United States v. Kyle

268 A.3d 1256

UNITED STATES, Appellant,

v.Montero KYLE, Appellee.

No. 20-CO-330

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued December 9, 2021

Decided February 10, 2022

Daniel J. Lenerz, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Michael R. Sherwin and Channing D. Phillips, Acting United States Attorneys at the time the briefs were filed, and Elizabeth Trosman, John P. Mannarino, and Dennis Clark, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the briefs, for appellant.

Shilpa S. Satoskar, Public Defender Service, with whom Samia Fam and Jaclyn S. Frankfurt, Public Defender Service, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before Blackburne-Rigsby, Chief Judge, McLeese, Associate Judge, and Fisher, Senior Judge.

McLeese, Associate Judge:

The United States appeals from the trial court's order suppressing evidence. We reverse.

I.

The following evidence was introduced at a hearing on appellant Montero Kyle's motion to suppress evidence. At around 11 p.m. one night, uniformed Metropolitan Police Department officers saw a group of people in the street and on the sidewalk. Loud music was playing, and people in the group appeared to be drinking. Officers got out of the car, and one of them noticed Mr. Kyle, who was walking away from the group. Mr. Kyle was holding a bottle and had a backpack in his hand. One of the officers said "hey boss, come here," and Mr. Kyle then ran. The officer chased Mr. Kyle into an alley, where Mr. Kyle fell. As Mr. Kyle got up, he threw the backpack over a ten-foot-tall, solid fence separating the alley from a backyard. Mr. Kyle ran again, leaving the alley, running onto another street, and entering the backyard of a house on that street, where the officer apprehended him. Another officer retrieved the backpack, which contained a gun, Mr. Kyle's expired D.C. identification, his current Virginia driver's license, his vehicle registration and title, Virginia and D.C. license plates, and a set of keys, among other items.

Mr. Kyle moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the backpack, arguing that the seizure and search of the backpack were unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. The United States argued in response that the seizure and search of the backpack did not violate Mr. Kyle's Fourth Amendment rights, because Mr. Kyle had abandoned the backpack. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that Mr. Kyle had not abandoned the backpack. The trial court gave several reasons for its conclusion: (1) the backpack contained personal items that would have been expensive, difficult, or impossible to replace; (2) the closed backpack was not an obviously incriminating item such as an exposed gun or drugs; (3) Mr. Kyle threw the backpack onto private property rather than in a public place; and (4) after Mr. Kyle threw the backpack over a high fence, the backpack was not immediately or readily accessible to the police. The trial court acknowledged the United States's argument that Mr. Kyle had thrown the backpack into the yard of a stranger, but reasoned that the officers would not have known that when they retrieved the backpack.

The trial court also ruled in the alternative that, even if Mr. Kyle had abandoned the backpack, the evidence recovered from the backpack should be suppressed because the police lacked both a warrant and adequate grounds to seize and search the backpack.

II.

When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party." Bennett v. United States , 26 A.3d 745, 751 (D.C. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). We draw all reasonable inferences in favor of upholding the trial court's ruling. Milline v. United States , 856 A.2d 616, 618 (D.C. 2004).

The seizure and search of the backpack could violate Mr. Kyle's rights under the Fourth Amendment only if Mr. Kyle "manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in [the backpack] that society accepts as objectively reasonable." California v. Greenwood , 486 U.S. 35, 39, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988). In other words, Mr. Kyle can prevail only if both (1) he retained a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack; and (2) that expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable.

Mr. Kyle emphasizes our statement that "the ultimate determination of abandonment in the Fourth Amendment sense hinges on the outcome of a factual inquiry into intent." Spriggs v. United States , 618 A.2d 701, 703 (D.C. 1992) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Boswell , 347 A.2d 270, 274 (D.C. 1975) ("Abandonment is primarily a question of intent ...."). It is true that the subjective intent of the defendant is an important part of the relevant inquiry. Our cases, including Spriggs and Boswell , make clear, however, that the defendant's intent is only half of the inquiry. For a defendant to prevail on a motion to suppress, the defendant's subjective expectation of privacy must also be objectively reasonable. E.g. , Spriggs , 618 A.2d at 703 n.3 (question is whether defendant voluntarily "relinquished his interest in the property in question so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of the search") (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted); Boswell , 347 A.2d at 274 (same); see also, e.g. , Greenwood , 486 U.S. at 39, 108 S.Ct. 1625 (seizure and search is basis for relief under Fourth Amendment only if defendant "manifested a subjective expectation of privacy ... that society accepts as objectively reasonable ") (emphasis added).

In the present case, we assume without deciding that Mr. Kyle retained a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack. We hold that throwing the backpack over a fence into someone else's backyard while fleeing from the police precluded Mr. Kyle from retaining an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the backpack. We note that Mr. Kyle does not dispute that his action in throwing the backpack over the fence was voluntary for purposes of this case.

The issue presented in cases such as this is often discussed using the term "abandonment." E.g. , Dozier v. United States , 220 A.3d 933, 947 n.20 (D.C. 2019). That term also refers to a property-law concept, however, and its use in the Fourth Amendment context has the potential to create confusion. "The issue is not abandonment in the strict property-right sense ...." Boswell , 347 A.2d at 274. "It is possible for a person to retain a property interest in an item ... while at the same time relinquishing any reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of obtaining suppression." Holt v. United States , 675 A.2d 474, 479 n.3 (D.C. 1996) ; see also, e.g. , Oliver v. United States , 466 U.S. 170, 183, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields; "The existence of a property right is but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate. The premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.") (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Salvucci , 448 U.S. 83, 91, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980) ("This Court has repeatedly repudiated the notion that arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law ought to control our Fourth Amendment inquiry.") (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore focus our inquiry on whether Mr. Kyle retained an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the backpack at the time the police seized and searched the backpack.

Our cases are not entirely clear as to our standard of review. Compare, e.g. , Spriggs , 618 A.2d at 703 ("Because the ultimate determination of abandonment in the Fourth Amendment sense hinges on the outcome of a factual inquiry into intent, a finding of abandonment is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.") (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted), with, e.g. , Brown v. United States , 97 A.3d 92, 95-97 (D.C. 2014) (in context of abandonment claim, court states that whether defendant has reasonable expectation of privacy is issue of law that court reviews de novo). Because the standard of review does not affect the outcome of this appeal, we assume without deciding that we review the trial court's ruling for clear error.

On a related topic, Mr. Kyle argues that abandonment must be shown by clear, unequivocal, and decisive evidence. Boswell , 347 A.2d at 275. The United States has not disputed that argument. We therefore also assume without deciding that the United States bore a heightened burden of proof in this case. But see, e.g. , Nix v. Williams , 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) ("[T]he controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence.") (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Rynhart , 125 P.3d 938, 943 (Utah 2005) (applying preponderance-of-evidence standard to issue of Fourth Amendment abandonment, explaining that "the distinction between the concept of abandonment in property law and in the context of the Fourth Amendment supports application of the burden of proof generally applicable to motions to suppress").

III.

We hold that Mr. Kyle clearly lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his backpack at the time the backpack was seized and searched. While fleeing from the police, and in the sight of the pursuing officer, Mr. Kyle threw the backpack over a fence into a backyard that was not his own. There was no evidence that he had any other connection to the backyard, which happened to be next to the spot in the alley where he fell down while fleeing. After he threw the backpack, Mr. Kyle got up and ran some distance before ultimately being apprehended by police. We conclude that those circumstances are clearly, unequivocally, and decisively inconsistent with an objectively reasonable expectation of...