United States v. Lane

689 F.Supp.3d 232

UNITED STATES of America v. Dai'Quan Jarrvel LANE, Defendant.

Criminal Action No. 3:23cr62 (RCY)

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division

Signed August 31, 2023

Olivia L. Norman, U.S. Attorney, United States Attorney's Office, Richmond, VA, Devon Schulz, U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USAO, Richmond, VA, for United States of America.

Laura Jill Koenig, Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Richmond, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Roderick C. Young, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Dai'Quan Jarrvel Lane's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment. The Defendant seeks dismissal of the indictment charging him with one count of Possession of Ammunition by a Convicted Felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and one count of Possession of a Machinegun, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), based on the Supreme Court's decision in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387 (2022). The Defendant brings both facial and as-applied challenges to §§ 922(g)(1) and 922(o). For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny the Defendant's motion in full.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Dai'Quan Jarrvel Lane is a rap music artist born and raised in Richmond, Virginia. Mot. Dismiss Indictment 3, ECF No. 21.

On March 1, 2021, Mr. Lane was convicted of Felony Perjury, in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-434.¹ Id. at 3, 3 n.2; Def.'s Reply 1, ECF. No 34. As a result of that conviction, Mr. Lane was sentenced to five years in prison, with four years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days of that prison sentence suspended. Def.'s Reply 2.

On February 1, 2023, Mr. Lane was playing one of his recordings live on Instagram. Mot. Dismiss Indictment 3; Gov't's Resp. 2, ECF No. 28. During the livestream, Mr. Lane displayed what appeared to be a firearm. Mot. Dismiss Indictment 3; Gov't's Resp. 2. A Richmond Police Department ("RPD") officer was watching the livestream. Mot. Dismiss Indictment 3; Gov't's Resp. 2. Knowing that Mr. Lane had a prior felony conviction for perjury, that officer and other RPD officers went to where they believed that Mr. Lane might be. Mot. Dismiss Indictment 3; Gov't's Resp. 2. When the RPD officers approached Mr. Lane and attempted to engage with him, Mr. Lane turned and ran away. Mot. Dismiss Indictment 3; Gov't's Resp. 2. The officers eventually caught up to Mr. Lane and arrested him. Gov't's Resp. 2.

RPD searched the area where Mr. Lane fled. Mot. Dismiss Indictment 3; Gov't's Resp. 2. Somewhere along Mr. Lane's path of flight, RPD officers recovered a Glock-style handgun with a machinegun conversion device (known as a "switch") attached to the firearm. Gov't's Resp. 1-2; see Mot. Dismiss Indictment 3. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF") calls this a "Glock switch." Mot. Dismiss Indictment 3. The firearm that RPD officers recovered was loaded with 20 rounds of ammunition. Mot. Dismiss Indictment 3; Gov't's Resp. 3. The firearm that RPD recovered was not the same firearm displayed in Mr. Lane's livestream. Mot. Dismiss Indictment 3; Gov't's Resp. 3.

According to an ATF examination, the recovered firearm with the "Glock switch" installed was able to fire multiple bullets with a single pull of the gun's trigger. Mot. Dismiss Indictment 3; Gov't's Resp. 3. Thus, according to the ATF, the "switch" converted the handgun into a machinegun under federal gun laws. Mot. Dismiss Indictment 3-4; Gov't's Resp. 3.

After his arrest, Mr. Lane made some post-Miranda statements to the police. Gov't's Resp. 3; see Mot. Dismiss Indictment 3. In those statements, Mr. Lane admitted that he is a convicted felon. Gov't's Resp. 3; see Mot. Dismiss Indictment 3. He admitted that he had found the recovered firearm months before the present arrest. Gov't's Resp. 3; see Mot. Dismiss Indictment 3. He also admitted that he knew that the "Glock switch" made the gun fire in a fully automatic manner. Gov't's Resp. 3; see Mot. Dismiss Indictment 3.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 17, 2023, a grand jury indicted Mr. Lane pursuant to: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for knowingly possessing 20 rounds of assorted ammunition which affected interstate commerce, after previously having been convicted for a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; and (2) 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) for knowingly possessing a machinegun—specifically, a Glock-style handgun affixed with a "switch" or "auto sear" which converted the Glock into a weapon that can fire multiple rounds with a single function of the trigger. Indictment, ECF No. 14; Mot. Dismiss Indictment 3-4, ECF No. 21; Gov't's Resp. 1-2, ECF No. 28.

Mr. Lane was arraigned on May 31, 2023, and filed the instant Motion to Dismiss the Indictment on June 16, 2023, seeking dismissal of both counts. Mot. Dismiss Indictment. The Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on July 14, 2023. Gov't's Resp. The Defendant filed his Reply on July 21, 2023. Def.'s Reply, ECF No. 29.

On August 3, 2023, the Court held a status conference with the parties where it scheduled a hearing on the instant motion. The parties stated that they did not seek to adduce evidence and only argument was needed. At the conclusion of the status conference, the Court ordered that the parties jointly file a document containing: (1) the statutes that the Defendant was convicted of that make him a prohibited person; (2) the date of the Defendant's underlying convictions; and (3) any other relevant information regarding the Defendant's prior convictions. On August 10, 2023, the parties filed the joint filing. Parties' Stipul. Facts, ECF No. 34.

The motion hearing occurred on August 11, 2023, at the conclusion of which the Court took the matter under advisement, pending issuance of a formal written opinion.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 allows parties to "raise by pretrial motion any defense, objection, or request that the court can determine without a trial on the merits." Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1). The Defendant brings facial and as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of both § 922(g)(1) and § 922(o), arguing that they violate the Second Amendment.

A. Facial vs. As-Applied Challenges

"To succeed in a facial constitutional challenge, a movant 'must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.' " United States v. Hosford, 843 F.3d 161, 165 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)); see Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008). "Because of this stringent standard, a facial challenge is perhaps 'the most difficult² challenge to mount successfully.' " Hosford, 843 F.3d at 165. A party ordinarily "can only succeed in a facial challenge by 'establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid,' i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications." Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184 (first alteration in original) (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095).

"An as-applied challenge requires only that the law is unconstitutional as applied to the challenger's case; a facial challenge requires this showing as well, but it also requires that there be "no [other, theoretical] set of circumstances" in which the law could be constitutionally applied." United States v. Mgmt. Consulting, Inc., 636 F.Supp.3d 610, 619 (E.D. Va. 2022) (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095).

B. The Second Amendment

The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. Const. amend. II.

1. The Pre-Bruen Framework

After District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010), most of the federal Courts of Appeals (including the Fourth Circuit) adopted a two-step approach to evaluate Second Amendment challenges. The first question to be addressed was "whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment's guarantee." United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 681 (4th Cir. 2010). Such an inquiry sought "to determine whether the conduct at issue was understood to be within the scope of the right at the time of ratification. If it was not, then the challenged law is valid." Id. However, if the challenged regulation burdened conduct that was within the scope of the Second Amendment as historically understood, then courts would move to the second step: applying means-end scrutiny—either strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny (rational basis review was not permitted). See id. The applicable level was identified based on the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the challenged law burdened the right to keep and bear arms. See id.

2. The Bruen Framework

In the recent case of N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, the Supreme Court summarily rejected the second, means-end scrutiny step of the old framework. 142 S. Ct. at 2127. The Bruen majority crafted a new two-step test, which is as follows:

When the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's "unqualified command."

Id. at 2129-30.

Bruen's step one is a threshold inquiry. It requires a textual analysis to determine whether "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms," U.S. Const. amend. II., covers the...