United States v. McCoy

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. MAURICE MCCOY, TEEAUNA WHITE, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:17-CR-20489-TGB-EAS

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

February 18, 2022

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO SUPPRESS

HON TERRENCE G. BERG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In this drug conspiracy case, Defendants Maurice McCoy and Teeauna White move to suppress evidence seized as a result of the execution of two search warrants. Eighteen defendants have been charged in connection with the alleged conspiracy involving a nationwide heroin, fentanyl, and cocaine distribution ring self-identified as the “Money Gang Meal Clique.” The government alleges that Defendant McCoy is the leader of the organization, and that Defendant White is his girlfriend. Several defendants have entered guilty pleas. Currently, McCoy and six others remain charged with Conspiracy to Distribute a Controlled Substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, while McCoy, White, and three others are charged with Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Defendants McCoy and White challenge two search warrants, the first for data stored in an iCloud account associated with Defendant White and a business operated by her and McCoy, and the second authorizing a search of a home in California that they shared. Defendants move to suppress the evidence obtained from these searches.

Having reviewed the briefing in this case and heard oral argument on the matter, Defendants' motion to suppress and for a Franks hearing will be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant Maurice McCoy is accused of leading a wide-ranging drug trafficking organization (“DTO” or “McCoy DTO”). Defendant Teeauna White, McCoy's girlfriend, is accused of helping to maintain the DTO's finances and launder money. Defendant Maurice McCoy is charged with Conspiracy to Distribute a Controlled Substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Defendant Teeauna White is charged with Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).

In the course of their investigation, the government obtained the two warrants challenged here. The first warrant authorized agents to search an iCloud account that was associated with both the email address “mg.mealclique.ent@gmail.com” and Defendant White's cell phone number. The second warrant authorized agents to search a California residence shared by McCoy and White. As will be discussed below, Defendants allegedly operated or purported to operate a number of businesses, including a music promotion business with an associated recording studio called “Money Gang Meal Clique” (“MGMC”). This name, according to the evidence, was also used by members of the McCoy DTO as the name for their drug operation. The government argues that these businesses were intertwined with the DTO, and were used to conceal DTO proceeds and activity. The central contention of Defendants' motion is that the affidavits in support of these search warrants omitted material facts that would have supported innocent explanations for the suspicious behavior detailed in the warrant applications. In summary, Defendants argue that the affidavits cast several purportedly legitimate businesses as nothing more than fronts for the DTO, failed to provide important context that would explain Defendant White's communications with, and payment of travel expenses for, DTO members, and provided a misleading interpretation of a slang term used by Defendants. Defendants also challenge the reliability of a number of confidential informants relied upon in the affidavits.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Fourth Amendment outlines the right of the people “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The “core” of the Fourth Amendment is the right of a citizen to be “free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 2041, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). “One of the touchstones of the reasonableness requirement is that the police must generally obtain a warrant based upon a judicial determination of probable cause before entering the home.” Ziegler v. Aukerman, 512 F.3d 777, 785 (6th Cir. 2008)

Probable cause demands an assessment of whether there is “a ‘fair probability, ” given the totality of the circumstances, that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” U.S. v. Davidson, 936 F.2d 856, 859 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting U.S. v. Loggins, 777 F.2d 336, 338 (6th Cir. 1985)). When evaluating an application and affidavit for a search warrant, the magistrate judge must “make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity' and ‘basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).

If the affidavit in support of a search warrant “contains a statement, necessary to the finding of probable cause, that is later demonstrated to be false and included by an affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, ” the search warrant is invalid. United States v. Duval, 742 F.3d 246, 250 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)). Franks also extends to circumstances in which an investigator intentionally omits evidence in a search warrant affidavit that is “critical to determining the existence of probable cause.” Duval, 742 F.3d. at 251. Where a criminal defendant makes a “substantial preliminary showing” that a false statement was knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, included in a warrant affidavit, a court must hold a Franks hearing to determine whether the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-156.

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants seek to suppress evidence seized from both warrants. As to the iCloud warrant, Defendants argue that probable cause was lacking because the warrant affidavit included uncorroborated statements from unreliable informants, and that the warrant affidavit was materially misleading because certain facts were omitted. Defendants also argue that the affidavit did not support a finding of probable cause to search the entire iCloud account and all categories of data it contained. As to the warrant for the house located at 27622 Pala Loma Court in Moreno Valley, California, Defendants argue that the affidavit in support of the warrant omitted material information rendering it misleading, relied on statements of unreliable informants, and was stale. Defendants request an evidentiary hearing under Franks to address these alleged omissions.

A. Whether a Franks hearing is justified

i. iCloud Warrant

The first search warrant was issued on April 25, 2019, and authorized the search of an iCloud account associated with the email address “mg.mealclique.ent@gmail.com.” iCloud Warrant Aff., ECF No. 477-2, PageID.3508. The account was also tied to Defendant White's cell phone number. Id. at PageID.3533-34. The warrant required Apple to disclose account information, copies of emails sent to and from the account, copies of all messages associated with the account, contents of all files stored in the iCloud account, location data, and other logs. Id. at PageID.3546-49. Defendants argue that a Franks hearing should be held and that evidence seized pursuant to the warrant should be suppressed because the affidavit presented certain information in a fundamentally misleading light that deceived the issuing magistrate. Def's Mot., ECF No. 477, PageID.3480.

The iCloud affidavit is 37 pages long. The first seven pages detail the prior investigation into the DTO, and explain the investigative steps taken up to the point that the iCloud warrant was requested. The affidavit goes on to detail statements made by five confidential informants, and explains how the informants' statements were corroborated. The affidavit also includes a lengthy “financial investigation” section, which describes the examination of various bank accounts associated with the Defendants. Generally, the affidavit is very comprehensive and detailed.

Defendants do not argue that any of the information presented in the affidavit was strictly untrue. Rather, Defendants argue that the government should have included additional information in the affidavit that it had in its possession. Because Defendants' Franks argument rests on omissions, rather than affirmative falsehoods, Defendants face a higher bar. See United States v. Fowler, 535 F.3d 408, 415 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[the Sixth Circuit has] repeatedly held that there is a higher bar for obtaining a Franks hearing on the basis of an allegedly material omission as opposed to an allegedly false affirmative statement.”). A defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing based on alleged omissions “if and only if (1) the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that the affiant engaged in deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth in omitting information from the affidavit, and (2) a finding of probable cause would not be supported by the affidavit if the omitted material were considered to be a part of it.” Fowler, 535 F.3d at 415.

Specifically Defe...