United States v. Laffitte

1

United States of America, v. Russell Lucius Laffitte, Defendant.

CRIMINAL ACTION No. 9:22-00658-RMG

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Beaufort Division

March 6, 2023

ORDER AND OPINION

RICHARD MARK GERGEL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion for a new trial and for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rules 29(c) and 33(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and supplemental filings. (Dkt. Nos. 224, 242, 254). Defendant also moves for an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in his motion for a new trial. (Dkt. No. 231). The Government has filed responses in opposition. (Dkt. Nos. 238 260). For reasons set forth below, Defendant's motions are denied.

Legal Standard

Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a trial court “may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R Crim. P. 33. A motion for a new trial under Rule 33 must be filed within 14 days of the verdict, except for a claim of newly discovered evidence. In addressing a Rule 33 motion “the district court is not constrained by the requirement that it view the evidence in a light most favorable to the government” and “may evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” United States v. Arrington, 757 F.2d 1484, 1485 (4th Cir. 1985). A trial court, however, “should exercise its discretion to award a new trial sparingly,” and should grant a new trial “only when the evidence weighs heavily against the verdict.” United States v. Perry, 335 F.3d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, it is well settled that Rule 33 allows for the grant of a new trial where “substantial legal error has occurred.” United States v. Munoz, 605 F.3d 359, 373 (6th Cir. 2010).

Rule 29(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal within 14 days following a jury verdict. In addressing a Rule 29(c) motion, the trial court is required to sustain a guilty verdict if, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the verdict is supported by substantial evidence.” United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2006). Substantial evidence is defined as “evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

Procedural History

Defendant was indicted by the Federal Grand Jury on July 20, 2022 on charges of conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud, bank fraud, wire fraud, and three counts of misapplication of bank funds. (Dkt. No. 1). The Federal Grand Jury subsequently issued a Superseding and a Second Superseding indictment. (Dkt. Nos. 25, 61). Defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial and, after conferring with counsel, the Court set the trial to commence on November 8, 2022. (Dkt. Nos. 54, 55). The trial was conducted over nine days and resulted in a verdict of guilty on all counts. (Dkt. No. 208). Defendant thereafter filed his motions under Rules 29(c) and 33, and the Government filed responses in opposition. The parties also made supplemental filings at the direction of the Court. The motions are now ripe for disposition.

Rule 33 Motions for a New Trial

Defendant filed a motion for a new trial on five separate grounds: (1) the replacement of two jurors with alternates after the commencement of deliberations; (2) an “error” in the Indictment, which allegedly distorted the distinction between the personal injury claims of Arthur Badger and the claims of the Estate of Donna Badger, and the Court's denial of Defendant's right to argue this alleged error; (3) Court rulings which allegedly denied Defendant the right to question bank board members about their interest in selling the bank as a motive for their adverse testimony against Defendant; (4) Court rulings which denied Defendant the right to offer testimony about the negotiation of checks by the Bank of America related to Alex Murdaugh's theft of client funds; and (5) the refusal of the Court to charge an advice of counsel defense. The Court addresses each of these issues below.

A. The Replacement of Two Jurors with Alternates after Commencement of Jury Deliberations:

1. Factual Background

It is important at the outset to detail the circumstances leading to the replacement of two jurors, including the substance of their written communications to the Court, consultations with counsel, the responses of counsel prior to action being taken by the Court, and the basis of the Court's action stated at the time. Prior to jury selection, the parties were advised that the Court would select four alternate jurors in addition to the required twelve jurors in a criminal trial. The Court charged the jury after the close of the evidence that “[i]f it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send a note through the marshal,” but the jurors were advised in any communications “you are not to tell anyone, including me, how the jury stands.” (Dkt. No. 223 at 43). After the Court completed its charge, the Court directed the alternates to be placed in a secure location in the event it became necessary to replace any jurors during deliberations if jurors were “unable to perform . . . their duties.” (Id. at 44); Federal R. Crim. P. 24(c). No party objected to the selection of alternate jurors, the Court's charge regarding communications with the Court, or the retaining of the alternates in the event jurors needed to be replaced.

Following the completion of the Court's charge at 10:22 a.m. on November 22, 2022, the jurors were dismissed to begin their deliberations. (Dkt. No. 223 at 45). The Court summoned the parties and counsel to the courtroom at 7:43 p.m. to disclose the receipt of two notes from Juror No. 93. (Id. at 49-50). The first note read “need antibiotic @ 19:20. I can delay 1-2 hours.” (Dkt. No. 205 at 2). The second note read “feeling pressured to change my vote.” (Id. at 3). (emphasis in the original).

The Court advised the parties as follows:

[M]y instinct is that we have alternates and we should get to a verdict, and that it is not practical to get her medicine and drive back. I don't like this because I'm going to bring the jury back and tell them they've got to begin their deliberations again. But I don't know of any other choice I have. I welcome any thoughts anyone may have.

(Dkt. No. 223 at 50).

The Government responded that it agreed with replacing the juror. Defense counsel inquired whether the jury could stop its deliberations that evening and return in the morning. The Government expressed concern with breaking off deliberations that evening “since there's been no indication from the jury that they are having issues deliberating.” (Id. at 51).

At this point, the Court received another note written by multiple members of the jury. They wrote of a “shared concern” that an unidentified member of the jury was being influenced by the juror's prior jury experience and that the juror disagreed with the Court's charge, “specifically the definitions you provided.” (Dkt. No. 205 at 4). The note concluded: “We respectfully ask that you consider speaking to this issue, so that we are able to proceed with deliberations.” (Id.).

A moment later another note arrived from Juror No. 88: “Can you please call a alternative [sic] as I am experiencing anxiety and unable to clearly make my decision. I can provide more information as needed if necessary.” (Id. at 5).

The receipt of these various notes from the jurors in quick succession was highly unusual. The Court invited suggestions from the parties, noting that it was unclear if the issues raised in the notes involved two or three jurors. (Dkt. No. 223 at 53, 55). The Court and the parties addressed separately each of the situations raised by the juror notes. Regarding Juror No. 93, the juror needing her medication, the Court again stated that it proposed to replace that juror and to send her home. (Id. at 55-56). The Government concurred, observing that the juror “should be allowed to go home” because it would not be proper to “risk someone's health.” (Id. at 56). Lead defense counsel, Bart Daniel, voiced no objection and subsequently acknowledged on the record that he had agreed to Juror No. 93's replacement. (Id. at 62).

The Court and counsel discussed how the Court should address the note from a number of jurors indicating issues with an unidentified juror who allegedly was unwilling to follow the Court's charge and was referencing information from prior jury service. The Government referred to this unidentified juror as a potential “toxic juror” and indicated the juror should be replaced. (Id. at 57).

Regarding Juror No. 88, the anxious juror who had asked to be replaced by an alternate, the Court expressed concern with bringing the juror into the courtroom because it might exacerbate the stress she was already experiencing. (Id. at 55). The Court proposed, with the consent of the parties, that it would question Juror No. 88 in camera with only the court reporter and the courtroom deputy present to determine if the juror was capable of performing her duties. (Id. at 58). The Court explained that the Defendant was entitled to 12 functioning jurors and there was a problem with a juror who says “I can't do it anymore.” (Id at 56). The Government agreed with the Court's proposed procedure, indicating that bringing the anxious juror into the courtroom could contribute to her anxiety. (Id. at 58). Defense counsel also consented to the procedure proposed by the Court. (Id.). The Court stated that it intended to question Juror No. 88 and “take action. Fair enough? Everybody happy with that?” (Id. at 60). No party...