United States v. Morfin-Rios

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ALEXANDER MORFIN-RIOS, Defendant.

No. 3:18-cr-04997-JAH

United States District Court, S.D. California

July 5, 2023

ORDER: (1) DENYING MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 3582(C)(1)(A)(I); (2) DENYING AS MOOT MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL. (ECF NOS. 37, 40)

JOHN A. HOUSTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Alexander Morfin-Rios (“Defendant” or “Mr Morfin-Rios”), through counsel, filed a Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). (“Mot.”, ECF No. 40). The Government opposed the motion, (“Opp'n”, ECF No. 42), and Defendant replied, (“Reply”, ECF No 43). Defendant thereafter filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority in support of his Motion. (ECF No. 44). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion.

II. BACKGROUND

On February 21, 2019, Defendant pleaded guilty to a one-count Information charging him with Importation of Methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. (“Plea Agreement”, ECF No. 21). At sentencing, this Court sentenced Mr. Morfin-Rios to a mandatory minimum of 120-months in custody, followed by five years of supervised release-thirty-one months lower than the low-end of the Guideline range of 151-188 months. (Tr. June 21, 2019 at 5:12-6:4, ECF No. 39). Defendant is currently incarcerated at FCI Mendota in California, and at the time of this Order, has served approximately 56-months in custody. Defendant's expected release date is October 10, 2026.^[1]

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A court generally may not correct or modify a prison sentence once it has been imposed, unless expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. United States v. Penna, 319 F.3d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 2003). Defendant seeks modification of his sentence under the compassionate release provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as amended by the First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (Dec. 21, 2018). The amendment to § 3582(c)(1)(A) provides prisoners with two direct routes to court: (1) file a motion after fully exhausting all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prison's decision not to bring a motion on defendant's behalf, or (2) file a motion after “the lapse of 30 days from the receipt ... of such a request” by the warden of the defendant's facility, “whichever is earlier.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3852(c)(1)(A).

Thereafter, the Court may determine whether “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and whether “a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. The Court also considers whether a reduction would be consistent with the § 3553(a) factors.

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendant seeks relief on the basis of his unusually long sentence,^[2] his mother's failing health, his rehabilitation, and a combination of these bases. (Mot. at 15).

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

As a threshold matter, the Court must determine whether Defendant has administratively exhausted his claim by first filing a request with the Warden of the Bureau of Prisons. It is the Government's position that a defendant must exhaust with the warden every issue raised in his or her motion to the court. (Opp'n at 4-5). Mr. Morfin-Rios did not request relief on the basis of an “unusually long sentence” to the Warden of FCI Mendota.^[3] (Ex. A, ECF No. 40-1 at 19). Defendant contends that the Government argues in favor of an “issue-exhaustion” requirement, which is inappropriate in light of the plain language of § 3852(c)(1)(A) and recent Supreme Court caselaw. (Reply at 1-2).

The Ninth Circuit has not specifically addressed whether imposing an “issue exhaustion” requirement for § 3582 motions is appropriate, and district courts within this Circuit have not found any unanimity on the matter. Compare United States v. Bakhtiari, No. CR 18-0009 WHA, 2022 WL 1289050 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2022) (finding issue exhaustion is required); and United States v. Narez, No. 1:05-cr-00231-AWI, 2021 WL 5566787 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2021); and United States v. Roueche, No. CR07-344RSL, 2021 WL 2778577 (W.D. Wash. Jul. 2, 2021); with United States v. Sawyers, No. CR 15-00070-RSWL-1, 2021 WL 2581412 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 22, 2021) (finding issue exhaustion is not required); and United States v. Pacarro, No. 15-00704 HG-02, 2020 WL 7344590 (D. Haw. Dec. 14, 2020) (reversed on other grounds).

Presently, the Seventh Circuit is the only circuit court to explicitly address this issue. See United States v. Williams, 987 F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). The court in Williams held that issue exhaustion is prescribed by § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s regulatory scheme and statutory language. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that a finding to the contrary overlooked the purpose of § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement “to provide the Bureau with the information necessary to move for release on a defendant's behalf.” Id. In addition, the Williams court had concerns that rebuffing specific issue exhaustion ignored the “Bureau's regulation requiring an inmate to detail the circumstances warranting his compassionate release.” Id.

The Court finds the reasoning in Williams persuasive. Defendant asserts that the Supreme Court in Sims “ ‘warned against reflexively' applying issue exhaustion to judicial review of agency action.” (Reply at 2 (citing Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110 (2000)). However, “§ 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement more closely resembles the exhaustion requirement in the Prison Litigation Reform Act . . . than the Social Security regulations addressed in Sims. Th[e Prison Litigation Reform] Act requires proper exhaustion of available administrative remedies in order to afford prisons an opportunity to address issues before they are brought to federal court.” Williams, 987 F.3d at 703 (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006); § 1997e(a)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). This interpretation aligns with “good policy . . . [that] allows the government to implement an orderly system for reviewing compassionate-release applications, rather than one that incentivizes line jumping.” United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1282 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 2020)). As such, the Court finds that Mr. Morfin-Rios did not properly exhaust the issue of a sentencing disparity, but properly exhausted the remaining issues submitted to the BOP for consideration. Nonetheless, the Court will discuss the merits of Mr. Morfin-Rios' motion for compassionate release in toto.

B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons Warranting a Sentence Reduction

In support of his Motion, Mr. Morfin-Rios presents two arguments in furtherance of the position that he presents extraordinary and compelling basis for a sentence reduction: (1) the disparity between the sentence received and the sentence that he might have received with Safety Valve; and (2) his mother's failing health and the need to provide support. (See Mot. at 15-25). Each circumstance will be discussed in turn.

1. Mr. Morfin-Rios' Sentence

Mr. Morfin-Rios requests a reduced sentence, arguing the length of his sentence constitutes an extraordinary and compelling circumstance. (Mot. at 8). Mr. Morfin-Rios relies on the Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Lopez, 998 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 2021), (“Lopez”) in support of his proposition. (Id. at 21). Therein, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Safety Valve provision in § 3553(f)(1) to read in the conjunctive-that is, to be ineligible for Safety Valve, a defendant's criminal history must feature all three of the conditions specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C). See Lopez, 998 F.3d at 443 (holding that “§ 3553(f)(1)'s ‘and' is unambiguously conjunctive”). The Government's opposition only dedicates a footnote to address Mr. Morfin-Rios' argument, objecting solely on the basis that Mr. Morfin-Rios did not proffer any information as required for Safety Valve eligibility. (Opp'n at 2, fn.1).

Section 3553(f), commonly called Safety Valve, requires the court to find that-

(1) the defendant does not have-

(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;

(B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1).

At the time Defendant was sentenced in 2019, and before the decision in Lopez, the general understanding and reading of Safety Valve was that it was read in the disjunctive- that is, any of subparagraphs (A), (B), or (C) of § 3553(f)(1) could disqualify a defendant from Safety Valve protection. Therefore, at the time of his sentencing, it was presumed Mr. Morfin-Rios was ineligible for Safety Valve because his three-point assault conviction met the criteria for paragraph (B). Defendant argues that had he been offered Safety Valve, his sentence would have been lower. (Mot. at 24). It is this sentence disparity that Defendant believes constitutes an extraordinary and compelling circumstance under § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Although it is unclear in the Ninth Circuit whether a sentencing disparity can constitute an extraordinary and compelling basis warranting relief, district courts are “ ‘empowered ... to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason for release that a defendant might raise.' ” United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 284 (4th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original). However, even cases where compassionate release has been granted based on sentencing...