capaciousness of that text authorized the BOP to request (and district courts to grant) reductions for a wide range of reasons."¹ Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 390.

In 1984, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act ("SRA") wherein "Congress abolished federal parole and forbade the federal courts from 'modifying a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.' " Id. (citation omitted). But Congress retained an exception for compassionate release motions through its enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3582. Id. Thus, even after the SRA, a district court could, on a motion from the BOP, modify a term of imprisonment where, inter alia, "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

In enacting § 3582, Congress intended it to act as a " 'safety valve[ ]' for modification of sentences" to "assure the availability of specific review and reduction of a term of imprisonment for 'extraordinary and compelling reasons.' " S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 121 (1983). Through § 3582, Congress intended to keep "the sentencing power in the judiciary where it belongs, yet permit[ ] later review of sentences in particularly compelling situations." Id.

The "extraordinary and compelling reasons" prong has been—as we have described—"notoriously thorny." Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 391. This is in part because "Congress never defined or provided examples of 'extraordinary and compelling reasons' that might warrant a reduction." Id. at 390. Rather, Congress explicitly and clearly delegated that authority to the United States Sentencing Commission. Id. Specifically, the SRA "instructed the Commission to 'promulgate general policy statements regarding the sentencing modification provisions in section 3582(c)(1)(A)' that 'describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples.' " Id. (citation omitted). In delegating its authority, Congress provided only a single restriction: that "[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason."² Id. (emphasis added).

Exercising the authority explicitly delegated to it by Congress, the Commission enacted U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to inform the extraordinary and compelling reasons analysis undertaken by district courts. In its commentary to § 1B1.13, the Commission outlined four categories of circumstances that may be considered extraordinary and compelling: (1) medical conditions of the defendant; (2) age of the defendant; (3) family circumstances; and (4) other reasons. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (effective Nov. 1, 2006).

Notably, however, until 2018, compassionate release motions could only be brought by the BOP—not by criminal defendants. See Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 391. But in 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act ("FSA"), which for the first time allowed criminal defendants to move for compassionate release. Id. at 392. The Commission, however, did not have a quorum from 2019 through 2022 and thus could not promulgate new guidance for these prisoner-brought motions.³ U.S. Sent'g Guidelines Manual Supplement to App. C at 204-05 ("Because the Commission lost its quorum in early 2019 and did not regain it until 2022, it was unable to amend § 1B1.13 during the more than four-year period since defendants were first permitted to file such motions."). In the meantime, we held that the commentary for motions brought by the BOP was not applicable to motions brought by criminal defendants like this one. Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 393. Therefore, until November 1, 2023, when the Sentencing Commission enacted an applicable policy statement, what constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons for motions brought by criminal defendants was left to the broad discretion of the district courts, limited only by Congress's directive that rehabilitation alone was insufficient.

In the absence of guidance from Congress or the Sentencing Commission, appellate courts split on whether district courts could consider non-retroactive changes in the law as a factor when deciding whether extraordinary and compelling reasons existed for compassionate release. Compare United States v. Chen, 48 F.4th 1092 (9th Cir. 2022), United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14 (1st Cir. 2022), and United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2020), with United States v. Crandall, 25 F.4th 582 (8th Cir. 2022), United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255 (3d Cir. 2021), and United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569 (7th Cir. 2021). And, until now, we have not definitively decided this issue, a decision applicable only to motions decided by district courts prior to November 1, 2023.⁴

It was under this framework that the district court evaluated, and granted, Jean's motion for compassionate release.

B

We turn now to the facts of the case before us. Jean has been incarcerated in Texas since 2009. In 2007, Jean was one of five defendants indicted on charges stemming from an ongoing investigation into the use of motels to traffic drugs in the Houston, Texas area. On the day that Jean's trial was to start, he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense.

At the time of sentencing, Jean had three qualifying Texas convictions for controlled-substance offenses, and as a result, he was classified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Due to his classification as a career offender, Jean's Guidelines range was 352 to 425 months' imprisonment, and he was ultimately sentenced to 292 months imprisonment, a downward variance from the Guidelines.

In the years after Jean was sentenced, a series of cases redefined what could be considered a controlled-substance offense for the purpose of § 4B1.1—namely, Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), United States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2016), and United States v. Tanksley, 848 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2017). Due to the legal impacts of Mathis, Hinkle, and Tanksley, one or more of Jean's three Texas convictions no longer qualified as a controlled-substance offense for the purpose of the career offender Guideline. As a result, it is undisputed that if he were to be sentenced today, Jean would not be classified as a career offender under § 4B1.1.

In 2023, Jean filed a motion for compassionate release pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that three extraordinary and compelling reasons warranted compassionate release. First, and primarily at issue on appeal, Jean argued that non-retroactive changes in the law, due to Mathis, Hinkle, and Tanksley, would result in a substantially shorter sentence today and thus militates in favor of compassionate release. Second, Jean argued that his sentence was unjust because it was longer than that of his co-defendants and those convicted of more heinous offenses. Finally, Jean argued that his post-sentencing conduct and rehabilitation weigh in favor of compassionate release.

As to the first argument, the district court recognized that post-Mathis, Hinkle, and Tanksley, Jean would not be considered a career offender, and thus his Guidelines range would be substantially lower—roughly 160 to 185 months.⁵ Though the district court noted that a non-retroactive change in the law "affects all prisoners sentenced under the prior law," the court nonetheless correctly concluded that "non-retroactive changes in sentencing law may constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting compassionate release when other factors, such as the defendant's rehabilitation, are also present." Accordingly, the district court found that the non-retroactive changes in the law may favor compassionate release.

Next, the district court rejected Jean's argument that the disparity between the sentence imposed upon him and that imposed upon others weighed in favor of compassionate release. The district court identified several distinguishing factors between Jean and his co-defendants before concluding that this disparity did not warrant compassionate release.

Finally, the district court considered Jean's argument that his post-sentencing conduct and rehabilitation, when combined with other factors, justified compassionate release. We agree that the record evidence of Jean's post-sentencing conduct is remarkable. As soon as Jean began his 292-month term of imprisonment, he worked with fervor toward self-improvement. In his first interview with the probation officer, as the Presentence Investigation Report explains, Jean stated that he "is truly sorry...