United States v. Murillo-Gonzalez

524 F.Supp.3d 1139

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Epifanio MURILLO-GONZALEZ, also known as Epifanio Gonzales, Defendant.

No. 1:19-cr-00768-JCH-1

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

Filed March 1, 2021

Jason Lloyd Wisecup, US Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff.

Amanda R. Lavin, Public Defender, Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS

JUDITH C. HERRERA, Senior United States District Judge This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Statements and Tangible Evidence, Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 37. The Government responded in opposition, Govt.’s Resp., ECF No. 39, to which Defendant filed a reply, Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 40. The Court held a hearing on the motion on December 3, 2020. The Court, having carefully considered the motion, briefs, record evidence, and relevant law, concludes that the motion will be denied .

I. Factual Findings

The Court makes the following findings of fact, as supported by the record, in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(d). In making its factual findings, the Court heard the testimony of Jorge Casanova, a deportation officer with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), whom the Court finds credible. On the morning of February 16, 2019, Officer Casanova went to execute an administrative warrant to arrest a man named Jose Torres-Mena on suspicion that he was illegally present in the United States. See December 3, 2020 Motion Hearing Transcript (Tr.) 12:9-21; 13:12-14, ECF No. 54. Casanova and other agents surveilled Torres-Mena's suspected residence in Albuquerque. Id. at 15:22-23. As they covertly watched, a pick-up trucked driven by Defendant arrived at the house. Id. at 18:14-15; 20:18. A few minutes later, Torres-Mena exited the house, climbed into the truck's passenger side, and Defendant and Torres-Mena drove off. Id. at 18:14-19.

After driving a few blocks, Casanova and three other officers stopped the truck to serve the warrant on Torres-Mena. Id. at 20:13-15; 37:20. While two officers dealt with detaining Torres-Mena, Officer Casanova spoke with Defendant while the fourth officer stood nearby. Id. at 20:15-18, 21:7-8; 25:14-22; 37:21 – 38:1-5. Casanova explained in English the purpose of the stop. Id. at 21:16 – 22:1-3. Defendant did not understand him, so Casanova switched to Spanish and asked Defendant to step out of the truck and move to the sidewalk, which he did, and to produce driving documents. Id. at 22:5-23:12.

Defendant handed over a New Mexico driver's license and a Mexican consular identification. Id. at 23:12-14. Casanova then asked Defendant where he was from. Id. at 24:7-8. Defendant answered that he was from Mexico. Id. at 24:8-9. Casanova then asked him if he had any authority to be in the county, to which Defendant answered no. Id. at 24:9-11.¹ Casanova also asked Defendant if he had committed any crimes while in the United States, to which he answered that he had committed a drug offense. Id. at 44:17-20.

Casanova then ran the identification documents through police records. Id. at 24:19; 45:9-14. Within a couple of minutes, the records revealed that Defendant was previously deported for a drug crime and unlawfully in the country. Id. at 24:19-25; 26:23-24. Casanova then told Defendant that he was under arrest and placed him in handcuffs. Id. at 28:9; 55:2-5. The time between the initial stop and the arrest was three to four minutes. Id. at 27:19 – 28:1. Casanova told Defendant to remain silent but did not otherwise provide him Miranda warnings. Id. at 28:13-16. He told Defendant that he would "fully Mirandize " him later at a DHS office. Id. at 28:14.

Meanwhile, other officers had completed a search of Torres-Mena that involved searching him for contraband, "getting [his] property ready," and asking Torres-Mena about any medical issues that officers needed to be aware of. Id. 55:8-23. At the time that Casanova determined he would arrest Defendant, other officers had either placed Torres-Mena in a police car or were about to do so. Id. at 55:9-17. The time from Defendant's departure from Torres-Mena's house to when both he and Torres-Mena were handcuffed and placed in a police vehicle occurred within five to eight minutes. Id. at 56:3-6.

Once at the DHS office, Casanova took Defendant's fingerprints and entered them into the IDENT and IAFIS computerized system. Id. 32:1-9. This search showed that Defendant had an "A-File" and "history" with DHS. Id. at 31:9-18; 32:1-18. According to Defendant's motion, a final order for Defendant's removal was issued in 1990 and Defendant had not reapplied for admission into the country since his removal. Def.’s Mot. at 4. Officers Mirandized Defendant for the first time and he gave incriminating answers to questions about his history of immigration violations. Tr. at 29:10 – 30:15.

Defendant was federally charged by criminal complaint and later indicted for reentering the United States despite being a removed alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a), (b). In December 2019, Defendant moved to suppress evidence of his alienage, including his oral and written statements to officers and the contents of his Alien File (A-File), claiming that this evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.

II. Legal Standards

a. Criminal and Immigration Detentions and Arrests

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In general, law enforcement officers must obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before conducting a search or seizure. Kentucky v. King , 563 U.S. 452, 459, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011). "Although ‘the defendant bears the burden of proving whether and when the Fourth Amendment was implicated,’ ... ‘[t]he government then bears the burden of proving that its warrantless actions were justified [by an exception],’ " United States v. Neugin , 958 F.3d 924, 930 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Hernandez , 847 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 2017) ). "If the government establishes that an exception to the warrant requirement applies, the search is constitutional." Neugin , 958 F.3d at 930 (citing United States v. Maestas , 2 F.3d 1485, 1491-92 (10th Cir. 1993) ). Even though Defendant is not a United States citizen, the relevant Fourth Amendment rights apply to him. See Wong Wing v. United States , 163 U.S. 228, 238, 16 S.Ct. 977, 41 L.Ed. 140 (1896).

In the immigration context, immigration officers are authorized by statute "to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1). Accompanying regulations authorize an immigration officer to "briefly detain [a] person for questioning" if the "immigration officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that the person being questioned ... is an alien illegally in the United States." 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(2). "The officer can arrest a suspect without a warrant if the officer has ‘reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of any such law or regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.’ " United States v. Sanchez-Velasco , 956 F.3d 576, 581 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) ).

" ‘Reason to believe’ " means probable cause that the Fourth Amendment requires for a valid arrest." Id. Simply stated, "immigration officers [must] have reasonable suspicion to briefly stop individuals to question them regarding their immigration status and probable cause for any further arrest and detention." Morales v. Chadbourne , 793 F.3d 208, 215 (1st Cir. 2015) ; Medina v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. , No. C17-218-RSM-JPD, 2017 WL 2954719, at *21 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 2017), report and recommendation adopted , No. C17-218 RSM, 2017 WL 1101370 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 24, 2017) ("The lawfulness of an ICE officer's seizure of a non-citizen turns on the familiar principles of reasonable suspicion and probable cause: If an officer detains a person for a brief, investigatory stop, the stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion that the person is an alien illegally in the United States ... and if an officer arrests a person, the arrest must be supported by probable cause that the person is an alien illegally in the United States.") (quotation marks and citations omitted).

b. Miranda Safeguards Under the Fifth Amendment

The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend V. Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) established certain safeguards that must be afforded to suspects, including the right to remain silent and to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation. Under Miranda , "the government may not use any statements stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Any waiver of one's Fifth Amendment under Miranda must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. United States v. Burson , 531 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2008). "The Fifth Amendment protection afforded by the Miranda rule applies to citizens and aliens alike." United States v. Jimenez-Robles , 98 F. Supp. 3d 906, 911 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976) ("Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection.")).

III. Discussion

a. Fourth Amendment Analysis

1. The traffic stop was justified at its inception

Defendant argues that by pulling him over to serve the warrant on his passenger, officers used the initial traffic stop as a pretext to seize Defendant even though officers lacked probable cause or any reasonable,...