United States v. Marquez

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER MARQUEZ, Defendant.

No. 1:21-cr-01510-KWR-1

United States District Court, D. New Mexico

May 16, 2024

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KEA W RIGGS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment because of unreasonable delay. Doc. 90. Having reviewed the pleadings and applicable law, the Court finds that Defendant's motion is not well taken and therefore, is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On October 14, 2021, a federal grand jury indicted Defendant with one count of abuse of a child (great bodily harm), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and N.M. STAT.ANN 30-6-1(D); one count of assault of a spouse or intimate partner by strangling or suffocating, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 113(a)(8), and 2266(7)(B); and two counts of abusive sexual contact, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 224(a)(2), and 2246(3). Doc. 1. On August 16, 2022, Defendant filed an Ex Parte Motion for an Order to Determine Competency, which this Court granted. Docs. 45, 46. Defendant was subsequently committed to the custody of the Attorney General on September 27, 2022. Doc. 51. Defendant was then admitted to Federal Correctional Institution (FCI), Butner, North Carolina on August 22, 2023. Doc. 63. Subsequently, on April 13, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion, seeking dismissal of the indictment for violation of the federal Speedy Trial Act. Doc. 90.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Speedy Trial Act mandates, “[i]n any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.” 189 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).

Under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1), if a court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant suffers from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General. The Attorney General then shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable facility, “(1) for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts that upon this Court's Order for Commitment (Doc 51), in which Defendant was committed to the Attorney General's custody for a period of 30 days to determine his competence, Mr. Marquez waited almost eleven months in custody at Otero County Prison Facility until his 30-day evaluation. Doc. 90 at 3. Mr. Marquez's almost eleven-month wait was eleven times longer than the period of his competency commitment and therefore, far longer than necessary and an unreasonable length of time for the Attorney General to select a suitable Bureau of Prisons institution and transport Defendant. Id. Defendant argues while a Court can commit a defendant to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment for a period not to exceed four months, several courts have concluded that the four-month limit as outlined under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 is measured from the time a defendant arrives at a treatment facility. Doc. 90 at 5 citing, United States v. Lara, 671 F.Supp.3d 1257 (D.N.M. 2023) citing, United States v. Donnelly, 41 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9^th Cir. 2022). However, Defendant argues the pre-hospital time spent in custody awaiting designation and transport cannot be indefinite and is measured via a reasonableness standard as held in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). According to Lara, Jackson's reasonableness standard applies to the period of pre-hospitalization custody. Doc. 90 at 6 citing, Lara, 671 Fed.Supp.3d at 1262 citing, Donnelly, 41 F.3d at 1106. Therefore, Defendant asserts that Mr. Marquez's near eleven-month wait for placement at FCI Butner violated his due process rights and was patently unreasonable. Doc. 90 at 4, 7.^[1] Furthermore, Defendant asserts that the delay between this Court's Order and his arrival at FCI Butner was presumptively unreasonable under the Speedy Trial Act. Id. at 5. Thus, the charges against Defendant should be dismissed. Id. This Court disagrees with Donnelly and concludes that Defendant's detention was reasonably related to his commitment and did not violate Due Process. Accordingly, this Court disagrees with Defendant and finds that the United States complied with both 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1), and therefore, dismissal is not warranted.

I. Defendant's Pre-Hospitalization Custody Period Did Not Violate 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1)

In interpreting statutes, a court must start with the plain language to “interpret the words of the statute in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve..,read[ing] the words of the statute in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Been v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 495 F.3d 1217, 1227 (10th Cir. 2007) citing, Wright v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 451 F.3d 1231, 1233-34 (10th Cir. 2006). “When that language is clear, we ordinarily end our analysis...[i]f, however, the language leaves us uncertain, we turn to the legislative history and policy of the statute to deduce Congress's intent.” Obduskey v. Wells Fargo, 879 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 2018), aff'd sub nom. Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 139 S.Ct. 1029, 203 L.Ed.2d 390 (2019) citing, Woods v. Standard Ins. Co., 771 F.3d 1257, 1265 (10th Cir. 2014). “Courts indulge ‘a strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses. Therefore, when the terms of a statute are clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ends and we should stick to our duty of enforcing the terms of the statute as Congress has drafted it.'” United Kingdom Ministry of Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 422 F.3d 165, 171 (4th Cir. 2005) citing, Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 305 (4th Cir. 2000).

This Court concludes that based on the text of 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), the four-month time limit prescribed in the statute does not begin until a defendant is hospitalized at a facility for evaluation. The critical text of 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1) at issue states, “The Attorney General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable facility - (1) for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward.” From the plain language and construction of the statute, the operative clause, “[t]he Attorney General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable facility[,]” is limited and constrained by the subsequent clause, “for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months[.]” The plain meaning, context, and structure of the statute indicate that once hospitalization for determining a defendant's competency evaluation commences, such a hospitalization is limited to no longer than four months. Several other courts, including this Court, have previously held that the four-month limit within 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) commences upon hospitalization. United States v. Delorme, No. CR 19-2322 JB, 2023 WL 8020262 * 18 (D.N.M. Nov. 17, 2023); Lara, 671 F.Supp.3d at 1261 citing, Donnelly, 41 F.4th at 1105; United States v. Castrellon, No. 22-cr-00112, 2023 WL 2330688 (D. Colo. March 1, 2023); United States v. Leusogi, No. 2:21-CR-32, 2022 WL 11154688 (D. Utah Oct. 19, 2022); United States v. Wazny, No. 3:21-CR-247, 2022 WL 17363048 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2022); United States v. Belgarde, No. 3:21-cr-58, 2022 WL 540932 (D.N.D. Feb. 23, 2022). 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) is otherwise silent as to the timeframe a defendant may need to wait for transport to a suitable facility for hospitalization. Accordingly, while the time a defendant must wait is required to comply with due process, § 4241(d) does not place a specific timeframe on pre-hospitalization detention. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738-39.

Here, Defendant admits that the four-month limit for hospitalization only applies to the time spent in a Bureau of Prisons facility for a competency evaluation, which is not contested in the case of Mr. Marquez.^[2] Doc. 90 at 6. From the plain statutory meaning, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) does not place a time constraint on pre-hospitalization detention - rather, the statute is silent as to how long pre-trial hospitalization can last. Given the statute's omission of a temporal constraint on the length of pre-hospitalization detention, a deliberate decision by Congress, this Court is not at liberty to insert its own preferred language or meaning into the statute. Borden v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 1817, 1829 (2021). Therefore, given the silence of § 4241(d) as to the temporal limits of pre-hospitalization detention and the length of this Defendant's hospitalization, less than four months, this Court concludes that no statutory violation of § 4241(d) occurred.^[3],^[4]

II. This Court Finds that Defendant's Pre-Hospitalization Detention Did Not Violate Due Process

Defendant argues the length of his pre-hospitalization detention violated his due process rights, citing Lara, in which an opinion in this district previously found in applying Jackson and Donnelly, that pre-hospitalization detention greater than four months violated due process. This...