United States v. Manzon

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. BRENDAN LEE MANZON, Defendant.

No. 1:22-cr-00102-DCN

United States District Court, D. Idaho

November 8, 2023

MEMORANDUM DECISION

DAVID C. NYE, CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is the issue of whether Defendant Brendan Lee Manzon's prior Idaho conviction for aggravated battery constitutes a “crime of violence” under United States Sentencing Guideline (“U.S.S.G.”) § 4B1.2(a)(1) for purposes of sentencing in this case. If Manzon's prior conviction is a crime of violence, he is ineligible for safety-valve relief, even under United States v. Lopez, 998 F.3d 431, 440 (9th Cir. 2021) because he has sixteen criminal history points, multiple prior three-point offenses, and his conviction for aggravated battery qualifies as a prior two-point violent offense.^[1]

II. BACKGROUND

On May 10, 2022, Manzon was indicted with one count of Distribution of Methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years.^[2] Dkt. 1. On September 15, 2022, Manzon entered a guilty plea to Count One of the single-count Indictment without the benefit of a plea agreement. Dkt. 28.

United States Probation (“Probation”) subsequently prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”). In the Initial PSR, Probation determined Manzon is safety valve eligible under Lopez. Dkt. 32, ¶ 14, 64, 86. To preserve its standing objection that Lopez was wrongly decided, the Government objected to the Initial PSR, arguing 18 U.S.C. § 3551(f)(1)'s requirements, when properly interpreted, are disjunctive and that the Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court will eventually so hold. Dkt. 36, at 2. The Government argued application of the correct interpretation of Lopez would bar Manzon from safety-valve eligibility because he has more than four criminal history points. The Government's contention that Lopez was wrongly decided is not currently at issue.^[3] In addition to challenging the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3551(f)(1) in Lopez, the Government also argued Probation's application of the safetyvalve was erroneous, even under Lopez, because Manzon's prior three-point offense, aggravated battery, constitutes a prior two-point violent offense. Id. at 2; See, supra, text accompanying note 1. Manzon responded to the Government's objection, arguing Manzon's aggravated battery conviction does not qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. Dkt. 37, at 3-5.

After the Government replied to its objection to the Initial PSR, Dkt. 42, Probation determined aggravated battery does not constitute a federal crime of violence due to the overbreadth of Idaho's aggravated battery statute and did not amend the Initial PSR. Dkt. 43-1. Probation filed its Final PSR on February 28, 2023. Dkt. 43. In its concurrent Sentencing Recommendation, Probation explained Manzon is safety-valve eligible under Lopez and is thus relieved from the ten-year mandatory minimum penalty associated with 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). Dkt. 44, at 1.

Given the similarity between the “crime of violence” issue in this case and that in another of this Court's cases then on appeal, United States v. Vega, 2022 WL 8238891 (D. Idaho 2022) (“Vega I”) the parties later agreed to continue Manzon's sentencing until the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Vega. Dkt. 48. On July 31, 2023, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, in an unpublished decision, this Court's holding that Vega's prior conviction for Idaho felony domestic battery with traumatic injury is not categorically a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Vega, 2023 WL 4858148 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Vega II”). The Court subsequently ordered the parties in this case to submit supplemental briefs regarding whether violation of Idaho's aggravated battery statute constitutes a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. Dkt. 49. The parties did so on August 31, 2023. Dkt. 51; Dkt. 52.

In preparation for Manzon's sentencing, the Court has reviewed the supplemental briefing, and issues the instant Decision.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The operative definition of “crime of violence” is set forth in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1),^[4] which is known as the “elements” clause.^[5] Borden v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 1817, 1822 (2021). The elements clause defines a crime of violence as “any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another[.]” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). To determine whether a defendant's prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence as defined in § 4B1.2(a)(1), courts apply the “categorical approach” outlined in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-02 (1990).^[6]“Under this categorical approach, if the state statute of conviction criminalizes more conduct than the federal generic offense, then the state offense is not categorically included in the definition of the federal generic offense.” Rodriquez-Castellon v. Holder, 733 F.3d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). “If the state statute of conviction criminalizes the same conduct or less conduct than the federal generic offense, then it qualifies as a generic federal offense.” United States v. Perez, 932 F.3d 782, 784-85 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Barragan-Lopez v. Holder, 705 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2013)).

The United States Supreme Court has emphasized the “key” to the categorical comparison is only the “statutory definitions-i.e., the elements-of a defendant's prior offense[]” and not “the particular facts underlying” the defendant's prior conviction. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013) (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600). Under the categorical approach, a court must presume a defendant's prior conviction “rested upon nothing more than the least of the acts criminalized” under his state statute of conviction. United States v. Baldon, 956 F.3d 1115, 1125 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up) (quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190-191 (2013)).

“Some statutes, however, have a more complicated (sometimes called ‘divisible') structure, making the comparison of elements harder.” Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 505 (2016). When a prior conviction is for violating a “divisible statute”-that is, if the statute “lists alternative sets of elements, in essence several different crimes”-a court may employ the “modified categorical approach.” United States v. Werle, 815 F.3d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 2016). Under the modified categorial approach, “a sentencing court looks to a limited class of documents (for example, the indictment, jury instructions, or plea agreement and colloquy) to determine what crime, with what elements, a defendant was convicted of.” Mathis, 579 U.S. at 505-06. After determining which of the listed alternative elements was integral to a defendant's conviction, “the sentencing court can then compare that crime, as the categorical approach commands, with the relevant generic offense.” Id.

IV. ANALYSIS

Here, the Government does not maintain Idaho's aggravated battery statute, Idaho Code § 18-907, categorically qualifies as a crime of violence.^[7] Instead, the Government argues Idaho's aggravated battery statute is divisible, and that the subsection under which Manzon was convicted (Idaho code section § 18-907(a))^[8] qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2(a)(1). To determine whether to apply the categorical or modified categorical approach, the Court must thus first determine whether Idaho Code § 18-907 is divisible.

A. Divisibility

The Government argues Manzon's prior statute of conviction is divisible because:

[T]he charging documents from Manzon's prior conviction, the Jury Instructions, and the Judgment of Conviction demonstrate the State divided the aggravated battery statute into multiple subsections setting forth different elements by which the crime may be committed and charged Manzon with violating Subsection (a) of Idaho Code § 18-907, which requires ‘great bodily harm' to a person.

Dkt. 42, at 3.

The Government's argument puts the proverbial cart before the horse, as the Court cannot review the charging documents, Jury Instructions, or Judgment of Conviction from Manzon's prior conviction without first finding Idaho's aggravated battery statute is itself divisible. That Manzon may have been charged with, and convicted of, violating a specific subsection (or subsections) of Idaho code § 18-907 is irrelevant if such subsections provide various factual means of committing a single element, rather than alternative elements defining multiple crimes.^[9] Mathis, 579 U.S. at 505-06, 516 (explaining “a court may not look behind the elements of a generally drafted statute to identify the means by which a defendant committed a crime”) (citing Descamps, 570 U.S. at 258). “If a statute does not list alternative elements, but merely encompasses different means of committing an offense, the statute is ‘indivisible' and the modified categorical approach ‘has no role to play.'” Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Descamps, 570 U.S. at 264).

The Court thus begins with Idaho's aggravated battery statute. Idaho Code § 18-907 provides, in relevant part:

(1) A person commits aggravated battery who, in committing battery:

(a) Causes great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement; or

(b) Uses a deadly weapon or instrument; or (c) Uses any vitriol, corrosive acid, or caustic chemical of any nature; or

(d) Uses any poison or noxious or destructive substance or liquid; or

(e) Upon the person of a pregnant female, causes great bodily harm, permanent disability

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