United States v. Knight

488 F.Supp.3d 19

UNITED STATES of America,

v.Ronnie J. KNIGHT, Defendant.

10-CR-128S

10-CR-144S (1)

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed September 22, 2020

Mary C. Baumgarten, U.S. Attorney's Office, Buffalo, NY, for United States of America.

John F. Humann, Federal Public Defender, Buffalo, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

WILLIAM M. SKRETNY, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before this Court is Defendant Ronnie J. Knight's Motion for Compassionate Release, which the government opposes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A). For the reasons discussed below, Knight's motion is granted, and he is ordered immediately released from FCI Bennettsville.

II. BACKGROUND

On December 23, 2009, the government filed a criminal complaint in 10-CR-144S against Knight and his co-defendant charging them with manufacture of methamphetamine, cultivation of marijuana, possession with intent to distribute and distribution of methamphetamine and marijuana, and conspiracy to commit the offenses. (10-CR-144S, Docket No. 1.) While that complaint was pending, the government filed a separate, single-count information against Knight in 10-CR-128S, charging him with conspiring between December 8 and 29, 2009, to manufacture, to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute a mixture and substance containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. (10-CR-128S, Docket No. 1.) Several days later, on May 19, 2010, the grand jury returned an indictment in 10-CR-144S, charging Knight and his co-defendant with multiple controlled substances offenses, including the offense charged against Knight in the criminal complaint in 10-CR-128S. (10-CR-144S, Docket No. 1.) Thereafter, the case against Knight proceeded in 10-CR-144S, and the criminal complaint against him in 10-CR-128S was dismissed.

On September 20, 2010, Knight pleaded guilty in 10-CR-144S to conspiring to manufacture, to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute a mixture and substance containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. (10-CR-144S, Docket Nos. 28, 29.) Approximately four months later, on January 10, 2011, this Court sentenced Knight to 188 months’ imprisonment, 6 years’ supervised release, a $100 special assessment, and no fine, fees, or costs. (10-CR-144, Docket Nos. 41, 44.) Knight is presently serving his sentence at FCI Bennettsville, with a release date of January 9, 2024.¹

On April 20, 2020, Knight filed a pro se motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i) in 10-CR-128S, rather than in the case he was sentenced in—10-CR-144S. (10-CR-128S, Docket Nos. 677, 690.) Since full briefing occurred in 10-CR-128S, this Court will cite those docket entries, but will file this Decision and Order in both 10-CR-128S and 10-CR-144S to ensure accuracy of the overall record.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Compassionate Release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i)

"A court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except pursuant to statute." United States v. Gotti, 433 F. Supp. 3d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). One such statute is 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i) which, as amended by the First Step Act of 2018,² provides as follows:

The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that—in any case—the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553 (a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; ... and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

The defendant carries the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to a sentence reduction under the statute. See United States v. Ebbers, 432 F. Supp. 3d 421, 426-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). A defendant proceeding on his or her own motion may meet that burden by demonstrating (1) that he or she satisfied the statutory exhaustion requirement, (2) that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist for a sentence reduction, and (3) that a sentence reduction is consistent with the applicable Sentencing Guidelines provisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i) ; United States v. Perez, 451 F.Supp.3d 288, 291-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). If the court finds, after consideration of the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) factors, that the defendant has met this burden, it may reduce the defendant's sentence under the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i) ; see also United States v. Gileno, 448 F. Supp. 3d 183, 185 (D. Conn. 2020).

The statutory exhaustion requirement is mandatory and "must be strictly enforced." United States v. Monzon, No. 99 Cr. 157, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 550220, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2020) (citing Theodoropoulos v. I.N.S., 358 F.3d 162, 172 (2d Cir. 2004) ); United States v. Cassidy, 17-CR-116S, 2020 WL 1969303, at *3-8 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2020) (finding exhaustion mandatory). The exhaustion requirement is met when the earlier of two circumstances occurs: (1) the defendant fully exhausts all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion to modify an imposed term of imprisonment on his or her behalf,³ or (2) 30 days lapse from the date the warden of the defendant's facility receives the defendant's request to file such a motion on his or her behalf. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A).

Congress delegated to the Sentencing Commission the task of "describ[ing] what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction" under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i). See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (t). The Commission, in turn, promulgated a Policy Statement concerning sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A) in § 1B1.13 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The Commentary to that section contains four examples of circumstances that constitute "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a sentence reduction: "Medical Condition of the Defendant"; "Age of the Defendant"; "Family Circumstances"; and "Other Reasons". See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.

At issue here are the "Medical Condition of the Defendant" and "Other Reasons" examples. The "Medical Condition of the Defendant" example provides as follows:

Medical Condition of the Defendant—

(i) The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e. , a serious and advanced illness with an end of life trajectory). A specific prognosis of life expectancy (i.e. , a probability of death within a specific time period) is not required. Examples include metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease and advanced dementia.

(ii) The defendant is—

(I) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition,

(II) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or

(III) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process,

that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 comment n. 1 (A).

The "Other Reasons" example is a catch-all provision encompassing "an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the [other] reasons described."⁴ Id. n. 1 (D).

As it relates to the requirement that a sentence reduction be consistent with the applicable Sentencing Guidelines provisions, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is once again the relevant provision. It provides that a court may reduce a sentence if, after consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) factors, it determines that

(1) (A) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction; or

(B) the defendant (i) is at least 70 years old; and (ii) has served at least 30 years in prison pursuant to a sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (c) for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is imprisoned;

(2) the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (g) ; and

(3) the reduction is consistent with this policy statement.

See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.

Finally, district courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny motions for sentence reduction. See Gileno, 448 F. Supp. 3d at 186.

B. Knight's Motion for Compassionate Release

1. Exhaustion of Administrative Rights

As indicated above, 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A) contains a threshold exhaustion requirement. To satisfy this requirement, a defendant must demonstrate that either (1) he or she fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion to modify an imposed term of imprisonment on his or her behalf, or (2) 30 days have lapsed from the date the warden of the defendant's facility received the defendant's request to file such a motion on his or her behalf. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A).

For reasons discussed at length in two previous decisions (fully incorporated herein), this Court has found that the statutory exhaustion requirement is mandatory and cannot be excused. See Cassidy, 2020 WL 1969303, at *3-8 ; United States v. Schultz, 454 F.Supp.3d 217, 220-23 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) ; accord United States v. Montanez, 458 F.Supp.3d 146, 149-61 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding § 3582 (c)(1)(A) ’s exhaustion requirement mandatory).

Here, Knight submitted his request for compassionate release to the warden of FCI Bennettsville on April 28, 2020. (Docket No. 9, p. 18.) The warden...