United States v. Leggette

57 F.4th 406

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.Ervin Dwayne LEGGETTE, a/k/a Ervin Dewayne Leggette, Defendant – Appellant.

No. 21-4175

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: September 16, 2022

Decided: January 10, 2023

ARGUED: Ames Colby Chamberlin, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Margaret McCall Reece, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, Brittany Speas, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, Acting United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before RICHARDSON and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Richardson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Quattlebaum and Senior Judge Floyd joined.

RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge:

Late one spring evening, Dwayne Leggette and Deborah Marshall were trespassing in a public park after it closed. When officers saw their car, they investigated the trespass. The officers found a gun abandoned in a nearby trash can, so they frisked Leggette and questioned him about the gun. After first denying the gun was his, Leggette admitted he was a felon and that he owned the gun. The officers arrested Leggette, who was then federally indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He sought to suppress his incriminatory statements, arguing that his statements in the park were inadmissible because he was "in custody" under Miranda and so the officers needed to read him his Miranda rights before questioning him about the gun. The district court disagreed, and Leggette pleaded guilty. We find that the district court correctly determined that Leggette was not "in custody" when questioned in the park. So we affirm.

I. Background

Around 11:35 PM one night, Officer David Rochelle noticed a car parked in the parking lot of a public park.¹ This park, owned by the city of Winston-Salem, closed to the public at 10:30 PM. Being in the park after it closed was trespassing. So Officer Rochelle pulled into the lot when he saw the car. He called for backup and began investigating the dark area with his flashlight. Near the park's picnic area, he found Leggette and Marshall walking toward him. They told him they were just "hanging" in the park, and he told them the park was closed. Officer Rochelle's backup arrived and began looking around the picnic area while Officer Rochelle walked with Leggette and Marshall back to the parking lot and gathered biographical information about the pair.

The backup officer soon discovered a gun in a bag inside a trash can. Officer Rochelle learned over the radio about the gun. He patted Leggette down and determined that he was not otherwise armed. Officer Rochelle then asked Leggette about the gun found in the trash can. During a ninety-second exchange, Officer Rochelle asked Leggette about the gun three times.² The first two times, Leggette denied the gun was his, although he did volunteer that he "just did 15 years [in prison]." J.A. 93. Officer Rochelle said that he did not believe Leggette, explained that Leggette's honesty would "go a long way," and asked once more. J.A. 94. This time Leggette admitted that the gun was his and that he was not supposed to have it. Officer Rochelle did not search or question Marshall.

After Leggette's confession, Officer Rochelle handcuffed Leggette and put him in the patrol car. As Leggette was getting into the car, Officer Rochelle asked what type of gun it was. But before Leggette could answer, Officer Rochelle told Leggette "never mind, don't worry about that. I'll ask you later." J.A. 94.³ Officer Rochelle then drove Leggette to the detention center.

Once at the detention center, Leggette was placed in a separate room and read his Miranda rights for the first time.⁴ Leggette said he understood his rights, agreed to speak, and confessed again.

Afterward, Leggette was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He then sought to suppress his incriminating statements. Following a suppression hearing at which the officers testified, the district court issued a thoughtful opinion denying Leggette's motion to suppress.

Leggette then pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress his statements. He was sentenced to 180 months in prison and now appeals.

II. Discussion

The familiar Miranda warnings are required for the "in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime." Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (emphasis added). And without those Miranda warnings, any statements made during a custodial interrogation are inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief. United States v. Leshuk , 65 F.3d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1995). But so long as a defendant is not "in custody," then statements made during an interrogation remain admissible, even if the defendant were not given Miranda warnings. The district court found that Leggette was not "in custody" when he made incriminating statements at the park. So Miranda warnings were not required and the statements were admissible. We agree and affirm.

"An individual is in custody for Miranda purposes when, under the totality of the circumstances, ‘a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.’ " United States v. Parker , 262 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) ). This is an objective inquiry. J. D. B. v. North Carolina , 564 U.S. 261, 270–71, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011) ; see also Parker , 262 F.3d at 419 ("Custody determinations do not depend on the subjective views of either the interrogating law enforcement officers or of the person being questioned, but depend instead [on] the objective circumstances of the interrogation.").

A court asks two questions when determining whether a suspect's "freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest." See Parker , 262 F.3d at 419. "[T]he initial step," Howes v. Fields , 565 U.S. 499, 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012), is to ask "whether a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." United States v. Pressley , 990 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Hashime , 734 F.3d 278, 282–83 (4th Cir. 2013) ); Keohane , 516 U.S. at 112, 116 S.Ct. 457 (describing as "essential" to a custody determination the question of "would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave"). But this is just the first step. See Maryland v. Shatzer , 559 U.S. 98, 112, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010) ("Our cases make clear ... that the freedom-of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody."). If a reasonable person would not have felt at liberty to leave, then a court must still ask "the additional question [of] whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda. " Howes , 565 U.S. at 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181 ; see also United States v. Gardner , 823 F.3d 793, 801 (4th Cir. 2016) (rejecting custody because the questioning was not "the functional equivalent of a ‘stationhouse interrogation’ ").

Distinguishing between these two steps helps explain why the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have concluded that a person might not be free to leave but might also not be in custody under Miranda. For example, during a traffic stop, a driver may not be free to drive away, but such stops still do not ordinarily constitute "custody" because they are not coercive enough. See, e.g., Berkemer , 468 U.S. at 438, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (noting that most traffic stops are not custodial because, among other things, motorists do not "feel[ ] completely at the mercy of police").

For much the same reason, a " Terry stop does not constitute Miranda custody." Shatzer , 559 U.S. at 113, 130 S.Ct. 1213 (cleaned up) (citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ). Just like the subject of a traffic stop, the person cannot leave. But, like traffic stops, Terry stops lack the necessary coercion, and so do not curtail a person's freedom of action to "a degree associated with formal arrest." See Berkemer , 468 U.S. at 439–40, 104 S.Ct. 3138. Indeed, by their very definition, Terry stops are not the equivalent of an arrest. See Terry , 392 U.S. at 24–25, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (addressing what actions officers can take when they have reasonable suspicion but lack "probable cause for an arrest"); United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (explaining the line between "an investigative stop" under Terry and "a de facto arrest"). So an officer's actions that fall within the bounds of a lawful Terry stop do not create custody under Miranda : the "temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a traffic stop or Terry stop does not constitute Miranda custody." Howes , 565 U.S. at 510, 132 S.Ct. 1181 (quoting Shatzer , 559 U.S. at 113, 130 S.Ct. 1213 ); see also Leshuk , 65 F.3d at 1108–10.⁵

Leggette was not "in custody" when he admitted the weapon was his at the park. He was, of course, not free to leave. Officer Rochelle testified that Leggette was not free to leave when he discovered Leggette and Marshall trespassing in the park. Leggette's inability to freely leave continued while he was frisked and questioned following the discovery of his discarded weapon. Thus, when Leggette was interrogated at the park, he "was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." See Pressley , 990 F.3d at 388.

But...