United States v. Landa-Arevalo

104 F.4th 1246

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Angel LANDA-AREVALO, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 22-3133

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit

FILED June 25, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Kansas (D.C. No. 2:16-CR-20016-DDC-7)

William D. Lunn, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant.

Carrie N. Capwell, Assistant United States Attorney, Kansas City, Kansas (Kate E. Brubacher, United States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas, Michelle McFarlane, Kansas City, Kansas, and James A. Brown, Appellate Chief, Topeka, Kansas, with her on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee United States of America.

Before TYMKOVICH, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.

CARSON, Circuit Judge.

If a district court has reasonable cause to believe a criminal defendant is mentally incompetent, the court must halt the proceeding and conduct a competency hearing. But once the district court determines that the defendant is competent by a preponderance of the evidence, the district court need not order additional evaluation. Defendant Angel Landa-Arevalo received a pre-sentencing mental competency evaluation but argues the district court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by not providing him with a second, more extensive evaluation. Defendant also argues the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I.

A grand jury indicted Defendant for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and for possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. That grand jury also indicted nine codefendants as coconspirators. The district court designated this case as complex—Defendant did not object.¹ On August 29, 2016, Defendant and his various codefendants jointly moved for a ninety-day continuance to review discovery. The district court granted the motion and scheduled a status conference for the end of the ninety-day period. At the status conference on November 28, 2016, the district court announced that it would set the trial date during the motions hearing scheduled for May 8, 2017—Defendant did not object. Before the motions hearing, on April 10, 2017, the district court granted a codefendant's motion to extend the deadline for pretrial motions. Defendant, for the first time, objected to the protracted timeline. The district court rescheduled the motions hearing for September 20, 2017, and the jury trial for November 6, 2017.

On May 9, 2017, Defendant moved to sever his trial from his codefendants to protect his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights.² The district court denied the motion. On October 18, 2017, the district court granted a codefendant's motion to continue the trial over Defendant's objection and rescheduled the trial to August 13, 2018. On July 30, 2018, the district court granted another codefendant's motion to continue the trial over Defendant's objection and rescheduled the trial to June 3, 2019. In response, Defendant filed a second motion to sever his trial from his codefendants. The district court denied the motion.

On May 31, 2019, Defendant moved pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241 for a hearing to determine Defendant's mental competency. The district court denied the motion. On June 7, 2019, the jury convicted Defendant. From his arraignment on February 23, 2016, to the start of the trial, Defendant remained in pretrial confinement for 1,196 days.

Prior to sentencing, Defendant and the Government jointly filed a motion for a mental competency hearing. The district court granted the motion.

To assist with its competency determination, the district court appointed Dr. Alicia Gilbert, a forensic psychologist, to examine Defendant and report her results to the district court. Dr. Gilbert concluded Defendant "did not appear to be suffering from any severe mental illness or cognitive deficits," and that "there wasn't a lot of evidence to suggest any kind of serious mental illness." When asked what the "next step" would be "if the court should decide that [Defendant] needed more assessment," Dr. Gilbert advised that Defendant could "be sent to a federal medical center . . . where he could be assessed by a larger team of experts." Based on Dr. Gilbert's testimony and the district court's lengthy personal experience with Defendant, the district court concluded that Defendant was "more likely competent than not" and competent to proceed with sentencing.

II.

A.

On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court violated his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process by not ordering a second competency evaluation. Defendant also argues that, without a second evaluation, the district court violated Defendant's Fifth Amendment right to substantive due process by finding Defendant competent to stand trial. We disagree.

We review a district court's determination on whether to order a competency examination for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ramirez, 304 F.3d 1033, 1035 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Prince, 938 F.2d 1092, 1095 (10th Cir. 1991)). We also review a district court's refusal to order a second competency examination for abuse of discretion. Prince, 938 F.2d at 1095 (citing United States v. Bodey, 547 F.2d 1383, 1387 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Stevens, 461 F.2d 317, 321 (7th Cir. 1972)). We reverse the district court's determination only if it is "arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical, or results in a manifestly unreasonable judgment." United States v. Weidner, 437 F.3d 1023, 1042 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Moothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1504-05 (10th Cir. 1994)).

The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause precludes district courts from subjecting a mentally incompetent criminal defendant to trial. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975). The Fifth Amendment's competency requirement is both procedural and substantive: a district court violates a criminal defendant's right to procedural due process by failing to hold an adequate competency hearing and violates a defendant's substantive due process rights by trying him during incompetency. McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 952 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Walker v. Att'y Gen., 167 F.3d 1339, 1343-44 (10th Cir. 1999)).

Congress established 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a), classifying a mentally incompetent defendant as one "presently . . . suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense." See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). In reviewing a defendant's mental competency, courts must follow § 4241's two-step procedure. First, a district court must determine whether reasonable cause exists to believe the defendant may be mentally incompetent; if so, the district court must conduct a competency hearing. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). Second, if the competency hearing establishes the defendant's mental incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence, the district court must halt the proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). As a discretionary measure, the district court may order a psychiatric or psychological examination of the defendant to assist in its competency determination. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining Defendant was "more likely competent than not" or by denying another evaluation. Defendant highlights his prior behavior, characterizing some of his actions as indicative of mental incompetency. Defendant also emphasizes a portion of Dr. Gilbert's testimony which, according to Defendant, suggests that an extended neurological evaluation would produce more reliable results. Even if we accept Defendant's characterization of the evidence, Defendant has established only the existence of another permissible view of the evidence—not that the district court's competency determination was arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical as is necessary for us to conclude the district court abused its discretion. See Weidner, 437 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Moothart, 21 F.3d at 1504-05).

To the contrary, the record provides a reasonable basis for finding Defendant mentally competent by a preponderance of the evidence. Dr. Gilbert testified that Defendant "did not appear to be suffering from any severe mental illness or cognitive deficits" and that "the evidence suggesting that he was competent outweighed the evidence suggesting that he wasn't." Through observation, Dr. Gilbert concluded that Defendant "was most likely competent."

Dr. Gilbert also gave the district court direct evidence of Defendant's ability to understand the nature of his legal proceedings. Dr. Gilbert testified that Defendant "talk[ed] about getting a different attorney and the reasons why he wanted a different attorney." Dr. Gilbert also testified that Defendant expressed his "understanding that he was facing . . . some serious charges or was having to deal with legal consequences and was worried about self-incrimination and didn't want to talk to anyone other than an attorney who would keep it private," and that Defendant understood that Dr. Gilbert could not keep their conversations private.

The record also indicates that Defendant appeared before the district court many times between his initial appearance in 2016 and his mental competency hearing in 2021. Because a defendant's behavior and demeanor play central roles in a competency determination, we hesitate to pierce the observation-informed decisions of the district court, wielding only a cold appellate record. See United States v. Cornejo-Sandoval, 564 F.3d 1225, 1234 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Prince, 938 F.2d 1092, 1095 (10th Cir. 1991)).

Defendant highlights Dr. Gilbert's suggestion that Defendant could "be...