United States v. Mejia

Barry Wiegand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office Special Proceedings Section, Washington, DC, Laura R. Bach, William John O'Malley, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, Nihar Ranjan Mohanty, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia Violent Crime and Narcotics Trafficking Section, Washington, DC, Timothy Ronald Cahill, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USAO, Special Proceedings Division, Washington, DC, Seth Adam Meinero, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USAO, Washington, DC, Laura Jean Gwinn, Lakeita Rox-Love, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Washington, DC, for United States of America.

A.J. Kramer, Benjamin M. Flick, Public Defenders, Federal Public Defender for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, Pleasant Sanford Brodnax, III, Law Office of Pleasant S. Brodnax, III, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

Wilfredo Mejia, Ray Brook, NY, Pro Se.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Royce C. Lamberth, United States District Judge

Before this Court is defendant Wilfredo Mejia's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The government initially opposed the motion, arguing that Mejia's motion was procedurally barred and meritless. However, the parties have since conferred and requested, via joint motion, that the Court grant Mejia's § 2255 motion and vacate his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction because none of the potential predicate offenses qualify as a "crime of violence" following intervening changes in law. Upon consideration of the record, the applicable law, and the parties' briefing, the Court will GRANT the parties' joint motion, Mejia's original § 2255 motion, and his supplemental § 2255 motion.

This Court has previously described the factual background of this case in detail. See United States v. Mejia, 502 F. Supp. 3d 387 (D.D.C. 2020); United States v. Mejia, 541 F. Supp. 3d 87 (D.D.C. 2021). Therefore, the Court will briefly summarize the facts necessary to rule on the instant motion.

In November 2011, the United States obtained a superseding indictment against Mejia that charged him with the following twenty-three felonies arising from his membership in La Mara Salvatrucha, also known as "MS-13":

3d Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 101.

On July 20, 2012, Mejia, his counsel, and the government reached a plea agreement. Plea Agreement, ECF No. 216. Mejia agreed to admit his guilt as to all counts and enter a plea of guilty to Count 1, RICO Conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and Count 23, possessing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), (2). Id. In exchange for Mejia's plea, the government agreed to recommend a total sentence of 141 months of incarceration. Id. Mejia signed both the plea agreement and the government's associated factual proffer. See ECF No. 216-17. Judge Rosemary M. Collyer sentenced Mejia consistent with the government's recommendation. Min. Entry (10/05/2012). Specifically, Mejia was sentenced to 57 months of incarceration for Count 1. J., ECF No. 254. He was also sentenced to 84 months of incarceration for Count 23, to be served consecutively to his sentence for Count 1. Id. The sentence for Count 23 represented the mandatory minimum under the statute. See Final Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR"), ECF No. 243, at 8. He was further sentenced to 36 months of supervised release and $100 for each felony count of conviction. J. at 4, 6. Mejia did not appeal his sentence.

Mejia advocates for vacating his conviction on Count 23, presenting the Court with a variety of arguments. In the first round of briefing, he argued that the conviction was unconstitutional because (a) it was ambiguous which offense served as the predicate offense for his § 924(c) conviction,¹ (b) the court must assume the predicate was VICAR kidnapping, in turn predicated on D.C. kidnapping, and (c) D.C. kidnapping is no longer a crime of violence following the Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) and United States v. Davis, — U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019) invalidating the so-called "residual clause" of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 628; Def.'s Mem. in Supp., ECF No. 629; Def.'s Suppl. Mot., ECF No. 662. The government opposed, claiming that multiple offenses served as the predicate offense and at least one, specifically VICAR assault with a deadly weapon ("VICAR ADW"), predicated on D.C. assault with a dangerous weapon ("D.C. ADW"), survived Johnson and Davis. Gov't Opp'n, ECF No. 671. In reply, Mejia pivoted and argued instead that (a) there was no ambiguity regarding the predicate offense, (b) the sole predicate was D.C. armed robbery, and (c) D.C. armed robbery is not a crime of violence.² Def.'s

Reply, ECF No. 672. The United States filed a sur-reply, Gov't Sur-Reply, ECF No. 673, and Mejia responded with a sur-reply of his own.³ Def.'s Sur-Reply, ECF No. 675.

After learning that Mejia completed his prison term and was deported from the country, this Court dismissed Mejia's motion as moot. See Mejia, 502 F. Supp. 3d 387; Order, ECF No. 679. The Court also denied Mejia's motion for certificate of appealability. See Mejia, 541 F. Supp. 3d 87; Order, ECF No. 687. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit, at the parties' request, reversed, stating that "[t]he special assessment attributable to the conviction the appellant seeks to challenge precludes a mootness finding in this matter." United States v. Mejia, No. 20-3086, 2022 WL 4280686, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 2022) (internal citations omitted). The D.C. Circuit remanded the case for this Court to consider the merits of Mejia's motion. Mandate, ECF No. 703.

On remand, Mejia comes before the Court with yet another argument, though this time he is joined by the government. The parties now agree that none of the potential predicates for Mejia's § 924(c) conviction currently qualify as crimes of violence after intervening changes in law and accordingly request that this Court vacate his conviction. Joint Mot., ECF No. 709, at ¶¶ 8-10 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)).

A. 28 U.S.C. § 2255

A defendant may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence if he believes that the sentence was imposed "in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). § 2255 motions are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Id. § 2255(f). When the Supreme Court recognizes a new right and makes that right retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, the one-year statute of limitations begins on the date that "the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court." Id. The defendant bears the burden to prove his right to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Baugham, 941 F. Supp. 2d 109, 112 (D.D.C. 2013).

When considering the merits of a § 2255 motion, there is a "general rule that claims not raised on direct appeal may

not be raised on collateral review unless the [defendant] shows cause and prejudice." Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003) (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)). Cause may be shown where a claim is "so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel," but "futility cannot constitute cause if it means simply that a claim was unacceptable to that particular court at that particular time." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622-23, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) (internal quotations omitted). To establish "prejudice," a petitioner must show " 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for the errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' " United States v. Pettigrew, 346 F.3d 1139, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). In determining prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, a defendant "must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea." United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004).

B. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)

The Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), authorizes heightened, mandatory criminal penalties when a defendant uses, carries, or possesses a firearm in connection with a "crime of violence." Id. § 924(c)(1)(A). Under § 924(c)(3), there are two...