United States v. Mathison

467 F.Supp.3d 673

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Ryan Keith MATHISON, Defendant.

No. CR06-4030-LTS

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Western Division.

Signed June 17, 2020

Forde Fairchild, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Robert A. Knief, US Attorney's Office, Sioux City, IA, Martin J. McLaughlin, US Attorney's Office, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Plaintiff.

ORDER

Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before me on defendant Ryan Keith Mathison's motions (Doc. Nos. 608, 613) for compassionate release. The Government has filed a response (Doc. No. 616) and Mathison has filed a reply (Doc. No. 620). Oral argument is not necessary. See Local Rule 7(c).

II. BACKGROUND

On June 21, 2006, a Second Superseding Indictment was returned against Mathison and several other individuals. Doc. No. 185. It charged Mathison with seven counts: one count of continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) ; one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute on thousand kilograms or more of marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine and anabolic steroids in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846 ; one count of conspiracy to launder money in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 1956(h) and four counts of making a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). Doc. No. 185. The Second Superseding Indictment also charged Mathison's father, Robert Mathison, Sr., and brother, Ronald Mathison, among others. Id. Robert was charged with two counts: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute on thousand kilograms or more of marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine and anabolic steroids and (2) conspiracy to launder money. Id. Ronald was charged with one count of conspiracy to launder money. Id.

United States District Judge Mark W. Bennett presided over Mathison's, Robert's and Ronald's consolidated jury trial. See Doc. No. 340. Trial began on November 6, 2006. Id. On November 14, 2006, following the first week of trial, Mathison removed his GPS monitoring transmitter unit and absconded from pretrial supervision. Doc. No. 491 at ¶ 5; Doc. No. 353. Judge Bennett ruled Mathison had voluntarily absconded and that the trial could continue. See Doc. No. 353. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized the trial evidence as follows:

The evidence at trial showed that Mathison and his friend Shad Derby ran a drug smuggling operation, bringing anabolic steroids, marijuana, methamphetamines, and cocaine from Mexico to Sioux City, Iowa. Their business model was to use friends and family as drivers, sending the drivers with large amounts of cash to El Paso, Texas, or else meeting the drivers there with the cash. Once in El Paso, the drivers would call a phone number, and a supplier would pick up their car or truck and bring it back with bundles of drugs secreted within giant stereo speakers in the vehicle.

The drivers would drive back to Sioux City, where they would unload their cargo either at Derby's house, a shed outside of town rented by Mathison, or at Mathison's business, Stereo Town. The drivers were usually paid $50 per pound of marijuana transported. Mathison distributed the drugs around the areas of Sioux City, Iowa and Sioux Falls, South Dakota.

The evidence also showed that Mathison paid cash for at least two cars that were then registered in the names of Jennifer Urben-Potratz and Travis Olson, respectively. The Olson car was shown to have been paid for with drug money. William Sedelmeier, one of Mathison's drug customers, originally owned the car and Mathison bought it from him by paying off Sedelmeier's car loan. Sedelmeier paid off his car loan using Mathison's money; the money was the proceeds from marijuana that belonged to Mathison, but which Sedelmeier peddled for Mathison. After obtaining the car with drug proceeds, Mathison then sold the car to Travis Olson, ostensibly acting on behalf of Sedelmeier.

There was also evidence that Mathison filed income tax returns that did not show the true amount of his income for the year. Internal Revenue Service Agent James Biegger examined Mathison's financial records and testified that in the years 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, respectively, Mathison had income of $106,000, $234,805, $331,750, and $309,221, whereas his tax returns for those years showed income of only $27,073, $22,457, $54,179, and $78,066.

Doc. No. 509 at 2.

On November 15, 2006, the jury found Mathison guilty on all counts.¹ Doc. No. 358. He was apprehended in Juarez, Mexico, on November 27, 2006, and ultimately was returned to this district. Doc. No. 491 at ¶ 5. During his sentencing hearing on May 2, 2007, Judge Bennett calculated a sentencing guideline range of 360 months to life, based on a total offense level of 42 and a criminal history category II.² Doc. No. 487. Judge Bennett denied Mathison's motion for downward variance, stating, in part:

The need for the sentence imposed, you know, this is not just a regular drug conspiracy, but the defendant was found guilty of operating a continuing criminal enterprise, and that's obviously an extremely serious federal offense. So reflecting the seriousness of the offense, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public from further crimes, none of those factors in my view weigh in favor of a variance.

Doc. No. 498-1 at 11. Judge Bennett sentenced Mathison to 372 months' imprisonment. Doc. No. 487. This consisted of 372 months on the continuing criminal enterprise count, 240 months on the conspiracy to launder money count and 36 months on the false tax return counts, all to run concurrently.³ Id. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Mathison's convictions on appeal. See Doc. No. 509. Mathison's petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. See Doc. No. 520.

On April 27, 2020, Mathison filed a pro se motion for compassionate release. See Doc. No. 606. I denied that motion because Mathison failed to allege that he had exhausted his administrative remedies. See Doc. No. 607. On May 7, 2020, Mathison filed another pro se motion for compassionate release, this time including an administrative request he submitted to his warden on March 29, 2020. See Doc. No. 608. The administrative request was denied on March 29, 2020. Id. On May 11, 2020, I appointed counsel to represent Mathison and file an amended motion for compassionate release on his behalf. See Doc. No. 609.

According to the online Bureau of Prisons (BOP) inmate locator, Mathison is now 51 years old and located at Elkton FCI. His projected release date is July 29, 2033.

III. COMPASSIONATE RELEASE STANDARDS

A court's ability to modify a sentence after it has been imposed is extremely limited. One way a court may modify a sentence is through "compassionate release" as outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which was recently modified by the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA). See Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603. In the past, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) permitted a court to reduce a defendant's term of imprisonment only upon the motion of the Director of Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The FSA modified § 3582(c)(1)(A) such that a defendant may now directly petition the court "after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." See Mohrbacher v. Ponce , No. CV18-00513, 2019 WL 161727, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2019) (discussing modifications made to § 3582(c)(1)(A) by the FSA); see also United States v. Perez-Asencio , No. CR18-3611, 2019 WL 626175, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2019).

If a defendant fully exhausts administrative remedies, the court may, upon motion of the defendant, reduce the defendant's sentence, after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable, if the court finds that:

(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or

(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a determination has been made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, as provided under section 3142(g);

and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission ...

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Mathison does not meet the requirements of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). He is under 70 years of age and has not served at least 30 years in prison pursuant to a sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). See Doc. No. 491 at 2. Accordingly, Mathison's only possible avenue for relief is § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

The starting point in determining what constitutes "extraordinary and compelling reasons" under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) is the Sentencing Guideline discussing compassionate release issued by the United States Sentencing Commission. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2018); see also United States v. Hall , No. CR98-7, 2019 WL 6829951, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 13, 2019) ; United States v. Rivernider , No. CR10-222, 2019 WL 3816671, at *2 (D. Conn. Aug. 14, 2019). The Guideline provides that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist in the following circumstances:

(A) Medical Condition of the Defendant.—

(i) The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and advanced illness with an end of life trajectory). A specific prognosis of life expectancy (i.e., a probability of death within a specific time period) is not required. Examples include metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease, and advanced dementia.

(ii) The defendant is—

(I) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition,

(II) suffering from

...