United States v. Jimenez-Segura

476 F.Supp.3d 326

UNITED STATES of America

v.Juan JIMENEZ-SEGURA

Criminal Action No. 1:07-cr-146

Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-805

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division.

Signed August 4, 2020

Daniel T. Young, Assistant U.S. Attorney, for United States of America.

Geremy Kamens, Federal Public Defender for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

T. S. Ellis, III, United States District Judge

Defendant, Juan Jimenez-Segura, pled guilty in 2007 to two counts of using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during a "crime of violence," in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Defendant was then sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 84 months' imprisonment on the first § 924(c) conviction and 300 months' imprisonment on the second § 924(c) conviction, to be served consecutively, for a total of 384 months' imprisonment. Twelve years later, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Davis , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019) that § 924(c)'s "crime of violence" residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 2336, 139 S.Ct. 2319. And the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Simms , 914 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc) held that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery was not a "crime of violence" as that term is defined in § 924(c)(3). See id. at 233-34, 236. The Fourth Circuit's decision in Simms and the Supreme Court's decision in Davis prompted the Section 2255 motion at issue here. The central dispute between defendant and the government now is whether defendant's procedural default of his § 2255 claim should be excused under either the cause-and-prejudice standard or the actual innocence standard.

For the reasons that follow, defendant's § 2255 motion must be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, defendant's § 2255 motion is granted insofar as defendant's § 924(c) conviction based on the predicate offense of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is vacated, and a resentencing hearing on defendant's remaining § 924(c) conviction is scheduled for September 25, 2020 at 9:00 a.m. Defendant's § 2255 motion is denied in all other respects.

I.

The factual and procedural history of this criminal case provides important context for the issues presented here. On April 19, 2007, a federal grand jury returned an eight-count Indictment charging defendant with:

• Conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count 1)

• Two counts of substantive Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Counts 2 and 3)

• Attempted Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count 4)

• Two counts of using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, namely the Hobbs Act robberies charged in Counts 2 and 3, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Counts 5 and 6)

• Using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, namely the attempted Hobbs Act robbery charged in Count 4, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 7)

• Using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, namely the conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery charged in Count 1, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 8)

See Indictment (Dkt. 10). The charges in the Indictment arose out of defendant's participation in six armed robberies and three attempted armed robberies of check cashing stores between June 2005 and June 2006. Id. On June 20, 2007, the government filed a criminal information charging defendant with an additional § 924(c) offense predicated on another Hobbs Act robbery, namely a September 14, 2005 robbery of a Money Post store in Riverdale, Maryland. See Criminal Information (Dkt. 22).

On June 20, 2007, defendant pled guilty to two counts of using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm in relation to a "crime of violence," in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See Plea Agreement (Dkt. 24). Specifically, defendant pled guilty to (i) Count 8 of the Indictment, a § 924(c) offense for which the underlying predicate "crime of violence" was the conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery charged in Count 1 of the Indictment, and (ii) the Criminal Information, a Section 924(c) offense for which the underlying predicate "crime of violence" was the Hobbs Act robbery of a Money Post store in Riverdale, Maryland on September 14, 2005. See id.

As part of the statement of facts in defendant's plea agreement, defendant admitted that he and another individual robbed the Money Post in Riverdale, Maryland of approximately $8,000 on September 14, 2005, and that defendant used, carried, and brandished a firearm in the commission of that robbery. See Statement of Facts (Dkt. 25). Defendant further admitted that from June 25, 2005 through June 2006, defendant conspired with other individuals to commit additional robberies of check cashing stores in the Eastern District of Virginia and that defendant or his co-conspirators used, carried, and brandished a firearm "in furtherance of the goal or objective of the conspiracy and in order to take or attempt to take from the presence of employees of each check cashing store ... money belonging to the store." Id. On June 20, 2007, the Court accepted defendant's guilty plea to Count 8 of the Indictment and to the Criminal Information. See Minute Entry for Proceedings (Dkt. 23). Thereafter, on July 10, 2007, an Order issued granting the government's motion to dismiss Counts 1-7 of the Indictment pursuant to the terms of the parties' plea agreement. See Order Dismissing Remaining Counts of the Indictment (Dkt. 26); Plea Agreement (Dkt. 24), at 7.

Defendant's plea agreement made abundantly clear the maximum penalties and the mandatory minimum penalties pertinent to Count 8 of the Indictment and to the Criminal Information, the charges to which defendant pled guilty. See Plea Agreement (Dkt. 24). Specifically, defendant's plea agreement made clear (i) that each § 924(c) offense was punishable by a maximum term of life imprisonment, (ii) that conviction on Count 8 of the Indictment required a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of seven years pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), (iii) that conviction on the Criminal Information required a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of twenty-five years pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1),¹ and (iv) that the two terms of imprisonment were required to be served consecutively to one another. See id. Defendant reviewed every part of the plea agreement with his attorney prior to agreeing to its terms voluntarily, and defendant acknowledged knowingly and voluntarily agreeing to the terms of his plea agreement in his plea colloquy. On October 26, 2007, defendant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment—84 months of imprisonment on Count 8 of the Indictment and 300 months of imprisonment on the Criminal Information, to be served consecutively to the 84 months on Count 8. See Judgment in a Criminal Case (Dkt. 35). Accordingly, defendant was sentenced to a total term of 384 months of imprisonment. Id. Defendant did not file a direct appeal of his conviction or his sentence.

On June 24, 2016, defendant, by counsel, filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate both of his § 924(c) convictions on the ground that the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States , 576 U.S. 591, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) operated to invalidate his two § 924(c) convictions. See Motion to Vacate Conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Dkt. 38). On July 12, 2016, the government filed a motion to dismiss defendant's § 2255 motion. See Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 39). On July 27, 2016, a Memorandum Opinion and Order issued granting the government's motion to dismiss and denying defendant's § 2255 motion as untimely pursuant to § 2255(f)(3) because Johnson did not recognize a right applicable to § 924(c) that would re-open Section 2255(f)(3)'s one-year statute of limitations (the "2016 § 2255 Opinion"). See United States v. Jimenez-Segura , 206 F. Supp. 3d 1115, 1126-27 (E.D. Va. 2016). The 2016 § 2255 Opinion also concluded that both of defendant's § 924(c) convictions fell within the force clause of § 924(c), not the residual clause of § 924(c),² and therefore remained valid convictions after Johnson . See id. at 1132-34.

On September 20, 2016, defendant appealed the denial of his § 2255 motion. See Notice of Appeal (Dkt. 44). While defendant's appeal was pending, the Fourth Circuit decided United States v. Simms , 914 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc), which held that § 924(c)'s residual clause was void for vagueness and that, applying the categorical approach, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery did not fall within § 924(c)'s force clause. See id. at 233-34, 236. Five months later, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Davis , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019), which also held that Section 924(c)'s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 2336. In light of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Simms and the Supreme Court's decision in Davis , defendant's appellate counsel filed a motion to remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings on November 25, 2019. On April 22, 2020, the Fourth Circuit granted defendant's motion to remand. See Remand Order (Dkt. 51). The Fourth Circuit expressed no opinion as to whether defendant is entitled to relief on his § 2255 motion. See id.

That same day, April 22, 2020, an Order issued directing the parties to file supplemental briefs that articulated the parties' arguments under Davis and Simms . See Supplemental Briefing Order (Dkt. 52). Defendant, by counsel, filed a supplement brief in support of his § 2255 motion on May 28, 2020, the government filed its supplemental opposition to defendant's § 2255 motion on June 10, 2020, and defendant, by counsel, filed a supplemental reply brief on June 17, 2020. See Defendant's Supplemental Brief (Dkt. 55); Government's Supplemental Opposition Brief (Dkt. 57); Defendant's Supplemental Reply...