United States v. Moses

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. KEON MOSES.

CRIMINAL No. CCB-02-0410-2

United States District Court, D. Maryland

July 10, 2023

MEMORANDUM

Catherine C. Blake, United States District Judge.

Now pending before the court are Keon Moses's motions for compassionate release and for resentencing under Section 404 of the First Step Act. Moses is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release for crimes he committed as a teenager. Given intervening developments in charging practices in this District, judicial discretion in sentencing, and the role of youth in criminal punishment, Moses's sentence is dramatically out of step with the sentence he would face were he sentenced today. Accordingly, the court will grant Moses's motion and modify his sentence to a total term of thirty-five years imprisonment.

BACKGROUND

On October 1, 2003, Moses was charged, alongside two co-defendants, for his role in a drug trafficking organization known as the “Lexington Terrace Boys.” See Third Superseding Indictment, ECF 181. The indictment charged Moses with one count of conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 (Count One); three counts of using a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime resulting in death under 18 U.S.C § 924(j) (Counts Three, Four, and Six); one count of discharge of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Five); and made a special finding that Moses was eligible for the death penalty on Counts Three, Four, and Six. See id. A jury convicted Moses on Counts One Three, Four, Five, and Six. See Jury Verdict, ECF 373; Judgment, ECF 432.^[1]

Moses's convictions stem from his role in the Lexington Terrace Boys, a drug conspiracy known for distributing crack-cocaine in a “six-square-block neighborhood in West Baltimore” known as “Lexington Terrace.” United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 237 (4th Cir. 2007). As a member of the Lexington Terrace Boys, Moses started selling crack-cocaine in the neighborhood's “open-air drug market” as a teenager, with his participation escalating to serious crimes of violence by the time he turned eighteen. See id. at 237-38. The jury convicted Moses on one count of conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine for his participation in the conspiracy, and on even more serious charges for additional violent crimes he committed as a member of the conspiracy.

The first of these crimes, the so-called “Calhoun Street murders,” involved Moses, his codefendant Michael Taylor, and a third Lexington Terrace Boys member, Marcus Baskerville. See id. at 238-240. Moses had for some time been relying on members of a neighboring gang as suppliers, and after Moses “had a falling out” with one of these suppliers, he, Taylor, and Baskerville hatched a plan to rob the suppliers' stash house. Id. at 239.

At the stash house, the Lexington Terrace Boys encountered three members of the supplying gang: Gregory Spain, Ronald Harris, and Charles Brockington. See id. at 238-240. The Lexington Terrace Boys, armed and masked, demanded money, drugs, and guns. Id. at 239. When those demands went unfulfilled, an altercation ensued. See id. The Lexington Terrace Boys ultimately began firing on the suppliers in rapid succession. “Moses shot Spain at least seven times,” killing him. Id. Harris was also shot repeatedly and killed. Id. Taylor shot Brockington in the head and chest, but although Brockington sustained “eight gunshot wounds,” he survived. See id. at 239-40. The jury convicted Moses on two counts of using a firearm in furtherance of a drugtrafficking crime resulting in death and one count of discharging a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime for the Calhoun Street murders.

Moses added to these crimes when he solicited the murder of Robert “Snoop” McManus to prevent McManus from testifying against him in his state trial for the Calhoun Street murders. As a result of those murders, Moses had been arrested on state charges. McManus was a critical witness for the prosecution. See id. at 240. So Moses wrote to Taylor, instructing him to kill McManus. “His statements can hurt me,” Moses wrote, “I don't gotta say it, you know what I mean?” Id. (quoting J.A. 726). Taylor received the letter and, on February 22, 2002, executed McManus. See id. The jury convicted Moses on one count of causing death through use of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime for directing Taylor to kill McManus.

All told, Moses was convicted on four charges-one count of conspiracy and three counts of drug-related killings-and the Government sought the death penalty as punishment for his crimes. After the jury convicted Moses, however, it elected to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release for his death-eligible offenses. See Verdict, April 28, 2004; Sentencing Tr. 31:14-25.^[2] The court sentenced Moses on the remaining counts. All together, Moses received concurrent sentences of life without the possibility of release for drug trafficking (Count One), for the murder of Ronald Harris (Count Three), for the murder of Gregory Spain (Count Four), and for the murder of Robert McManus (Count Six), and ten years consecutive to the preceding counts for the shooting of Charles Brockington (Count Five). See Judgment; Tr. 32:1-24. He was also sentenced to five years of supervised release. See Judgment; Tr. 32:1-24.

Although the court was bound to impose the jury's selected sentence on the death-eligible offenses, it also made clear that it “fully agree[d] with that verdict” because of “the severity of the crimes” Moses had committed. See Tr. 31:18-25.

The court entered Moses's sentence on July 23, 2004, and Moses began seeking postconviction relief around five years later. On March 12, 2009, Moses filed pro se his first motion to vacate his sentence. Mot. to Vacate, ECF 549. The court denied the motion. Order, ECF 582. On December 1, 2014, Moses filed his second pro se motion to vacate. Second Mot. to Vacate, ECF 637. The court denied that motion as well. Order, ECF 650. On September 30, 2020, Moses filed a pro se motion to reduce his sentence under Section 404 of the First Step Act. Mot. for First Step Act Resentencing, ECF 692. A year and a half later, now represented by counsel, Moses filed a motion for compassionate release. Mot. for Compassionate Release, ECF 744. The Government has filed responses opposing Moses's First Step Act and compassionate release motions, see ECFs 722, 749, and Moses filed a reply in support of his motion for compassionate release, see ECF 756. The court now proceeds to the merits of Moses's motions, which are ripe for review.

ANALYSIS

Moses seeks compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) or, in the alternative, resentencing under Section 404 of the First Step Act. Under the compassionate release statute, a court may reduce a movant's sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons” if the reduction is consistent with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Fourth Circuit law permits a district court to “consider any extraordinary and compelling reason for release that a defendant might raise.” See United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 284-86 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Zullo, 976 F.3d 228, 230 (2d. Cir. 2020)). Accordingly, the court may grant a properly presented motion for compassionate release if “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances warrant a sentence reduction and such a reduction is consistent with the § 3553(a) factors.

I. Administrative Exhaustion

At the outset, the court must determine whether Moses's motion for compassionate release is properly before it. Under the compassionate release statute, a petitioner may seek relief in federal court only after “fully exhaust[ing] all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on [their] behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of [their] facility, whichever is earlier.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

The Government argues that Moses has not satisfied this administrative exhaustion requirement for two reasons. First, it contends that the court cannot consider the arguments in this motion because Moses's petition to the Bureau of Prisons sought compassionate release only on the basis of risk of COVID-19 exposure, yet Moses's motion for compassionate release here is predicated on an unwarranted sentencing disparity. See Opp'n to Mot. for Compassionate Release Ex. 1, ECF 749-1. The Fourth Circuit has held, however, “that § 3582(c)(1)(A) does not require issue exhaustion.” See United States v. Ferguson, 55 F.4th 262, 269 (4th Cir. 2022). Accordingly, Moses may appropriately advance arguments in this motion not raised in his original administrative petition. Second, the Government argues that Moses's motion is “untimely” because he “submitted his request for compassionate release in December 2020 and filed the instant Motion fourteen months after receiving his administrative response.” See Opp'n to Mot. for Compassionate Release at 7. The Government cites no authority identifying a statutory deadline for filing a compassionate release motion once administrative remedies have been exhausted, however, and the court is aware of none. As a result, Moses has satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirements and the court may consider the merits of his motion.

II. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons Warranting Relief

A petitioner's sentence presents an extraordinary and compelling basis for relief if they would “likely receive a dramatically lower sentence than the one [they are] currently serving” we...