United States v. Moustrouphis

560 F.Supp.3d 333

UNITED STATES of America,

v.Alex MOUSTROUPHIS, Defendant.

Docket No. 2:19-cr-00177-NT

United States District Court, D. Maine.

Signed September 9, 2021

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS

Nancy Torresen, United States District Judge

Defendant Alex Moustrouphis is charged with two counts of knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine and forty grams or more of a mixture or substance containing fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Superseding Indictment (ECF No. 38). Before me are the Defendant's motions to suppress all evidence seized as a result of two traffic stops. Mot. to Suppress Evid. Generated by June 24, 2019 Automobile Stop and Search (the "June Stop Motion ") (ECF No. 57); Mot. to Suppress Evid. Generated by July 14, 2019 Automobile Stop and Search (the "July Stop Motion ") (ECF No. 58). I held a hearing on the Defendant's motions on August 17, 2021.¹ For the reasons set forth below, I GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART the June Stop Motion and DENY the July Stop Motion.

I. THE JUNE STOP MOTION

BACKGROUND

On June 23, 2019, Officer Benjamin Savage and his sergeant responded to a call that the Defendant was passed out behind the wheel of a car in a parking lot. The sergeant approached the car, but Officer Savage did not interact with the Defendant. Law enforcement ultimately determined that the Defendant was not doing anything illegal and did not issue him any sort of citation. However, after this encounter, Officer Savage checked the Defendant's criminal history and saw that he had had "several drug-related contacts and incidences involving illegal drugs," including a prior drug conviction,² and that he had recently been on "probation"³ for this offense.

The next day, Officer Savage pulled over a Toyota Scion in the Bayside neighborhood of Portland after noticing that the driver was not wearing a seatbelt. Bayside is consistently one of the busiest neighborhoods in Portland in terms of criminal activity and calls to the police.

After making the stop and approaching the car, Officer Savage recognized the Defendant, both from the encounter the day before and also because they had gone to school and driver's education courses together. The Defendant told Officer Savage that his car had been totaled and that the Scion he was driving was a rental car. This was suspicious to Officer Savage because, according to his training and experience, drug traffickers and drug users often use rental cars. Officer Savage also contends that in the course of this interaction, the Defendant appeared nervous and continuously avoided eye contact. However, Officer Savage acknowledged at the hearing that, in the course of the traffic stop as a whole, the Defendant was polite and cooperative, and that during at least some portion of the stop, he stood up straight and was "[f]or the most part" looking at Officer Savage. Officer Savage's cruiser cam video shows that during the first part of the stop, while Officer Savage was back in his cruiser performing license and registration checks, the Defendant had his arm dangling casually out of the driver's side window. After the Defendant was removed from the car and was asked about drugs, the cruiser cam shows that the Defendant became visibly fidgety.

The Defendant provided Officer Savage with his license and the car rental agreement, and Officer Savage also took down the identifying information for the Defendant's passenger, Nicholas Foster. Officer Savage then returned to his cruiser and continued his traffic stop investigation by checking the criminal and traffic history for the Defendant and Mr. Foster. Officer Savage learned that the Defendant had a Westbrook address⁴ and that Mr. Foster was under a protection order and had previously been a suspect in a "Maine Drug Enforcement incident."

Upon learning this information, just over four minutes⁵ into the stop, Officer Savage asked police dispatch whether there were any available narcotics-sniffing K-9s working in South Portland. Dispatch confirmed that there was one and then notified Officer Savage that the K-9 was en route. Approximately seven minutes⁶ into the stop, Officer Savage got back out of his cruiser, re-approached the Scion, and handed the Defendant back the rental agreement and his license. He did not issue the Defendant a ticket for the seatbelt violation that he had earlier observed.

At this point, Officer Savage's traffic investigation had concluded. Officer Savage stated at the hearing that, at this point, he had "totally switched gears"; that he was now "focused on" investigating drug activity rather than a traffic violation; and that he intended to detain the Defendant.

While waiting for the K-9 to arrive, Officer Savage continued this second investigation—his drug investigation—with the help of Officer Cody Forbes. Officer Savage removed the Defendant from the car, informed him that he had summoned the K-9 unit, and asked the Defendant whether he had anything in the car. The Defendant denied that there was anything in the car, and Office Savage asked him to stand on the sidewalk against a wall while he went back to the vehicle to talk to Mr. Foster. As Officer Savage was standing outside the passenger window, he noticed a large knife in the center console of the vehicle. He immediately asked Mr. Foster to exit the vehicle. Officer Savage conducted a pat down of Mr. Foster (with his consent) and found two cell phones. Officer Forbes did the same to the Defendant (again with consent) and found a large amount of cash in various denominations and a presumed meth pipe. Officer Savage concluded that, based on his training and experience, the cell phones and cash were indicative of drug activity.

Approximately nineteen minutes into the stop, the K-9 officer (Officer Stephenson) and his K-9 (Zak) arrived. By this point, Officer Savage believed that he had probable cause to search the Scion, and he communicated that to Officer Stephenson. Close to six minutes later, Zak entered the car. After a few minutes of sniffing, Zak alerted in the area of the center console and the backseat, and the officers began to search the car, where they found two large bags of powder later determined to be methamphetamine. They also found more cash and a digital scale. The officers placed the Defendant and Mr. Foster under arrest.

Officer Forbes subsequently transported the Defendant to Cumberland County Jail. During this trip, Officer Forbes saw the Defendant squirming around in the backseat. After arriving at the jail, Officer Forbes looked in the passenger compartment of his cruiser and saw two bags of powder, which later tested positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

For an investigatory stop to be constitutional, it must be the case that the police officer not only had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the initial stop, but also that the actions undertaken in the course of the stop were "reasonably related in scope to the stop itself" or the police otherwise had "a basis for expanding their investigation." United States v. Dion , 859 F.3d 114, 124 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Ruidíaz , 529 F.3d 25, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2008) ). That is, "a seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution." Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) ; see Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion) ("The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.").

"A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation ... ‘becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation." Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. 348, 350–51, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) (quoting Caballes , 543 U.S. at 407, 125 S.Ct. 834 ). "Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed." Id. at 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609. "In determining the reasonable duration of a stop, ‘it is appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued the investigation.’ " Id. (quoting United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) ).

A dog sniff "is not an ordinary incident of a traffic stop" and "is not fairly characterized as part of the officer's traffic mission" but rather is "aimed at ‘detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.’ " Id. at 355–56, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond , 531 U.S. 32, 41, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000) ). As a result, a dog sniff cannot extend the length of an otherwise-lawful traffic stop. The "critical question," then, is whether conducting the dog sniff adds any time at all to the stop. Id. at 357, 135 S.Ct. 1609.

There is no de minimis exception to the bright-line rule that a traffic stop cannot be prolonged any longer than necessary. See generally id. at 350–53, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (reversing Eighth Circuit's conclusion that a dog sniff that caused only a "seven-or-eight-minute delay" to a traffic stop constituted a de minimis intrusion on the defendant's personal liberty and was thus constitutional), 356–57, 135 S.Ct. 1609. "[A] police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures." Id. at 350, 135 S.Ct. 1609.

This also means that the overall length of the stop is irrelevant—all that matters is whether the stop exceeded the time needed to complete the tasks tied to the traffic infraction (or the time in which such tasks reasonably should have been completed). See id. at 357, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (holding that an officer cannot "earn...