United States v. Murray

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. AARON MURRAY, Defendant.

No. 1:15-cr-26

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division

January 12, 2023

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

Susan J. Dlott United States District Court Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Aaron Murray's Motion for Compassionate Release, Addendum to Pro Se Motion for Compassionate Release, and Supplemental Brief in Support of Request for Compassionate Release. (Docs. 162, 169, 181). The United States opposes a compassionate release for Murray. (Doc. 172, 179.) For the reasons that follow, Murray's Motion, Addendum, and Supplemental Brief will be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Murray's Offense and Conviction

On June 3, 2015, Defendant Aaron Murray pled guilty to Counts 1-4 of the Bill of Information and waived indictment. (Doc. 22; Doc. 38.) Count 1 charged Murray with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and 18 U.S.C. § 2, interference with commerce by robbery and aiding and abetting the interference with commerce by robbery, which carried a term of imprisonment of up to twenty years, a fine of $250,000, and supervised release of up to three years. (Doc. 22 at PageID 60.) Count 2 charged Murray with violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, which carried a term of imprisonment of seven years to life to be served consecutive to any sentence on the other counts, a fine of up to $250,000, and supervised release of up to five years. (Id.) Count 3 charged Murray with violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d), armed bank robbery, which carried a term of imprisonment of twenty-five years, a fine of up to $250,000 dollars, and supervised release of up to five years. (Id.) Count 4 charged Murray with violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 924(c)(1)(C)(i), using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, which carried a term of imprisonment of twenty-five years to life to be served consecutive to any sentences on the other counts, a fine of up to $250,000, and supervised release of up to five years. (Id. at PageID 61.) Murray also was required to pay a mandatory special assessment on each count of conviction. (Id.)

Pursuant to the Statement of Facts to which he admitted, on August 17, 2014, Murray along with his co-defendants, Savoy Carpenter and James Crawford, planned and cased the robbery of a Micro Center store in Cincinnati, Ohio. (Id. at PageID 65.) Murray rode with Carpenter to the Micro Center store prior to the commission of the offense, where they mapped out escape routes and finalized the plan for the robbery. (Id.) Murray performed the robbery, and Carpenter was the getaway driver. (Id.)

On August 17, 2014, Murray entered the store during business hours, masked in a red bandana, black hat, and blue zip up hoodie while carrying a firearm. (Id.) He ordered all customers and employees to the ground. (Id.) Murray pointed the firearm at the head of the manager of the store and demanded the manager take him to the safe. (Id.) Upon arriving at the safe, Murray forced the manager to open the safe at gun point and ordered him to remove the money and place it in a bag. (Id.) Once the money was placed in the bag, Murray then fled the store. (Id.) He joined up with Carpenter, and they both fled the scene. (Id.) Recognizing law enforcement was in hot pursuit, Murray and Carpenter abandoned Carpenter's car and ran to a wooded area. (Id. at PageID 66.) Murray and Carpenter then contacted Crawford and requested he come to their rescue. (Id.) Crawford picked up the pair and drove them to safety. (Id.) The total loss sustained by Micro Center as a result of the robbery was $29,259.04. (Id.)

On October 15, 2014, Murray used and brandished a firearm during the commission of the robbery of a Fifth Third Bank in Cincinnati, Ohio. (Id.) The total loss sustained by Fifth Third Bank as a result of this offense was approximately $10,839.00. (Id.)

Murray admits that he executed a written transfer with Demarco Johnson for the Hi-Point C9 9mm, bearing serial number P1734019, which was subsequently used and recovered during the November 7, 2014 Family Dollar robbery committed by Savoy Carpenter. (Id. at PageID 66-67.)

On May 9, 2016, Murray was sentenced to 60 months of imprisonment on Count 2, 240 months of imprisonment on Count 4, to be served consecutively, and 1 day of imprisonment on Counts 1 and 3 to be served concurrently with all other counts. (Doc. 71.) Murray is currently incarcerated at FCI Beckley and his projected release date is July 13, 2036. See Federal BOP, Find an Inmate, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last viewed 1/4/2023).

B. Motion for Compassionate Release

On May 27, 2020, Murray requested compassionate release from the Warden of FCI Beckley. (Doc. 162 at PageID 1012-1015.) On January 27, 2021, Murray filed a pro se motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Doc. 162.) His attorney filed an Addendum to his Pro Se Motion for Compassionate Release on May 3, 2021. (Doc. 169.) The Government responded in opposition. (Doc. 172.) On July 27, 2021, the Court issued an order holding Murray's motion in abeyance pending the outcome of a similar case then on appeal with the Sixth Circuit. (Doc. 173.) That case was dismissed, however, and the Court lifted the abeyance on January 10, 2022. (Doc. 177.) The Court also directed the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding Murray's compassionate release in light of its ruling denying Murray's co-defendant, Savoy Carpenter, compassionate release. (Id.) The Government filed a Response brief (Doc. 179), and Murray filed a Supplemental Brief adopting Carpenter's Motion to Reconsider. (Doc. 181.)

II. STANDARD OF LAW

Murray seeks a reduction in his sentence, otherwise known as compassionate release, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Section 3582(c) provides as follows:

The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that-

(1) in any case-

(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that-

(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Where, as here, a defendant has exhausted administrative remedies, the district court must (1) determine whether “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a reduction and (2) weigh the relevant sentencing factors listed in § 3553(a). United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1101, 1108 (6th Cir. 2020).^[1] “Congress did not define what constitutes an ‘extraordinary and compelling reason,' except to state that ‘[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.'” United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 561 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(t)), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 2771 (2022). Courts generally have discretion to define what constitutes “extraordinary and compelling” reasons. Id. Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit recognizes two restrictions on that discretion:

First, non-retroactive changes in the law, whether alone or in combination with other personal factors, are not “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction. Second, facts that existed when the defendant was sentenced cannot later be construed as “extraordinary and compelling” justifications for a sentence reduction.

Id. at 562; see also United States v. McCall, No. 21-3400, __ F.4th __, 2022 WL 17843865, at *15 (6th Cir. Dec. 22, 2022) (en banc) (resolving intra-Circuit split by holding that “[n]onretroactive legal developments do not factor into the extraordinary and compelling analysis”). More generally, the Sixth Circuit has emphasized that extraordinary and compelling reasons must be “unusual, rare, and forceful” as opposed to “ordinary and routine.” McCall, 2022 WL 17843865, at *6 (internal citation and quotation omitted).

The § 3553 factors referenced in the statute include (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the defendant's history and characteristics; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense; (3) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; (4) the sentencing guideline range and (5) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553. These factors implicitly allow the Court to consider the amount of time served when determining if a reduction in sentence is appropriate. See United States v. Kincaid, 802 Fed.Appx. 187, 188 (6th Cir. 2020). Also, district courts can consider the nonretroactive changes in law relevant to compelling reasons” without reference to the policy statement in § 1B1.13. Id. at 1111; United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519-520 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2021). sentencing as part of its weighing of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See Hunter, 12 F.4th at 568-569. District courts are encouraged to be “explicit and particular with...