United States v. Mitsuyoshi

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. TODD MITSUYOSHI, Defendant.

No. CR. 11-00380 JMS (03)

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

March 17, 2022

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE (COMPASSIONATE RELEASE), ECF NO. 372

J Michael Seabright Chief United States District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Todd Mitsuyoshi (“Defendant”) moves for compassionate release from Safford Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI Safford”), pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). ECF No. 372. He argues that a reduction in his sentence is warranted on the basis of (1) the length of his 240-month sentence, which is disproportionately long compared to the sentence he would receive if sentenced today; (2) his numerous medical conditions; and (3) his rehabilitation efforts. See Id. at PageID ## 1829-40, 1843-45. For the reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED. The court ORDERS that Defendant's sentence be reduced to time served plus seven days.

II. BACKGROUND

Defendant is 55 years old and is currently incarcerated at FCI Safford with a projected release date of July 17, 2028. See https://www.bop.gov/ inmateloc/ (last visited March 16, 2022). To date, Defendant has served approximately 129 months in custody. See Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 261 at PageID # 812 (noting that defendant has been in custody since June 6, 2011, the date of his arrest); see Id. at PageID # 808 (same).

On March 2, 2012, Defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers and salts of its isomers, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. See ECF No. 188; ECF No. 189 at PageID ## 511-12; see also PSR, ECF No. 261 at PageID ## 808, 812. On June 25, 2012, after the government filed a special information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, Defendant was sentenced to a mandatory-minimum term of 240 months imprisonment. See ECF No. 252 at PageID ## 784-85. The mandatory-minimum sentence was increased from 10 years to 20 years (the 240 months) due to Defendant's prior state-court conviction qualifying as a “felony drug offense.”^[1] That term of imprisonment is to be followed by ten years of supervised release. Id. at PageID # 786.

On March 2, 2021, Defendant submitted a request for compassionate release to FCI Safford's warden. ECF No. 372-2. Defendant did not receive a response. See ECF No. 372 at PageID # 1829. On January 14, 2022, more than thirty days after he submitted his request to the warden, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Reduce Sentence. ECF No. 372. The government filed its Opposition on January 28, 2022. ECF No. 376.

The parties agree that due to changes in sentencing laws caused by the FSA, there is a disparity between the sentence Defendant received in 2012 and the sentence he would receive if sentenced today. The parties disagree, however, as to whether such intervening, nonretroactive changes in sentencing laws can be grounds for compassionate release. Compare ECF No. 372 at PageID ## 1819-22, with ECF No. 376 at PageID # 1966. Based on a circuit split on this issue, the court held a status conference on February 11, 2022 and directed the parties to search for appeals pending before the Ninth Circuit concerning whether a district court may consider the FSA's nonretroactive amendments to a defendant's mandatory minimum on an individualized basis when determining whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist to reduce the defendant's sentence. See ECF No. 378. Defendant and the government filed simultaneous responses on February 22, 2022, ECF Nos. 379 and 381, respectively.

The court decides the Motion without a further hearing pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(c).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Defendant moves for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the FSA, which provides as relevant:

[T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that-

(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; . . . .

and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]

Accordingly, the court may reduce Defendant's sentence if (1) Defendant has exhausted the required administrative remedies; (2) the court finds there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting a sentence reduction; and (3) the court considers the § 3553(a) factors, to the extent they are applicable, and determines that the reduction is warranted under the circumstances. See United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 2021).

Although the text of § 3582(c)(1)(A) also requires a sentence reduction to be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the United States Sentencing Commission, ” that requirement does not apply to this case, as there is currently no policy from the Sentencing Commission that is “applicable” to compassionate-release motions filed by a defendant rather than the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) Director. See United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 801-02 (9th Cir. 2021). Specifically, the Sentencing Commission's policy statement, United States Sentencing Guideline (“Guideline”) § 1B1.13, was promulgated before the FSA provided criminal defendants the ability to file motions for compassionate release on their own behalf. See Aruda, 993 F.3d at 800. And, without a quorum, the Sentencing Commission has been unable to amend the Guidelines post-FSA. Id. at 800 n.1. This court is thus empowered to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason that warrants a sentence reduction. See Id. at 801-02. In making this determination, “[t]he Sentencing Commission's statements in [§ 1B1.13] may inform a district court's discretion for § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by a defendant, but they are not binding.” Aruda, 993 F.3d at 802.

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendant submitted a request for compassionate release to FCI Safford's warden on March 2, 2021. ECF No. 372-2. In that request, Defendant asserted multiple bases for compassionate release. See Id. at PageID ## 1859-60. Two of those bases are (1) that he is serving a 20-year mandatory-minimum sentence that “was changed under the ‘first step act' to 15-years, but . . . was not made retroactive”; and (2) his rehabilitation efforts, including “95 months of UNICOR employment” and “a good prison conduct record.” Id. More than thirty days after he submitted his request-and having not received a response from the warden-Defendant filed the instant Motion. See ECF No. 372 at PageID ## 1828-29. Defendant has thus exhausted his administrative remedies as to those two bases. See United States v. Burdette, 2020 WL 6375535, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2020) (“In order to fulfill the exhaustion requirement, Defendant's request to the BOP must explain the basis for his release.”); see also 28 C.F.R. § 571.61(a)(1) (an inmate's compassionate-release request to BOP must contain “[t]he extraordinary or compelling circumstances that the inmate believes warrant consideration”).

C. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons Warrant Reduction of Defendant's Sentence

Defendant bears the burden to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting compassionate release. See, e.g., United States v. Bogema, 2020 WL 6150467, at *3 (D. Haw. Oct. 20, 2020) (citations omitted). As explained above, Defendant asserts there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying compassionate release because of the disparity between the sentence he received in 2012 and the sentence he would receive if sentenced today, and also because of his rehabilitation efforts while incarcerated. See ECF No. 372-2 at PageID ## 1859-60.

First, Defendant argues that, if sentenced today, he would be subject to a mandatory minimum of only 120 months and a guideline range of 130 to 162 months, instead of a 240-month mandatory minimum.^[2] See ECF No. 372 at PageID ## 1827, 1830-31. The government agrees. See ECF No. 376 at PageID # 1966 (admitting that “the 130-162 months guideline sentencing range . . . applies today”). This disparity flows from the FSA's amendments to the mandatory-minimum provision in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Before the FSA's amendments in 2018, a mandatory-minimum sentence of 20 years imprisonment applied to any conviction under §§ 841(a) & 841(b)(1)(A) based on the filing of a § 851 information setting forth a prior conviction for a “felony drug offense.”^[3] 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2010 ed.). Defendant was subjected to that mandatory minimum because the government filed a § 851 special information setting forth his prior conviction under Hawaii Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 712-1243(2) for Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Third Degree, a class C felony carrying a maximum sentence of five years, HRS § 706-660(1)(b).^[4] See ECF No. 112; PSR ¶¶ 35, 59- 61, ECF No. 261 at PageID ## 820, 825.

And the parties agree that, if sentenced today, Defendant would fall out of § 841(b)(1)(A)'s amended mandatory-minimum provision. That is, Defendant's conviction under HRS § 712-1243(2) does not qualify as a “serious drug felony, ”^[5] as required by the FSA to increase a mandatory-minimum sentence....