United States v. Longsworth

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICK E. LONGSWORTH, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 23-13692

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

August 30, 2024

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-20017-RAR-1..

Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Patrick Longsworth appeals his convictions for aiming a laser pointer at Coast Guard and police helicopters flying over his home. He contends that the district court committed structural error by permitting him to represent himself at trial despite indications of "severe mental illness." After careful review of the record, we agree with the district court that Longsworth knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, so we affirm his convictions.

I.

Longsworth was charged by indictment with three counts of aiming a laser pointer at an aircraft, which each carried a maximum term of five years' imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 39A.

A. Conflicts with Appointed Counsel

Early on, the government offered Longsworth a way to resolve the case without conviction. Namely, he could agree to participate in a pretrial-diversion program, which would not require him to admit guilt or spend any time in jail, and the case would be dropped so long as he met certain requirements including drug testing and community service.

But Longsworth resisted the offer, leading to conflict with his court-appointed attorneys. Over the course of three status hearings on these matters, Longsworth offered various and not altogether consistent reasons for insisting on going to trial, including that (a) he "might as well go to prison" rather than participate in the diversion program "amongst people that I despise"; (b) video or audio evidence was missing or had been altered; (c) he needed to protect his daughters at his home in a "very dangerous" neighborhood; (d) he wanted to do all he could to stay out of jail; (e) he was concerned about drug testing, despite saying he did not use drugs; and (f) he had transportation issues with regard to doing community service.

At the status hearings, the district court questioned Long-sworth about his reasons for rejecting the pretrial-diversion offer, and it explained at length and in extensive detail the respective burdens and risks of the diversion program versus trial, with specific emphasis on Longsworth's sticking points. Still, Longsworth resisted and insisted on going to trial, despite claiming he understood the risks involved. That prompted the court to tell him that his position made "literally zero sense" and was not "rational," and that it was "worried, a little bit, about your competency." Nevertheless, the court made clear that it was ultimately Longsworth's decision whether to go to trial.

The district court appointed substitute counsel after the first hearing, citing a breakdown in communications, but to no avail. Longsworth again asked for a new lawyer at the second hearing. The court denied the motion, admonishing Longsworth for "jerk[ing] everyone around," and explaining that he could work with his court-appointed attorney, whether by going to trial or entertaining some form of plea, or he could represent himself. Longsworth indicated he wished to retain a private attorney, and the court gave him one week to do so, but it warned that no further extensions or continuances would be granted. The court denied Longsworth's extension motion filed one week later.

Then, at the third hearing, the district court addressed appointed counsel's motion to withdraw based on irreconcilable differences. Longsworth maintained that some video or audio discovery remained missing, or had been altered, relating to communications between the aircraft and Opa-Locka Airport. The government confirmed that no such video or audio evidence existed. The court found no grounds to appoint substitute counsel at government expense. The court explained that, if Longsworth wished to proceed with discharging counsel, the court would treat that decision "as an exercise of [his] right of self-representation," meaning he "will be representing [him]self." Longworth confirmed that he wanted to discharge counsel, which the court treated as an "unequivocal request for self-representation."

B. The Faretta Inquiry

At that point, the district court put Longsworth under oath to conduct a Faretta^[1] inquiry. In response to direct questioning from the court, Longsworth affirmed that he had never studied law or represented himself in a criminal trial. The court explained the benefits of proceeding to trial with counsel, and Longsworth confirmed that he understood. The government explained the nature of the charges in the indictment. The court also confirmed that Longsworth understood that each offense carried a potential sentence of five years' imprisonment, one year of supervised release, up to a $250,000 fine, and a $100 special assessment.

Next, Longsworth affirmed that he understood that (1) apart from the penalties listed in the indictment, the advisory sentencing guidelines could impact his sentence; (2) the court could not assist him at trial if he proceeded pro se; (3) he must abide by the Federal Rules of Evidence, which govern what evidence may be introduced at trial; and (4) he must abide by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which govern the way a criminal action is tried. Long-sworth was not familiar with the Federal Rules, but he confirmed his understanding that he would be bound by them at trial. Long-sworth also confirmed that he had not only read and understood the charges against him, but also discussed them with his former attorneys.

In response to further questioning from the district court, Longsworth affirmed that (1) he was 69 years old; (2) he could read but could not write very well; (3) he did not have trouble understanding English; (4) he completed the eleventh grade; (5) he was not then under the influence of alcohol or drugs; (6) he had never been diagnosed or treated for any mental illness; (7) he had no physical problems that prevented him from representing himself; and (8) no one threatened him to prevent him from hiring a lawyer or accepting court-appointed counsel.

Finally, Longsworth affirmed that, after being advised of his "right to counsel, the advantages of having counsel, the disadvantages and dangers of proceeding without counsel, the nature of the charges, and the possible consequences in the event of a conviction," he still wished to discharge appointed counsel. At that point, the district court found that Longsworth was competent to represent himself, and Longsworth confirmed that he understood that he would have to defend himself, without the assistance of a lawyer, if he did not retain private counsel before the start of the trial.

The district court then said that, in its opinion, it was "very unwise" for Longsworth to represent himself-because he was unfamiliar with the law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Rules of Evidence-and "strongly urge[d]" Longsworth not to proceed pro se, advising that an attorney would defend him "far better than you could defend yourself." Still, the court found that Long-sworth had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, and it permitted Longsworth to represent himself-with prior appointed counsel serving as stand-by counsel. But the court made clear that counsel would provide assistance only at Longsworth's request-or if Longsworth proved incapable of representing himself.

C. Trial and Sentencing

Longsworth represented himself at the two-day trial and was convicted on all three counts. During jury selection, Long-sworth did not make any peremptory strikes or ask any questions of potential jurors. Then, during trial, Longsworth did not make an opening statement or closing argument, raise any evidentiary objection, call any witnesses, or testify in his defense, and he engaged in minimal and largely irrelevant cross-examination. Among other evidence, the government presented video evidence in which Longsworth admitted aiming lasers at the Coast Guard and police helicopters, because he did not want them flying over his house.

Post-trial, Longsworth retained counsel, who moved for a competency hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 4241. The district court ad-dressed-and ultimately denied-the motion at Longsworth's sentencing hearing. In ruling on the motion, the court said that it had found Longsworth competent to stand trial after a thorough Faretta inquiry, and that it would have sua sponte ordered a competency evaluation had Longsworth exhibited any truly irrational behavior. Still, the court commented that Longsworth's decision to turn down the government's offer-and risk going to jail-signaled that he suffered from "some paranoia and mental illness." But in the court's view, Longsworth was always respectful, responsive, and "understood what was going on" in his interactions with the court.

The district court sentenced Longsworth to 24 months' imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently. The court cited Longsworth's mental state as a mitigating factor when it varied his sentence downward from the guideline range. This appeal followed.

II.

Longsworth appeals, through counsel, arguing that the district court erred in finding that he was competent to represent himself at trial and allowing him to proceed pro se. He maintains that his unwillingness to communicate with counsel or accept the government's offer of pretrial diversion stemmed from paranoid delusions caused by severe mental illness, and that the court should have known he was incapable of self-representation. He asserts that this amounts to structural error, requiring...