United States v. Lamar

600 F.Supp.3d 714

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Rollie Deshawn LAMAR, Defendant.

No. 5:22-mj-05138-MAS-1

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division. Lexington.

Signed April 27, 2022

Roger West, Ron L. Walker, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney's Office, Lexington, KY, for Plaintiff.

RELEASE OPINION AND ORDER

Matthew A. Stinnett, United States Magistrate Judge

The Complaint alleges that Defendant Rollie Deshawn Lamar ("Lamar") conspired to distribute an unspecified quantity of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. [DE 1 (Complaint)].¹ The Court confronts the Government's motion for pretrial detention in this case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B). As discussed below, the Court decides only whether the record demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that no combination of conditions will reasonably assure that Lamar does not endanger any other person or the community by obstructing or attempting to obstruct justice. The Court finds that the Bail Reform Act ("BRA") and pertinent case law require Lamar's release in this specific posture and on the present record.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

At Lamar's initial appearance, Lamar waived his right to a preliminary hearing, and the Government sought detention based upon a general danger theory.

Shortly after the hearing's conclusion (and on that same date), the Court briefly reconvened the parties and counsel to clarify the Government's statutory basis for its detention motion. The United States invoked 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B) and, because it produced some evidence indicating a serious risk that Lamar would obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice if released, the Court found that it was entitled to request a detention hearing on that basis. [DE 5].

The Court conducted a detention hearing in this case on April 20, 2022. [DE 8]. At the outset, the Court stated its belief that persuasive authority limited the instant detention analysis to only § 3142(f)(2)(B) obstruction bases and expressed intent to cabin the hearing accordingly. Although the Government maintained that the evidentiary scope should be more expansive, it tailored its presentation of proof during the hearing to its § 3142(f)(2)(B) arguments. The parties likewise disagreed as to the applicable standard of proof in (f)(2)(B) cases.

After hearing all evidence and factual arguments, the Court directed expedited supplemental briefing on two critical legal issues: (1) whether the scope of a detention hearing requested and held under § 3142(f)(2)(B) is limited to facts and argument supporting detention on that basis; and (2) whether the United States must prove the facts in support of its (f)(2)(B) theory by clear and convincing evidence or by some other quantum of evidence. Both sides filed supplemental briefs.

Before turning to the ultimate issue of pretrial detention, the Court must first address these two legal issues.

II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A. SCOPE OF DETENTION DETERMINATION

The Court first must discern the proper bounds of a detention hearing held "upon motion of the attorney for the Government ... in a case that involves ... a serious risk that such person will obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B).²

The Government argues that, even when a hearing is solely triggered by (f)(2)(B), it may present evidence of a defendant's dangerousness beyond any obstruction risk—such as evidence that Lamar may engage in drug trafficking upon release. The United States contends that subsection (e) permits the Court to examine all risks of flights and danger regardless of the subsection (f) basis for detention.

Lamar, in turn, asserts that an (f)(2)(B) hearing and the corresponding detention determination are limited to assessment of the specific danger risks outlined in that subsection. Per Lamar, the Government's reading defeats the entire purpose and structure of subsection (f).

After review of the text of the BRA, its legislative history, and persuasive case law interpreting the statutory scheme, the Court agrees with Lamar's position.

1. Plain Language of the BRA

The Court begins its analysis with the BRA's plain language and structure, giving each phrase full effect and reading "no clause, sentence, or word of [the] statute ... as superfluous, void, or insignificant" in the process. United States v. Bedford , 914 F.3d 422, 427 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting In re City of Detroit , 841 F.3d 684, 696–97 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

To start, subsection (f) strictly limits the cases in which the Government can request a detention hearing.³ See, e.g., United States v. DeGrave , 539 F. Supp. 3d 184, 201 (D.D.C. 2021) ; United States v. White , No. 3:21-MJ-04070, 2021 WL 2155441, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. May 27, 2021) (discussing the two-step process at length and concluding that under Sixth Circuit law "if [subsection (f)] circumstances are not present, a detention hearing (and, thus, detention) is simply unauthorized, regardless of how the Government would fare with respect to risk of non-appearance and danger to other persons or the community"). Under (f)(1), the Government can move for pretrial detention in cases involving specified offenses.⁴ See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A)-(E). Under subsection (f)(2), either the Government or the Court can move for pretrial detention in cases involving a serious risk of flight or a serious risk of obstruction, witness tampering, or juror intimidation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A) and (B). Upon finding that the Government has grounds to seek pretrial detention under (f), the Court then turns to (e) where detention is mandated "[i]f ... [the] judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the [defendant] as required and the safety of any other person and the community". 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).

The issue before the Court here is whether the basis for the detention hearing under (f) consequently limits the analysis under (e). Again, the Government's position is that any basis under subsection (f) opens the door as broadly as possible to any danger and flight considerations. The Court disagrees. Given subsection (f)’s limiting language regarding when pretrial detention is even available, it is appropriate to likewise construe subsection (e) narrowly. The Government's approach would heavily dilute the explicit, restrictive value of subsection (f) and its limited categories rendering subsection (f) superfluous. See United States v. Malone , 889 F.3d 310, 312 (6th Cir. 2018) (reiterating the "cardinal principle" that courts should avoid interpretations of a statute that would render a portion of it insignificant or superfluous); see also United States v. Schwamborn , No. CR060328SJFAKT, 2007 WL 9653331, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2007), report and recommendation adopted , No. 06-CR-328 (SJF), 2007 WL 9653332 (E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2007), aff'd , 249 F. App'x 906 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Leon , 766 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1985) ) ("Obstruction of justice has been held to be an ‘alternate ground for detention,’ distinct from ‘risk of flight and safety to the community.’ ").

The plain language of the BRA supports the narrowest reading of subsection (f) and, by consequence, subsection (e).

2. Legislative History of the BRA

The legislative history likewise confirms Congress's intent that subsection (f) should carefully circumscribe the universe of cases in which the United States could seek, and courts could make, pretrial detention decisions.

The district court in United States v. LaLonde fully examined the legislative history of the BRA relevant to this very context. 246 F. Supp. 2d 873 (S.D. Ohio 2003). The court cited the following quote from the legislative history: "[T]he requisite circumstances for invoking a detention hearing in effect serve to limit the types of cases in which detention may be ordered prior to trial." Id. at 875 (quoting S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 20, as reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1984, p. 3203). Based upon this statement, LaLonde held that, "[t]o the extent that the statute fails to be explicit in limiting detention to the cases identified in § 3142(f), the legislative history makes clear that Congress intended for the statute to do so. The Court resolves any latent ambiguity or uncertainty in the language of the statute in favor of the meaning Congress plainly intended." Id.

The overall congressional record adds to the quote cited by LaLonde. 131 Cong. Rec. S00000-12, 1985 WL 707152. There, the statements from senators indicate that the role of (f)(1) is to outline specific "categor[ies] of prosecutions for which pretrial detention on grounds of dangerousness would be authorized". Id. at 51. As for (f)(2), the statements explain that (f)(2) simply expands those categories for the limited purpose of preserving the "inherent right of the trial court to protect the integrity of the judicial process" in cases specifically involving serious flight or obstruction risks. Id. at 53.

If Congress explicitly and repeatedly emphasized the limited means by which the Government may seek detention, any effort to negate the effect of subsection (f) via subsection (e) seems misplaced. When taking the plain language together with the full context of the BRA's legislative history, the narrowest reading of subsections (e) and (f) is only further supported. To the extent ambiguity remains, the rule of lenity further supports such a reading in this context. See United States v. Miller , 734 F.3d 530, 540 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Choice , 201 F.3d 837, 840 (6th Cir. 2000) ) ("If the statute remains ambiguous after consideration of its plain meaning, structure, and legislative history, we apply the rule of lenity in favor of criminal defendants.").

3. Precedent Addressing the Issue

Though the Sixth Circuit has not squarely addressed the issue, the bulk of circuit and district courts have...