United States v. Laroche

83 F.4th 682

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Jade LAROCHE, Defendant - Appellant

No. 22-2969

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

Submitted: June 16, 2023

Filed: October 4, 2023

Appeal from United States District Court for the District of South Dakota - Central

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant and appeared on the appellant's brief, was David S. Barari, AFPD, of Rapid City, SD.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee was Kevin Koliner, AUSA, of Sioux Falls, SD. The following attorney(s) appeared on the appellee's brief; Troy Robert Morley, AUSA, of Pierre, SD.

Before LOKEN, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Around 2:30 a.m. on October 31, 2021, Jade LaRoche's mother, Josephine Skunk, called local dispatch and said an officer needed to come by because her son was "acting up." Bureau of Indian Affairs Officer Justin Schmiedt was dispatched to Skunk's home, learning on the way that LaRoche had an active tribal arrest warrant. Ms. Skunk invited Schmiedt into the living room and told LaRoche to join them. After a short conversation, Schmiedt told LaRoche he was "going to have to take you because you got that warrant." LaRoche fled to the garage, pursued by Schmiedt, where LaRoche knocked Schmiedt down and escaped.

A grand jury indictment charged LaRoche with forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, or interfering with a federal officer and inflicting bodily injury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b). After a two day trial, the jury acquitted LaRoche of that charge but convicted him of the lesser included offense of forcible assault of a federal officer involving physical contact in violation of § 111(a)(1). The district court¹ sentenced LaRoche to 44 months imprisonment. He appeals, raising numerous evidentiary issues and challenging the assessment of a two-level sentencing increase because Schmiedt "sustained bodily injury." See USSG § 2A2.4(b)(2). We affirm.

I. Evidentiary Issues

A. Denial of LaRoche's Motion to Suppress. LaRoche timely moved to suppress the statements he made when Officer Schmiedt came to his mother's house knowing there was an outstanding warrant for LaRoche's arrest, arguing the statements were made during custodial interrogation without the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). After an evidentiary hearing at which Schmiedt testified at length, the record was supplemented with a dash cam audio recording of Schmiedt's colloquy with LaRoche in the home. In a lengthy Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Mark Moreno recommended that the motion be denied, concluding that LaRoche was not in custody for purposes of Miranda, that "none of Schmiedt's inquiries amounted to impermissible interrogation," and that the statements were not involuntary. The district court in a five-page Opinion and Order overruled LaRoche's objections, adopted the Report and Recommendation, and denied the motion to suppress. On appeal, LaRoche argues he was in custody, he was subjected to interrogation, and his statements were not voluntary. We review the legal issues of custody, interrogation, and voluntariness de novo, and any underlying factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Sanchez-Velasco, 956 F.3d 576, 579 (8th Cir. 2020) (custody and interrogation); United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 724 (8th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (voluntariness), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1145, 125 S.Ct. 1292, 161 L.Ed.2d 105 (2005).

1. Custody. An individual is in custody if there is "restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (quotation omitted). This is an objective inquiry that turns on how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323-24, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994). The district court concluded that LaRoche was not in custody during his fifteen-minute conversation with Schmiedt that preceded LaRoche's flight:

Judge Moreno credited the testimony of Schmiedt who stated that he only asked LaRoche questions regarding the status of his warrant to build a rapport with LaRoche who plainly did not wish to go into custody. Schmiedt's questions [were intended] to assess the situation the officer faced . . . .

This Court also agrees with Judge Moreno's conclusion that the conversation between LaRoche and Schmiedt was: (1) relatively brief, amicable, and one LaRoche steered; (2) took place in a familiar and relaxed setting and in the company of LaRoche's mother; (3) did not involve any display of weapons, physical force, or heavy-handed tactics on the part of Schmiedt; (4) went on without restraint to LaRoche's freedom of movement; and (5) ended when LaRoche ran off to his bedroom. The mere fact that Schmiedt may have been standing between LaRoche and the front door does not mean that LaRoche was in custody. Indeed, Schmiedt's purpose in conversing with LaRoche seems to have been to get LaRoche to submit himself to custody peacefully, while LaRoche's purpose in the conversation appears to have been to try to talk Schmiedt out of taking him into custody.

After review of Schmiedt's hearing testimony and the dash cam audio transcript, we agree. LaRoche argues, citing United States v. Boucher, 909 F.2d 1170, 1174 (8th Cir. 1990), that the interaction was custodial because Schmiedt "announced" the arrest early on by saying "let's take care of [the warrant]." But the relevant question is "how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation." Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the amicable conversation -- dominated by LaRoche -- occurred in his mother's home, a non-custodial atmosphere. Schmiedt testified he did not know what the warrant was based on. LaRoche fled only after Schmiedt later told him he would be arrested, confirming that LaRoche initially believed or at least hoped that he could avoid immediate arrest.

2. Interrogation. Interrogation occurs when an officer "should know" that his statements "are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). This issue "focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police." Id. LaRoche argues that the conversation became interrogation when Schmiedt asked, "[s]o what's the warrant for? Do you know what it's for?" But prior to that question, LaRoche had acknowledged the warrant and vaguely described that it involved dealings with BIA Officer Moran. We agree with Magistrate Judge Moreno: "Given their context, [the questions] were designed to help [Schmiedt] assess the situation he faced and clarify LaRoche's earlier statements." Schmiedt knew nothing about the outstanding warrant when he arrived. Even if LaRoche was in custody, follow-up questions to clarify ambiguity do not amount to "interrogation" unless "their point is to enhance the defendant's guilt." United States v. Becerra, 958 F.3d 725, 729 (8th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted); see United States v. Jackson, 852 F.3d 764, 771-72 (8th Cir. 2017); United States v. Orr, 636 F.3d 944, 954 (8th Cir. 2011). Far from seeking to expand LaRoche's guilt, the follow-up questions gave LaRoche an opportunity to provide an explanation that might avoid the need for an immediate arrest.

3. Voluntariness. LaRoche argues his statements were involuntary because Officer Moran had previously declined to make a warrant arrest and this "implied promise" that he would not be arrested meant his will was overborne when faced by a uniformed officer who suspected he was under the influence. This contention is without merit. That an officer had given LaRoche an opportunity to resolve the warrant without an arrest was not a promise that would bind a different officer weeks later. Moreover, "a promise made by law enforcement not to arrest or prosecute does not render a confession involuntary." United States v. Thunderhawk, 799 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 2015). Rather, the issue is "whether or not the authorities overbore the defendant's will and critically impaired his capacity for self-determination." LeBrun, 363 F.3d at 725. Here, we agree with Magistrate Judge Moreno and the district court that LaRoche's statements were voluntary.

For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not err in denying LaRoche's motion to suppress. Therefore, we need not consider whether the alleged error was harmless, which is at least arguable because the statements in question "had no bearing on his guilt for the crime" of which he was convicted, his subsequent assault of a federal officer. United States v. Figueroa-Serrano, 971 F.3d 806, 813 (8th Cir. 2020).

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence. The district court instructed the jury that to find LaRoche guilty of the physical-contact lesser included offense, it had to find that LaRoche (1) voluntarily and intentionally (2) assaulted, resisted, opposed, impeded, intimidated, or interfered with federal officer Schmiedt and (3) made physical contact with Schmiedt while (4) Schmiedt was employed as a Bureau of Indian Affairs police officer. LaRoche argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of this offense because there was "no physical evidence of the charged events, nor was there corroborating evidence of actual physical contact. At best, there was frantic video captured from the taser that showed in at least one frame that LaRoche was close to Officer Schmiedt." We will affirm if, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Wilkins, 25 F.4th 596, 598-99 (8th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted).

Schmiedt, his treating chiropractor Brooke Schomp, and LaRoche...