United States v. Martin

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER D. MARTIN, Defendant.

Case No. 2:14-CR-126-3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

January 21, 2015

JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY

OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Motion of Defendant, Christopher D. Martin, to Dismiss for Violating Speedy Trial Rights Under 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (hereinafter "Motion to Dismiss") (Doc. 81). Defendant moves the Court to dismiss the indictment against him because more than 70 days have elapsed since the date of his arraignment on July 8, 2014, in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. (Doc. 81 at 1). For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a seven count public corruption and conspiracy indictment related to Arise! Academy ("Arise"), an Ohio Community School (commonly known as a charter school). Arise operated in Dayton, Ohio from at least 2008 to 2010 with funds provided through the State of Ohio. (Indictment, Doc. 1 at ¶ 1). On June 23, 2014, the United States filed an indictment against four Defendants: (1) Shane K. Floyd, allegedly the first Arise Superintendent and the school's Chief Executive Officer from July 1, 2008 - January 2010; (2) Carl L. Robinson, allegedly a business owner who contracted with Arise to provide educational consulting services during the 2008-2009 school year; (3) Christopher D. Martin, allegedly anArise Board member beginning in August 2008, serving as the Chairperson from July 2009 - January 2010, whose duties included contract approval and management; and (4) Kristal Screven (a.k.a. Kristal Allen), allegedly a Board Chairperson, from March 2009 - July 2009, and allegedly a business owner that contracted with Arise to provide security services for several months in 2009 and 2010. The Government alleges that these parties engaged in a bribe and kickback scheme using funding from the State of Ohio.

Defendant Floyd has been indicted in Count 1 (conspiracy to defraud the U.S.); Count 2 (bribery involving federal programs); and Count 3 (statements or entries generally). Defendant Robinson has been indicted in Count 1 (conspiracy to defraud the U.S.) and Count 3 (bribery involving federal programs). Defendant Martin has been indicted in Count 1 (conspiracy to defraud the U.S.); Count 2 (bribery involving federal programs); and Count 6 (statements or entries generally). Finally, Defendant Screven has been indicted in Count 1 (conspiracy to defraud the U.S.); Count 2 (bribery involving federal programs); Count 5 (statements or entries generally); and Count 7 (intimidation or force against witness).

On June 8, 2014, the Defendants made their first appearances before Magistrate Judge Terence Kemp and were arraigned. (Minute Entry, Doc. 32). Each of the Defendants entered a plea of "not guilty" in response to the charges in the indictment. (Id.). Upon its filing, this case initially was assigned to The Honorable Judge James L. Graham of the Southern District of Ohio. On July 23, 2014, Judge Graham entered a Scheduling Order, setting motion deadlines and scheduling trial for August 25, 2014. (Doc. 39). Shortly thereafter, on July 30, 2014, Defendants Floyd and Robinson filed a motion requesting a continuance of the August 25, 2014trial date to allow adequate time for discovery.¹ (Counsel Entering Appearance and Motion for Continuance, Doc. 45 (hereinafter "Motion for Continuance")). On August 13, 2014, in the "interests of justice," Judge Graham continued the trial until December 8, 2014. (Order, Doc. 55 at 1). "For purposes of judicial economy," Judge Graham continued the trial "as to all defendants joined in the indictment." (Id.).

On November 7, 2014, Judge Graham recused himself from the case. The case was reassigned to The Honorable Judge George C. Smith for the Southern District of Ohio on the same day. A few weeks later, on November 25, 2015, Judge Smith also recused himself from the case. That same day, the case then was transferred to The Honorable Judge Algenon L. Marbley. This Court conducted a status conference with the parties on December 10, 2014 to determine whether Defendant Robinson had yet engaged representation² and to establish a new scheduling order to govern the case, among other matters.

As a result of the December 10, 2014 status conference, the parties were ordered to file any remaining pre-trial motions by December 17, 2014, including motions to dismiss. (Doc. 80 at 2). The Government was ordered to respond to any such motions within a week. (Id.). Following discussion with the parties during the status conference, the Court also set a new trialdate of February 17, 2015. (Id. at 1). This date was deemed to be a reasonable amount of time for Defendant Robinson's newly engaged attorney to review the Government's discovery and otherwise to prepare for trial.

On December 17, 2014, Defendant filed this Motion to Dismiss the indictment against him, claiming that more than 70 days have elapsed since the date of his arraignment on July 8, 2014, in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. (Doc. 81 at 1). The United States has responded in opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 84). This matter is therefore ripe for review.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Defendant moves to dismiss his indictment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) (the "Speedy Trial Act" or the "Act"), which places a 70-day time limitation on the start of a trial following the entry of a "not guilty" plea. Defendant claims 162 days passed between Mr. Martin's arraignment and the date Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was filed, December 17, 2014. (Doc. 81 at 1). Likewise, Defendant calculates that 223 days since arraignment will have passed by the February 17, 2015 trial date. (Id.). "Both greatly exceed[] the 70 day Speedy Trial [Act] requirement." (Id.).

Defendant argues that the Government cannot meet its burden to show sufficient 'excludable time' under the Speedy Trial Act proving that Defendant's rights have not been violated for two reasons. First, Defendant maintains that "[t]he continuances by the Court failed the requirements of 18 U.S.C. Section 3161(h)(7)," and thus are not 'excludable time' under the Act. (Doc. 81 at 3). Specifically, Defendant claims that no 'ends of justice' finding was made particular to him when the August 13, 2014 Continuance was granted. (Id. at 3-4). Similarly, Defendant argues that "the Court set a February 17, 2015 Trial date [during the December 10,2014 status conference] without articulating the reasons necessary under 18 U.S.C. Section 3161(h)(7)" and without specifying "exactly what task was continued for purposes of speedy trial." (Id. at 3-4). Second, Defendant argues that the pre-trial motions filed in this case "have little effect on extending the Speeding [sic] Trial deadline" and that "this Motion...should not count toward an excludable period." (Id. at 4).

The Government responds that there is sufficient delay that is excludable from the 70-day period in which the trial generally must commence because the Act was tolled by pre-trial motions and a valid continuance. (Doc. 84 at 2-5). The Government argues that the excludable delay of one defendant is ascribed to all co-defendants, including Defendant Martin, because one Speedy Trial Act clock governs for all co-defendants who are joined in a single action. (Id. at 5). Additionally, the Government contends that "silence in the face of continuances waives any rights to later make claims of error." (Doc. 84 at 4 (citing United States v. Sherer, 770 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2014))). Thus, the Government maintains that no Speedy Trial Act violation has occurred.

A. Speedy Trial Act

The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c), requires that a defendant be brought to trial within 70 days from the date of the filing of the indictment or arraignment, whichever is later. United States v. Huebner, No. 3:12 CR 443, 2013 WL 6199599, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 27, 2013). The Act provides, however, that certain enumerated pretrial delays are excludable from the 70-day limit. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)-(7); see also Bloate v. U.S., 130 S. Ct. 1345 (2010) (noting that the Speedy Trial Act automatically excludes from the speedy trial calculation any period of pretrial delay resulting from "proceedings concerning the defendant, "including but not limited to" eight categories of delay listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)-(7)).

Specifically, the Act provides that the following periods of delay "shall be" excluded in computing the time within which a trial must commence: (1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to - (A) delay resulting from any proceeding, including any examinations, to determine the mental competency or physical capacity of the defendant; ... (F) delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion; ... (I) delay resulting from consideration by the court of a proposed plea agreement to be entered into by the defendant and the attorney for the Government. 18 U.S.C. §§§ 3161(h)(1)(A), (F), (I). The periods of delay specified in § 3161(h)(1) through (6) are "automatic" and excludable without necessity of a motion of the parties or affirmative order of the court. See Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 326, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986); see also United States v. Barnwell, 617 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548 (E.D. Mich. 2008) aff'd, 364 F. App'x 240 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that periods of excludable delay specified in §3161(h)(1) through (6) do not require "ends of justice" findings).

In addition, § 3161(h)(8)(A) provides that any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on his own motion or at the request of either of the parties is excludable if the judge granted the continuance based upon an "ends-of-justice" finding - that...