United States v. McMillin

603 F.Supp.3d 1044

UNITED STATES of America

v.Shane D. MCMILLIN

Case No. 19-cr-40040-TC

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

Signed May 18, 2022

Stephen Hunting, Office of United States Attorney, Topeka, KS, for United States of America.

Salvatore D. Intagliata, Monnat & Spurrier, Chartered, Wichita, KS, for Shane D. McMillin.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Toby Crouse, United States District Judge

Shane D. McMillin is charged with being a felon in possession of a stolen firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 922(j). Doc. 2. He now moves to suppress evidence of the firearms, arguing that they were found after law enforcement unreasonably prolonged his traffic stop in contravention of Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. 348, 354–55, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). Doc. 42. Because police officers did not extend the stop beyond the time required to complete their traffic-related tasks, his motion is denied.

I

A

The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Searches and seizures—of people, their homes, and their personal property—are presumed unreasonable when conducted without a warrant. United States v. Karo , 468 U.S. 705, 717, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984). But that does not mean that every warrantless search or seizure is unreasonable. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart , 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) ; Cady v. Dombrowski , 413 U.S. 433, 447, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973) ; see also Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 383, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (noting that "ensuring public safety" is "the paramount governmental interest"); Georgia v. Randolph , 547 U.S. 103, 118, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006) (distinguishing between intrusions to investigate and to protect).

Traffic stops are seizures for Fourth Amendment purposes, United States v. Pettit , 785 F.3d 1374, 1379 (10th Cir. 2015), yet warrantless stops are valid where the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation occurred, Kansas v. Glover , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1187, 206 L.Ed.2d 412 (2020). "Reasonable suspicion" is "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 417–18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ). The inquiry depends on "the totality of the circumstances," Navarette v. California , 572 U.S. 393, 397, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (quoting Cortez , 449 U.S. at 417, 101 S.Ct. 690 ), and "requires ... ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,’ and ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause." Id. (quoting United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) ).

But even stops based on reasonable suspicion of a traffic infraction will violate the Fourth Amendment if they are "prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission." Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). In other words, every traffic stop must be justified at its inception and must conclude once the traffic-related mission has been accomplished, unless officers develop reasonable suspicion of other illegal activity or the initial detention becomes a consensual encounter. United States v. Gomez-Arzate , 981 F.3d 832, 839 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Cortez , 965 F.3d 827, 833 (10th Cir. 2020) ).

B

On February 13, 2019, Salina Police Department Officer Michael Baker and his drug-sniffing K-9 were on patrol in Salina, Kansas.¹ Baker saw Shane McMillin's blue pickup truck traveling on a city street. Baker knew McMillin and his truck and also knew, from a prior stop in December 2018, that the truck's temporary license plate had expired. Baker began following the truck, used radar to record it exceeding the speed limit by nine miles per hour, and then stopped the truck. At some point after Baker began following McMillin, and before initiating the stop, Baker used his radio to request that a back-up officer assist him with the traffic stop.

After Baker and McMillin had both come to a stop, Baker approached the truck and found McMillin and a female passenger inside. He obtained their identities, discussed the expired temporary tag with McMillin, and requested proof of insurance, which McMillin could not locate. As a consequence, Baker decided to cite McMillin for the failure to insure and register his vehicle.

Officer Gino Constantino arrived on the scene while Baker was still engaged in his initial discussion with McMillin and the passenger. When that discussion concluded, Constantino met with Baker, and the two officers spoke briefly at the rear of McMillin's truck. During that conversation, Baker asked Constantino to prepare the citation for both the lack of insurance and improper registration, as well as a warning for speeding, while Baker walked his K-9 around the truck. Before walking his K-9, however, Baker returned to the truck to obtain its VIN. Throughout the stop, Baker had been using his radio to provide information to dispatch, which ran searches to confirm that the occupants had no outstanding warrants. He did the same with the VIN, asking dispatch to confirm that the vehicle had not been reported stolen. This return information from dispatch came both by radio and by real-time updates to the computer system in Baker's and Constantino's patrol cars.

As was his usual practice when deploying his K-9, Baker instructed McMillin and his passenger to roll up the vehicle's windows, turn off the vehicle, and step out. He directed them to stand next to the front passenger headlight of the patrol car in which Constantino sat preparing the citations using his in-vehicle computer system. While Baker was directing them to this spot, dispatch returned a clear search on the VIN—the last information Constantino would have needed to fill out the citations.

Baker then took his K-9 to the truck. She alerted almost immediately, giving Baker probable cause to search the vehicle. During his search of the truck's interior, he located two handguns, ammunition, a digital scale, syringes, rubber tubing, and a "baggie of suspected methamphetamine." At that point, the focus of the stop shifted to the contraband, and Constantino never completed the traffic citations.

The K-9 alert occurred roughly eight minutes into the stop and about three minutes after Constantino began writing the citations. Constantino testified that traffic stops usually take approximately 15 minutes and that preparing the citation itself ordinarily takes between seven and eight minutes.

II

McMillin alleges that the dog sniff violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures.² His position fails because the dog sniff was conducted during a lawful traffic stop and did not prolong the time needed to complete the mission of issuing a ticket for the traffic violations. Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. 348, 350–51, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) ; accord Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 409, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) (rejecting constitutional objection to drug sniff conducted by second arriving officer during lawful traffic stop).

Dog sniffs conducted during a lawful traffic stop are permissible unless they prolong the stop "beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket for the violation." Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at 350, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (cleaned up). Whether officers improperly extended a stop is a fact-intensive question. United States v. Malone , 10 F.4th 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2021). A stop is unlawfully extended when officers pursue unrelated activities that extend the stop beyond "when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed." Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609 ; see also United States v. Frazier , 30 F.4th 1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 2022).³ And while there is no de minimis exception to the rule, United States v. Mayville , 955 F.3d 825, 830 (10th Cir. 2020), the question is only whether "police diligently pursued the [traffic] investigation," Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609, and not whether they took the quickest route humanly possible to concluding the stop. Mayville , 955 F.3d at 827. Thus, courts are not to "second-guess the logistical decisions of officers so long as their actions were reasonable and diligently completed within the confines of a lawful traffic stop[ ] ... because reasonableness—rather than efficiency—is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment." Id.

Video evidence and testimony confirm that Baker and Constantino did not unreasonably extend McMillin's stop. They were efficient in collecting the information necessary to process the traffic citations that justified the stop, obtaining the names and addresses of the truck's occupants, checking McMillin's license, discussing with McMillin his traffic infractions, obtaining the truck's VIN, sharing with dispatch the collected information to run standard searches, and exercising discretion as to what citations to issue. These acts are within the heartland of tasks permitted during a lawful stop. See, e.g. , Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at 355–57, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (citing, among others, Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) ).

The officers then took the information obtained to begin the task of drafting and issuing citations. Baker delegated that task to Constantino while he walked his dog around the exterior of the vehicle. In Caballes , the Supreme Court held that one officer's act of conducting a dog sniff while another on-the-scene officer wrote citations did not violate the Constitution. See Caballes , 543 U.S. at 406–08, 125 S.Ct. 834. McMillin identifies no factual or legal basis for a different result...