United States v. Martin

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JEROME MARTIN, JR., SAMUEL CARSON, WILLIAM KYLE SWEENEY, SEAN COATES, Defendants.

No. 1:98-cr-329-RCL

United States District Court, District of Columbia

May 23, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Royce C. Lamberth United States District Judge

Defendants-Jerome Martin, Samuel Carson, William Sweeney, and Sean Coates-were convicted for various conspiracies, murders, violent crimes in aid of racketeering, and narcotics-traffieking crimes among others, and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. Years later, they filed motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentences. The Court denied defendants' motions in their entirety. United States v. Martin, No. 1:98-cr-329 (RCL), 2021 WL 4989983 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2021). Defendants then filed notices of appeal to the D.C. Circuit. See ECF Nos. 1287, 1289 1292, 1297, 1300. The D.C. Circuit held these appeals in abeyance and directed this Court to “determin[e] whether a certificate of appealability is warranted.” See, e.g., ECF No. 1295 (citing Mitchell v Reno, 216 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). Upon consideration of the parties' § 2255 briefing applicable law, and the record in this case, the Court will DENY defendants' requests for certificates of appealability.

I. BACKGROUND

In the 1980s and 1990s, defendants organized and operated a massive narcotics conspiracy around the 200 block of K Street, Southwest, in the District of Columbia. United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 339 (D.C. Cir. 2006). This conspiracy “led to an astonishing amount of violence and a seemingly complete repudiation of civil society and respect for human life.” Id. After a nine-month trial, a jury returned guilty verdicts against defendants for multiple narcotics, racketeering, murder, and weapons-possession charges. Id. at 347; see ECF No. 810. The trial court sentenced each defendant to life imprisonment, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed. Carson, 455 F.3d at 339. The Supreme Court denied defendants' petitions for writs of certiorari on February 20, 2007. Carson v. United States, 549 U.S. 1246 (2007).

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), defendants had until February 20, 2008, to file motions to vacate their sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). On February 15, 2008, then-Chief Judge Hogan granted a motion by defendant Sweeney to unseal all docket entries, trial materials, and records in this case. ECF No. 1016. Defendants filed their first § 2255 motions before the February 20, 2008 deadline. ECF Nos. 1017, 1020, 1021.^[1]

On March 5, 2010, this Court ordered the government to respond to the § 2255 motions. ECF Nos. 1042, 1043, 1044. Coordination problems then reared their head. The defendants expressed a desire to file supplements to their first § 2255 motions. See, e.g., ECF No. 1053 at 2 n.l. In light of this request, the Court granted motions for extensions of time for defendants to file their supplements and for the government to respond. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 1064, 1066, 1073, 1074, 1081. The government consistently emphasized that it did not oppose extensions of time but stated that it did “not waive any timeliness arguments.” ECF No. 1053 at 3; accord ECF No. 1067 at 1-2; 05/17/13 Tr. 5:1-19, ECF No. 1219.

After granting further extensions of time and holding status conferences on December 20, 2012, May 17, 2013, and August 29, 2013, the Court set the supplement deadline for November 28, 2014. See ECF Nos. 1122 & 1128. The supplements then began arriving. Defendant Sweeney filed a supplement on November 28, 2014. ECF No. 1140. Defendant Carson-after obtaining another extension-filed his supplement on April 9, 2015. ECF No. 1170. All four defendants filed more supplements between 2015 and 2020. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 1182, 1183, 1184 (asserting claims based on Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015)).

The United States then filed an omnibus brief in opposition. ECF No. 1268. In its brief, the government argued that many claims that defendants brought in supplements fell outside of § 2255(f)'s statute of limitations and did not relate back to timely filed claims. See generally Id. Defendants Sweeney and Carson replied to this brief. ECF Nos. 1277 & 1278. They asserted that their claims did relate back or, in the alternative, that the Court should equitably toll the statute of limitations. See ECF No. 1277 at 8-21. The Court ultimately denied all of defendants' § 2255 claims. ECF No. 1283 & 1284.

With their § 2255 claims denied, defendants filed notices of appeal to the D.C. Circuit. The D.C. Circuit held these appeals in abeyance and referred them to this Court to determine whether these cases warranted certificates of appealability. See, e.g., ECF No. 1295. The Court will now do so.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In 1996, Congress passed AEDPA-an act imposing “gatekeeping” mechanisms that restrict (often frivolous) post-conviction collateral attacks. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657 (1996). One of these restrictions is a “certificate of appealability.” Under AEDPA, a defendant has “no absolute entitlement” to appeal the denial of a post-conviction motion. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335 (2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253). Instead, when a district court enters a final order adverse to a defendant's § 2255 motion, the court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability.” Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings, Rule 11 (a). The defendant may not appeal a final order without this certificate of appealability, which requires, “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).

The Supreme Court has counseled that courts should not issue certificates of appealability as “a matter of course.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 337. A defendant must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate whether . .. the petition could have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 (1983)). When a district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the defendant must show that “jurists of reason would find it debatable” (1) “whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling” and (2) “whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right.” United States v. Baxter, 761 F.3d 17, 26 n.lO (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Slack, 529 U.S. at 484).

III. DISCUSSION

None of the defendants have moved for a certificate of appealability or briefed disputed issues. The Court therefore treats their notices of appeal as motions for certificates of appealability. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 483 (treating a notice of appeal as an application for a certificate of appealability); West v. Schneiter, 485 F.3d 393, 395 (7th Cir. 2007) (“A notice of appeal acts as a request for a certificate whether or not the prisoner files a separate application.”); accord United States v. King, No. 1:18-cr-318 (JDB), 2022 WL 1165932, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2022).

The Court denied defendants' § 2255 claims on four grounds. First, defendants raised many claims for the first time in supplements filed long after AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. Second, defendants procedurally defaulted many claims by failing to raise them on direct appeal. Third, defendants offered claims with vague or conclusory arguments. And finally, defendants' remaining claims were meritless. The Court will evaluate its conclusions in turn. After reviewing defendants' § 2255 motions, supplements, and replies, the government's opposition, applicable law, and the record as a whole, the Court will DENY defendants' requests for certificates of appealability.

A. Timeliness Issues

During trial, defendants' counsel repeatedly requested Brady, Giglio, and Jencks Act materials from the government.^[2] The government turned over disputed material either in redacted form or by filing it with the trial court under seal. On direct appeal, defendants' attorneys jointly moved to review these sealed documents. Mot. to Allow Counsel to Review Specific Sealed Portions of the Trial Record (“Mot. to Review”), United States v. Carson, No. 02-3015 (D.C. Cir. May 29, 2003), Doc. No. 751872. The attorneys identified thirteen sets of sealed materials, explained their suspicions, and tied those suspicions to suspected Brady, Giglio, or Jencks Act violations. See id. The D.C. Circuit refused to allow defendants to review these documents. See Order, United States v. Carson, No. 02-3015 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 28, 2003), Doc. No. 769196. Instead, the Circuit ordered defendants to raise these alleged Brady violations in their appellate brief. Id. Defendants did not do so.

In their § 2255 supplements (filed in 2014 and 2015) defendants Sweeney and Carson included claims alleging (1) Brady, Giglio, and Jencks Act violations about those sealed materials, (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not challenging the trial court's in camera reviewing procedures, and (3) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to challenge these alleged violations on direct appeal. In defendants' view, relation-back and equitable-tolling principles excused their late filings. See ECF Nos. 1277 & 1278. The Court instead concluded that AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations barred these claims. See, e.g., Martin, 2021 WL 4989983, at *7-8. It stands by this conclusion for three reasons: (1) AEDPA's statute of limitations ended on February 20, 2008; (2) the claims in defendants' supplements do not relate back to those in their first § 2255 motions; and (3) the facts of this case do not warrant...