United States v. Montalvo-Flores

81 F.4th 339

UNITED STATES of America v. Christopher MONTALVO-FLORES, Appellant

No. 22-1752

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

Argued June 8, 2023

Opinion filed August 28, 2023

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (District Court No.: 2-20-cr-00080-001), District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini

Louise Arkel (Argued), Saverio A. Viggiano, Office of Federal Public Defender, 1002 Broad Street, Newark, NJ 07102, Counsel for Appellant

Mark E. Coyne, Richard J. Ramsay (Argued), Office of United States Attorney, 970 Broad Street, Room 700, Newark, NJ 07102, Counsel for Appellee

Before HARDIMAN, AMBRO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

Christopher Montalvo-Flores moved to suppress evidence the Government obtained in its search of his girlfriend's rental car. The District Court denied his motion, holding that he failed to show he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that vehicle. We disagree, as unrebutted evidence shows Montalvo-Flores had possession and control of the car with his girlfriend's permission.

I. BACKGROUND

a. Factual Background

In November 2019, officers swarmed a New Jersey hotel room to execute an arrest warrant for Montalvo-Flores in connection with his suspected involvement in a robbery. After arresting him, officers found car keys during a search incident to arrest. Although Montalvo-Flores exclaimed that those were his car keys, officers knew he did not have a valid driver's license. Upon locating the car in the hotel parking lot, they discovered it was not reported lost or stolen and that its registered owner was the Enterprise Rental Car Company ("Enterprise").

Officers then called Enterprise's regional risk manager to obtain permission to search the car. They told the manager that Montalvo-Flores was operating the vehicle while involved in criminal activity. The Enterprise manager, noting that its rental contract prohibits using the car for criminal purposes and that Montalvo-Flores was not listed on the rental agreement—his girlfriend, Jennifer Pisciotta, was—gave officers her consent to search the vehicle. In that search, officers found 304 grams of cocaine inside the trunk and $35 in the center console. As a result, Montalvo-Flores was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).

b. Motion to Suppress Proceeding

Montalvo-Flores moved to suppress the cocaine and cash that officers obtained from the car.¹ He argued that he, with his girlfriend's permission, lawfully possessed and controlled it. In response, the Government acknowledged his girlfriend gave him permission to operate it. A68-69 (agreeing that he was a "driver[ ] with permission of the lessee to operate the vehicle"); A70 (admitting that he "had permission from his girlfriend, the lessee, to drive the rental vehicle"). But it asserted its warrantless search was nonetheless lawful for other reasons: Montalvo-Flores lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy because he had no driver's license and was not listed on the car's rental agreement, plus it had consent from Enterprise, the car's registered owner, to search the vehicle. The District Court held a suppression hearing to consider the parties' evidence and arguments.

The evidence elicited at the hearing largely tracked the parties' arguments. Yet only one witness, Detective Abdullah Holmes, testified. He acknowledged that Montalvo-Flores' girlfriend rented the car and that Montalvo-Flores possessed its keys. A151:22-152:3 (explaining that his girlfriend signed the rental agreement); A189:9-11 (he had the car keys). When officers took the keys from him, he exclaimed that "those are my rent-a-car keys!" A149:5-12. And, consistent with the Government's position that Montalvo-Flores had permission to drive the vehicle, Holmes testified that, prior to the search, fellow officers observed Pisciotta giving him the car. A176:25-177:3 (Q. "Prior to that[,] someone had surveilled Ms. Pisciotta and knew that she was in that vehicle and then exchanged it with Mr. Flores. Correct?" A. "Correct."); see also A182: 15-21 (reading from a police report stating "Mr. Flores['] girlfriend was observed by Detectives prior to the arrest exchanging/possessing the vehicle with Mr. Flores"). Holmes further submitted that Montalvo-Flores possessed and operated the vehicle. A179:8-12 (Q. "Probably, definitely one of the other members saw him operating the vehicle?" A. "He had possessed the vehicle at one time, yes." Q. "Possessed it or operated? They're two different things." A. "Operated. Possessed."); A180:6-10 ("I assumed that he possessed the vehicle, yes."); A181:10-14 (Holmes stating that "one of the [officers] did see him operate the vehicle"). Also in line with the Government's theory of why its search was valid, Holmes described how an Enterprise agent gave him permission to search the vehicle. He called the agent and "advised her that the person operating the vehicle at the time was . . . arrested for outstanding warrants and was a part of an armored truck robbery, and he did not have a driver's license." A151:8-13. After the agent gave him permission to search the car, officers used the keys to open it and then found the cocaine and cash that Montalvo-Flores moved to suppress.

c. District Court Opinion

The District Court denied Montalvo-Flores's motion to suppress, holding that he lacked standing because he failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. It stated that, unlike the driver in Byrd v. United States, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 200 L.Ed.2d 805 (2018),² Montalvo-Flores "was never observed possessing, operating, or otherwise exercising any sort of control over the rental vehicle aside from possessing the keys thereto." A12. It noted that "[a]lthough Detective Holmes testified that other detectives had apparently seen his girlfriend exchange the car and car keys with [Montalvo-Flores], Detective Holmes was not able to testify as to when or where that observation was made, or if detectives subsequently observed [Montalvo-Flores] operating or exercising control over the vehicle prior to his arrest." Id. The Court thus concluded that "there appears to be little evidence" he had "dominion and control" over it. Id. In its view, the evidence suggested only that Montalvo-Flores possessed the keys to the car. It thus concluded that "the mere possession of keys to a vehicle is [not] sufficient, standing alone, to create a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle owned by and rented to third parties." A13. It further stated in dictum that even if Montalvo-Flores had been seen operating the vehicle with his girlfriend's consent, he still would lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in it because he did not have a driver's license.³

After a stipulated bench trial, the Court found Montalvo-Flores guilty of possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). It sentenced him to 40 months of incarceration to be followed by three years' supervised release. He appeals to us.

II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court's order denying a motion to suppress under a "mixed standard of review. We review findings of fact for clear error, but exercise plenary review over legal determinations." United States v. Dyer, 54 F.4th 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2022). "A [factual] finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing body on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993).

III. ANALYSIS

a. Did Montalvo-Flores Have a Fourth Amendment Interest in His Girlfriend's Rental Car?

"[C]apacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). To decide that issue, we ask first whether Montalvo-Flores "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, [whether his] expectation [was] one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). These two questions reflect the "subjective" and "objective" prongs, respectively, of the Fourth Amendment's "standing" inquiry.⁴ See United States v. Cortez-Dutrieville, 743 F.3d 881, 884 (3d Cir. 2014). Montalvo-Flores bears the burden of proving each element. See United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 551 (3d Cir. 2010) ("To invoke the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, a defendant must demonstrate that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure.").

There is no question Montalvo-Flores had a subjective expectation of privacy in the rental car. When officers took the keys from him, he exclaimed "those are my rent-a-car keys!" A149:5-12. And officers needed the keys to open the locked vehicle parked outside his hotel. Thus, Montalvo-Flores no doubt believed he had privacy in the car and took steps to preserve his privacy.

The remaining question, then, is whether his expectation was reasonable. This "is a fact-bound question dependent on the strength of [a defendant's] interest in the car and the nature of his control over it; ownership is not necessary." United States v. Baker, 221 F.3d 438, 442 (3d Cir. 2000). Indeed, the Supreme Court held that "the mere fact that a driver in lawful possession or control of a rental car is not listed on the rental agreement will not defeat his or her otherwise reasonable expectation of...