United States v. Moore

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. EVAN MOORE, Defendant.

No. 1:23-cr-00077-ADA-BAM-1

United States District Court, E.D. California

November 29, 2023

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

(DOC. 21)

Evan Moore moves the Court to suppress a firearm that the government seized from his vehicle. (Doc. 21) He alleges that the officers acted without probable when conducting the vehicle search. (Id. at 1.) Because the Court determines the officers had reasonable cause to make the traffic stop and probable to search the vehicle, the motion is DENIED.

I. Procedural History

On March 30, 2023, the government charged Defendant with one count of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)-a Felon in Possession of a Firearm. (Doc. 1 at 1.) That day, U.S. Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto issued a warrant for his arrest. (Doc. 2.) On April 11, 2023, U.S. Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone issued a detention order, after a hearing, ordering Defendant to be detained. (Doc. 11 at 1.) Defendant filed the instant motion to suppress on June 5, 2023. (Doc. 21.) On June 6 2023, the Court set the motion's briefing schedule. (Doc. 27.) On July 3, 2023, the Government timely filed its opposition. (Doc. 30.) On July 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed a reply.

(Doc. 31.)

II. Factual Background

On December 18, 2022, at approximately 11:45 a.m., Madera Police Department (“MPD”) Officer Nathan Munoz was on duty. (Doc. 21 at 2; Doc. 30 at 5.) Officer Munoz was traveling eastbound on Sunrise Avenue, by Vineyard Avenue, when a black Cadillac caught his attention. (Doc. 21 at 2; Doc. 30 at 5.)^[1] Officer Munoz observed the Cadillac abruptly turn northbound onto Vineyard Avenue at a fast speed. (Doc. 21 at 2; Doc. 30 at 5.) Officer Munoz followed the Cadillac, observing that the rear taillights of the car obstructed the amount of light being emitted. (Doc. 21 at 2; Doc. 30 at 5.) Officer Munoz accelerated his patrol vehicle up to approximately 50 miles per hour in a 25-mile-per-hour zone. (Doc. 30 at 5.) Officer Munoz also observed that the Cadillac failed to come to a complete stop at a stop sign on Vineyard Avenue. (Id.) Then, Officer Munoz followed the Cadillac to East 5th Street near Lyons Street, where he observed the Cadillac make an abrupt turn into an alleyway. (Doc. 21 at 2; Doc. 30 at 5.) The Cadillac backed into a parking stall and turned off its lights. (Doc. 21 at 2; Doc. 30 at 5.) Officer Munoz pulled into the alley and turned on his emergency overhead lights, which automatically activated the patrol vehicle dash camera. (Doc. 30 at 5.)

Officer Munoz approached the Cadillac parked in a stall and advised Defendant that this was a traffic stop because the vehicle had tinted windows. (Doc. 21 at 3; Doc. 30 at 5; Doc. 30-3 at 00:13.)^[2] Defendant denied that he had tint on his windows and rolled his window up partially, revealing clear glass. (Doc. 30-3 at 00:13.) Officer Munoz responded saying, “[i]t looked like you did back there” and then said that there were a couple of reasons why he pulled Moore over, including speeding and not stopping at a limit line. (Id. at 00:29.) When asked, Moore provided his license and registration. (Id. at 00:45.)

Officer Munoz asked whether Moore was on probation or parole, and Moore denied that he was. (Id. at 00:50.) As Officer Munoz inspected Moore's license and registration, Officer Munoz asked whether Defendant had “guns, drugs, or large sums of money over $10,000” in his car, and Moore denied this. (Id. at 01:37.) Officer Munoz then told Moore that he smelled “a little bit of burnt marijuana” coming from the car. (Id. at 01:43.) Though Moore denied that there was an odor of marijuana, he stated that he had marijuana in the backseat of his car and provided Officer Munoz his medical marijuana card. (Doc. 21 at 4; Doc. 30 at 6.)

Officer Munoz asked whether Moore lived in the area, and Moore explained that he was at the apartment complex to visit a friend. (Id. at 02:37.) Moore then placed a phone call and refused to comply with Officer Munoz's order that he hang up the phone and not make calls during the traffic stop. (Id. at 02:47-02:54.) Officer Munoz then ended the call ordered Moore out of his car. (Id. at 03:10.) Pursuant to a pat-down search, Officer Munoz asked whether Moore had a weapon on his person, and he said no. (Id. at 3:28-3:30.) After patting him down, Officer Munoz directed Defendant to stand at the front of his vehicle. While moving to the front of the car, Moore told Officer Munoz he could not search his car. (Id. at 03:52.)

Officer Munoz walked to the passenger side of the car to see the backpack, which Moore had indicated contained marijuana. (Id. at 5:06.) Officer Munoz reported that he saw “a lot of baggies” in the backseat. (Id. at 6:13.) After Officer Munoz asked, Moore denied that he sold marijuana. (Id. at 06:27.) He explained that he was intending to weigh out some marijuana and put it in a smaller bag to take inside and smoke with his friend. Officer Munoz then consulted with another officer and explained what he had observed. They agreed that search of Moore's vehicle was permitted. (Id. at 07:22.) Officer Munoz told Moore that the officers had probable cause to believe that he was selling marijuana. (Id. at 7:25.) In response, Moore said, “you can search my car,” and reported that he had about a pound and a quarter of marijuana in his car that he just obtained. (Id. at 7:38.)

Officer Munoz then placed Moore in handcuffs, while explaining that Moore was not under arrest but that he was being detained. (Id. at 7:55.) Another officer placed Moore in Officer Munoz's patrol car, and the officers began to search the car. (Id. at 8:22.) Officer Munoz inspected the backpack in the backseat and found the marijuana in it, a digital scale and resealable plastic baggies. (Id. at 09:22.) Also on the floor were more resealable plastic bags. During the search, another officer found a loaded firearm under the steering column. (Id. at 15:00; Doc. 30 at 7.) Throughout, Moore denied that he sold marijuana.

In connection with this motion, the government produced a citation issued to Mr. Moore^[3]two years before the search for having modified taillights in violation of California Vehicle Code section 26101(b). (Doc. 30-6) Mr. Moore's attorney confirmed that the condition of the taillight was unchanged from October 2020 when the citation was issued, and December 2022 when the search occurred.

III. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

The Fourth Amendment states, “(t)he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “(T)he ‘seizure' of a ‘person,' which can take the form of ‘physical force' or a ‘show of authority' that ‘in some way restrain(s) the liberty' of the person.” Torres v. Madrid, 141 S.Ct. 989, 995 (2021) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)). Traffic stops, “even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose,” are “seizures” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore are “subject to the constitutional imperative that (they) not be ‘unreasonable' under the circumstances.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439, 442 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to investigatory traffic stops.”). “A police-initiated traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the police stop the vehicle because of a ‘reasonable suspicion' that the vehicle's occupants have broken a law.” United States v. Hartz, 458 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 543 F.3d 1080, 1087-1088 (9th Cir. 2008). An officer making a traffic stop “must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981); see also United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).

The reasonable suspicion standard is intentionally abstract, and courts are to give “due weight” to the factual inferences drawn by law enforcement officers. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273-77; see also United States v. Edwards, 761 F.3d 977, 983 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Reasonable suspicion ‘is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability,' and ‘(t)he standard takes into account the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture.'”); Hartz, 458 F.3d at 1017 (“Reasonable suspicion exists if ‘specific, articulable facts . . . together with objective and reasonable inferences' suggest that the persons detained by the police are engaged in criminal activity”).

It is the government's burden of establishing the admissibility of evidence obtained without a warrant. See United States v. Shetler, 665 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that in determining whether statements were the product of an illegal search, “(i)t is the government's burden to show that evidence is not ‘fruit of the poisonous tree'”); United States v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that determination of whether evidence was obtained by exploitation of an illegal act focuses on “the causal connection between the illegality and the evidence; and, the burden of showing admissibility rests on the prosecution”); see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984) (where unlawfully obtained information was “critical to establishing probable cause” the exclusionary rule applies).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Officer Munoz had reasonable suspicion to conduct Defendant's traffic stop^[4].

“The standard for determining whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion exists is an...