United States v. Mattox

27 F.4th 668

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellant

v.Marcus Anthony MATTOX, Defendant - Appellee

United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee

v.Marcus Anthony Mattox, Defendant - Appellant

No. 20-3065

No. 20-3133

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: December 17, 2021

Filed: March 4, 2022

Craig Raymond Baune, Benjamin Bejar, Thomas Calhoun-Lopez, David Genrich, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff - Appellant.

Marcus Anthony Mattox, Pro Se.

Karen E. Mohrlant, F. Clayton Tyler, Law Offices of F. Clayton Tyler, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant - Appellee.

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Marcus Mattox was convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) after the district court¹ denied his suppression motion. The Government and Mattox appeal. The Government challenges the district court's conclusion that Mattox was not an armed career criminal. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Mattox challenges the denial of his suppression motion, the sufficiency of the evidence that the gun had been in or affected interstate commerce, and the application of a sentencing enhancement for use or possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense. We affirm.

I.

On September 22, 2018, police officers responded to a 911 call about gunshots at an apartment complex in St. Paul, Minnesota. The officers followed a fresh blood trail and found a loaded Desert Eagle .50-caliber semi-automatic pistol with blood on it and the hammer cocked back in the firing position. The officers learned that a man had been shot in his face and right foot and had been taken to the hospital.

An officer went to the emergency room at the hospital and entered the man's room. The man's bloody clothes were on the floor, and at the officer's request, a nurse took the identification from the clothes. The identification showed the defendant's name, Marcus Mattox. The officer took the clothes, and the next day, an officer went to the hospital and executed a warrant for a DNA swab from Mattox and asked him some questions for a few minutes. Mattox admitted that he was at the scene of the crime and stated that he did not know who shot him. He declined to answer more questions.

The police compared Mattox's DNA sample to gun swabs that tested positive for blood. The swabs matched Mattox's DNA sample. The police also obtained video surveillance footage of the shooting. The video shows Mattox exit the apartment building, approach a male and a female at the back of an SUV in the parking lot, appear to draw a firearm, and take a shooting stance. After Mattox drew his gun, the male appeared to shoot at Mattox.

A federal grand jury indicted Mattox on one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Mattox moved to suppress the evidence seized from his hospital room and the statements he made to the police while hospitalized. The district court denied the motions, adopting the magistrate judge's conclusions that (1) the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement applied to the seizure of Mattox's clothes, and (2) the questioning of Mattox was not a custodial interrogation and his statements were voluntary.

At trial, the jury heard expert testimony that the Desert Eagle handgun found in the parking lot was manufactured in Israel. The jury convicted Mattox of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced Mattox to 106 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release. It applied a four-level enhancement for use or possession of a firearm "in connection with another felony offense," see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), overruling Mattox's objection to the enhancement. The district court denied the Government's request that Mattox be designated an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The Government appeals the denial of the armed career criminal designation, and Mattox challenges the denial of the suppression motions, the sufficiency of the evidence that the gun had been in or affected interstate commerce, and the application of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).

II.

We begin with Mattox's challenge to the district court's denial of his suppression motions. "In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error, giving due weight to the inferences police drew from those facts. We review de novo the district court's legal conclusion that reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed." United States v. Pacheco , 996 F.3d 508, 511 (8th Cir. 2021). We also review de novo whether a statement was given voluntarily, but "we review for clear error the factual findings underlying that determination." United States v. Vega , 676 F.3d 708, 718 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A.

We first consider whether Mattox's clothing was taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment permits an officer to seize an object without a warrant under the plain-view doctrine if "(1) the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed, (2) the object's incriminating character is immediately apparent, and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself." United States v. Vinson , 805 F.3d 1150, 1152 (8th Cir. 2015). Mattox does not dispute that the second and third conditions are met here. But he argues that the first condition is not met because the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering his hospital room.

We disagree. Whether the police violated Mattox's Fourth Amendment rights by entering the hospital room depends on whether Mattox had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the hospital room. See United States v. Long , 797 F.3d 558, 564 (8th Cir. 2015). Our determination of whether an individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy may be informed by state law. See, e.g. , U.S. v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1295-96 (8th Cir. 1986). True, as Mattox points out, overnight guests in homes and hotel rooms have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Minnesota v. Olson , 495 U.S. 91, 96-97, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) ; United States v. Conner , 127 F.3d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1997). But that is because hosting overnight guests in homes "is a longstanding social custom that serves functions recognized as valuable by society." Olson , 495 U.S. at 98, 110 S.Ct. 1684. Being admitted to the hospital for a gunshot wound does not serve the same valuable societal function. In fact, police in Minnesota are expected to show up to hospitals to investigate a gunshot-wound victim like Mattox because Minnesota law requires hospitals to report gunshot wounds to the police. See Minn. Stat. § 626.52, subd. 2 ; United States v. Clancy , 979 F.3d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir. 2020). The officer who interviewed Mattox testified that he had gone to the hospital in the past to interview victims of gunshot wounds. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit has recognized that a police officer "lawfully fulfilling his duty to investigate a reported shooting ... lawfully entered the emergency room of a hospital to interview the victim of the shooting." United States v. Davis , 690 F.3d 226, 234 n.13 (4th Cir. 2012). Furthermore, unlike in hotel rooms and residential guest rooms, in a hospital room, people are constantly coming and going from the room to provide medical services. Cf. Rakas v. Illinois , 439 U.S. 128, 148-49, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) (relying on the fact that the defendants could not exclude others from certain parts of a car in finding no legitimate expectation of privacy). And although Mattox rightly observes that there is a significant privacy interest in medical care, this interest is diminished in Minnesota for patients with gunshot wounds because the law requires the reporting of gunshot wounds. See Minn. Stat. § 626.52, subd. 2.

We conclude that Mattox did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his hospital room and thus the officer did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by entering the room. Because the officer lawfully entered his hospital room and his clothes were in plain view, Mattox's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.

B.

Next, we consider whether Mattox's statements to the police while in the hospital were voluntary. Mattox does not argue that a custodial interrogation occurred. A statement made outside of a custodial interrogation may be suppressed if it is not made voluntarily. See United States v. Brave Heart , 397 F.3d 1035, 1040 (8th Cir. 2005). "A statement is involuntary when it was extracted by threats, violence, or express or implied promises sufficient to overbear the defendant's will and critically impair his capacity for self-determination."

Vega , 676 F.3d at 718. "We determine if a defendant's will has been overborne by examining the totality of the circumstances, including both the conduct of law enforcement in exerting pressure to confess on the defendant and the defendant's ability to resist that pressure." Brave Heart , 397 F.3d at 1040. "The government bears the burden of persuasion and must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged statements were voluntary." Vega , 676 F.3d at 718.

Mattox argues that the statements were involuntary because he was in the hospital recovering from gunshot wounds, he had taken pain medication, the police executed a warrant to obtain a DNA sample, and he was not read Miranda rights. We disagree. The totality of the circumstances shows that law enforcement did not overbear Mattox's will. See Brave Heart , 397 F.3d at 1040. Being on pain medication does not show that a defendant's will has been overborne if there is evidence that the patient answered "reasonably" and understood what was occurring. See United States v. Annis , 446 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir....